2002 World Congress of Environmental and Resource Economists

The article describes climate change international negotiations. These negotiations concern two coalitions (DC and O.E.C.D. countries) and two cases are studied: one case in which negotiations remain bilateral and one case with a scission within the DC coalition. We also suppose an existing asymmetric information in favour of DC We show that even if the co-operation of all countries is a possible equilibrium, it does only happen under specific conditions. In the case of negotiations without scission, the existence of asymmetric information is a sufficient condition to favour the failure of negotiations. Whether there is a possibility of scission or not, co-operation may be only partial. However, a global agreement may be signed even if the probability of such an issue is higher if a scission is not possible than if a scission may occur.



	Paper Title:	Possibility Of Scission In The Climate Change Negotiations
	Presenting Author:	Christophe Pereau (university of marne la vallee)
	Coauthor 1:	Sandrine Mathy
	Coauthor 2:	Tarik Tazdait
	Coauthor 3:
	Abstract:	The article describes climate change international negotiations. These negotiations concern two coalitions (DC and O.E.C.D. countries) and two cases are studied: one case in which negotiations remain bilateral and one case with a scission within the DC coalition. We also suppose an existing asymmetric information in favour of DC We show that even if the co-operation of all countries is a possible equilibrium, it does only happen under specific conditions. In the case of negotiations without scission, the existence of asymmetric information is a sufficient condition to favour the failure of negotiations. Whether there is a possibility of scission or not, co-operation may be only partial. However, a global agreement may be signed even if the probability of such an issue is higher if a scission is not possible than if a scission may occur.
	Link to paper:	Not available

	Session / Day / Time	2A / Monday / 10:15 - 11:45 am

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