| Paper Title: |
On The Quality Of Compliance Mechanisms In The Kyoto Protocol |
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| Presenting Author: | Andries Nentjes (University of Groningen) | ||
| Coauthor 1: | Ger Klaassen | ||
| Coauthor 2: | |||
| Coauthor 3: | |||
| Abstract: |
In this paper we evaluate the compliance mechanisms agreed in Marakesh on the Kyoto Protocol. We differ from the literature since we concentrate on the complete set of compliance rules agreed in Marakesh and, as a new element, we systematically discuss these compliance incentives in conjunction with the implicit compliance incentives: reputation protection, emission trading and banking. We conclude that three compliance incentives show a trade off between effectiveness and efficiency: emission trading improves efficiency at the cost of effectiveness whereas the 90 per cent commitment period reserve rule and the 1.3 restoration rate improve effectiveness at a loss of efficiency. The other informal incentives (reputation protection, banking) and formal mechanisms (early reduction rule, suspension of eligibility to transfer and compliance action plan) improve effectiveness and either improve efficiency or do not lower it.
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| Link to paper: | Not available | ||
| Session / Day / Time | 2A / Monday / 10:15 - 11:45 am | ||
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