| Paper Title: |
Strategic Dimensions Of Multi-Greenhouse Gas International Agreements |
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| Presenting Author: | Stephane De Cara (Iowa State University) | ||
| Coauthor 1: | Gilles Rotillon | ||
| Coauthor 2: | |||
| Coauthor 3: | |||
| Abstract: |
We examine the influence of the multi-pollutants nature of climate change on the stability of international agreements. We first use an analytical two-stage game model to assess the superiority of comprehensive over single-gas approaches. Pollution results from two gases, which differ in their environmental impact and their abatement cost. Two kinds of agreements are examined: 'single-gas agreements' (one pollutant is neglected in international negotiations) and 'comprehensive agreements' (the treaty encompasses the two pollutants). Necessary and sufficient conditions of existence of stable agreements are given. Our main result shows that comprehensive agreements are more likely to emerge than single-gas agreements. In the second part of the paper, we conduct simulations to assess the influence of the heterogeneity among countries. The world is divided into eight regions and we account for carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and carbon sequestration. These simulations confirm the superiority of comprehensive approaches, insofar as stable agreements are more likely to exist.
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| Link to paper: | Not available | ||
| Session / Day / Time | 2A / Monday / 10:15 - 11:45 am | ||
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