Paper Title:

The Role Of Liability, Regulation And Economic Incentives In Brownfield Remediation And Redevelopment: Evidence From Surveys Of Developers In Europe And The U.S.

Presenting Author: Anna Alberini (Univ. of Maryland)
Coauthor 1: Alberto Longo
Coauthor 2: Peter Meyer
Coauthor 3: Stefania Tonin
Abstract:
We examine the attractiveness of different market-based mechanisms and other incentives intended to promote the environmental remediation and reuse of “brownfields,”--“abandoned, idled or underused industrial and commercial properties where real or perceived contamination complicates expansion or redevelopment.” We use a conjoint choice experiment to study the responses of real estate developers engaged in infill (rebuilding on abandoned lands or utilizing underused sites in already urbanized areas) to different mixes of these incentives. Respondents—selected to be representative of developers in the US and Europe—are asked to indicate which they believe is the more attractive between two real estate redevelopment projects described by site attributes and a policy mix. Conditional logit models are estimated to find out which attributes of a site and economic or regulatory incentive developers are sensitive to, and which ones are not deemed attractive.
Link to paper: Not available
Session / Day / Time 2B / Monday / 10:15 - 11:45 am
   
 
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