2002 World Congress of Environmental and Resource Economists

The paper develops a theory that explains why institutional design, equity, and flexibility are crucial elements for the success of climate negotiations (the formation of an effective and stable coalition). The paper then uses some well-known climate models to provide an empirical assessment of the impact of different institutional designs, equity rules, and flexible policies on the size and structure of a climate-agreement coalition. The paper will conclude with reflections based on the latest rounds of climate negotiations.



	Paper Title:	Equity, Flexibility And Institutions In Climate Change Negotiations: Theory And Experience
	Presenting Author:	Carlo Carraro (University of Venice)
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	Coauthor 2:
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	Abstract:	The paper develops a theory that explains why institutional design, equity, and flexibility are crucial elements for the success of climate negotiations (the formation of an effective and stable coalition). The paper then uses some well-known climate models to provide an empirical assessment of the impact of different institutional designs, equity rules, and flexible policies on the size and structure of a climate-agreement coalition. The paper will conclude with reflections based on the latest rounds of climate negotiations.
	Link to paper:	Not available

	Session / Day / Time	11B / Wednesday / 2:15 - 4:15 pm

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