Fishing Quota Markets
|Presenting Author:||Richard Newell (Resources for the Future)|
|Coauthor 1:||James Sanchirico|
|Coauthor 2:||Suzi Kerr|
Fisheries worldwide continue to suffer from the negative consequences of open access. In 1986, New Zealand responded by establishing an individual transferable quota (ITQ) system that by 1998 included 33 species, creating more than 150 distinct markets for fishing quota. We assess the functioning of these markets in terms of trends in market activity and price dispersion, and the fundamentals determining quota prices. We find that market activity is sufficiently high to support a competitive market and that price dispersion has decreased over time. We also find evidence of economically rational behavior through the relationship between quota lease and sale prices and measures of fishing value, ecological variability, and market interest rates. Controlling for these factors, our results show a significant increase in quota prices, consistent with increased profitability. Overall, the results suggest these markets are operating reasonably well, implying that ITQs can be effective instruments for efficient fisheries management.
|Link to paper:||http://weber.ucsd.edu/~carsonvs/papers/842.pdf|
|Session / Day / Time||11G / Wednesday / 2:15 - 4:15 pm|
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