2002 World Congress of Environmental and Resource Economists

Stakeholder negotiation is becoming an increasingly important policymaking tool for resolving environmental problems. However, relatively little is understood about the relationship between the structure of the negotiating process and the effectiveness with which participating stakeholders can pursue their indiviudal interests. Inthis paper we apply the Rausser-Simon multilateral bargaining model to a specific negotiation process, involving water storage capacity and use in the upper part of the Adour Basin in south-western France. The richness of the data and institutional information available to us provides a realistic environment in which to examine the effect of negotiation structure on participant power. We focus in particular onthe three farmer stakeholder groups, whose interests are aligned but distinct, and so form a natural negotiating coalition. We construct experiments that enable us to evaluate the effects of negotiation structure on the effectiveness of this coalition.



	Paper Title:	Structure And Power In Multilateral Negotiations: An Application To French Water Policy
	Presenting Author:	Leo Simon (U.C Berkeley)
	Coauthor 1:	Rachael Goodhue
	Coauthor 2:	Gordon C Rausser
	Coauthor 3:	Sylvie Morardet
	Abstract:	Stakeholder negotiation is becoming an increasingly important policymaking tool for resolving environmental problems. However, relatively little is understood about the relationship between the structure of the negotiating process and the effectiveness with which participating stakeholders can pursue their indiviudal interests. Inthis paper we apply the Rausser-Simon multilateral bargaining model to a specific negotiation process, involving water storage capacity and use in the upper part of the Adour Basin in south-western France. The richness of the data and institutional information available to us provides a realistic environment in which to examine the effect of negotiation structure on participant power. We focus in particular onthe three farmer stakeholder groups, whose interests are aligned but distinct, and so form a natural negotiating coalition. We construct experiments that enable us to evaluate the effects of negotiation structure on the effectiveness of this coalition.
	Link to paper:	http://weber.ucsd.edu/~carsonvs/papers/999.pdf

	Session / Day / Time	11I / Wednesday / 2:15 - 4:15 pm

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