

# Territorial Decentralization and Civil War Settlements<sup>1</sup>

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Political decentralization along territorial lines is emerging as a key element in contemporary civil war settlements. In Bosnia, the Dayton Agreement rests on a new federal structure to build the peace. In Kosovo, the Western powers used force against Serbia ostensibly to restore regional autonomy for the ethnic Albanians. In the Philippines, state leaders experimented with territorial autonomy as a solution to the decades-old conflict in Mindanao. And in Ethiopia, the Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front established an ethnically-based federal structure after assuming power from the hegemonic regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam. Territorial decentralization now appears to be an institution of first resort for domestic or international actors in their attempts to bring peace to war-torn societies.<sup>2</sup>

Territorial decentralization is supported by peacemakers because it recognizes the political and spatial realities on the ground, especially the division of territory won on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. By granting each group a state-within-a-state, peacemakers aim to mitigate fears of political exploitation and inter-group violence and, at least in part, to satisfy local demands for cultural and religious autonomy. At the same time, decentralization maintains existing external borders, and thus does not challenge the principle of territorial integrity central to contemporary notions of sovereignty (see Zacher 2001). In short, decentralization is believed to address the political insecurities and desire for self-determination that lead to conflict while respecting the principle that, if at all possible, sovereignty should not be dismantled.

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<sup>1</sup> We are grateful to Philip G. Roeder, the other participants in this project, and an anonymous reader for comments.

<sup>2</sup> Territorial decentralization allocates authority over policy domains to different sub-national governmental entities that are, themselves, defined in terms of territory, with municipalities, provinces, and the central government each responsible for different services and policy domains. As mechanisms of representation, these layers also structure the aggregation of interests, defining how lower level political communities are represented at the political center. We prefer the term territorial decentralization to the more common word “federalism” because it is more generic. Federalism is a de jure form of territorial decentralization explicitly organized into a fixed number of levels of government, whereas territorial decentralization can be de facto and vary in the number of levels by policy area. On federalism and decentralization more generally as intermediate forms of political hierarchy, see Riker (1964), Elazar (1998), Rector (2003), and Lake (2003).

We argue in this chapter that, in the short run, territorial decentralization can be a valuable tool in the transition to peace because it can serve as a costly signal of moderation by the political majority and, when offered, can help allay minority fears about its likely treatment in the future.<sup>3</sup> The evidence presented by Matthew Hoddie and Caroline Hartzell in the previous chapter underscores this role in the negotiation of peace settlements. Yet, it is not decentralization itself that mitigates conflict, we stress, but the *offer of decentralization* that reveals information about the moderate intentions of the majority.

More generally, we question the longer-term viability of this short-term solution-- particularly, once the primary task has shifted from initiating a transition from civil war to consolidating the peace. On the one hand, there are few successful cases of actual implementation of territorial decentralization after civil wars to substantiate the high hopes of contemporary proponents. Although Hoddie and Hartzell find several instances of provisions for territorial powersharing in peace settlements, we find no evidence of successful institutionalization of these provisions in any post-war constitutional order. Recent experiments should be regarded as just that—experiments with unknown outcomes. On the other hand, drawing on evidence from most nearly comparable cases, we expect that the conditions for successful territorial decentralization are extremely limited, casting doubt upon the likely future of present efforts. As peace settlements are implemented over an extended time horizon, the trend is likely to be toward greater political centralization, even in cases where some form of decentralization is initially used as a costly signal of majority intent. Peace consolidates majority power and, over time, this group (or coalition of groups) uses its political strength to centralize state authority and resources into its own hands. Alternatively, the political minority group, fearing the consequences of centralization, may continue to push for full independence, and the possibility of ongoing or renewed violence persists. In this trajectory, stability returns only with

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<sup>3</sup> The terms “majority” and “minority” are used loosely to refer not to absolute numbers of individuals in each group but, respectively, to groups that hold power at the political center and those that do not.

secession and separation. In this event, conflict is quite likely to become internationalized. Territorial decentralization is likely to prove a stable and effective long term solution only under an extraordinary conjunction of conditions--where multiple groups cohabit the same national space, none can achieve decisive control over the state, each is led by moderates willing to accept the desires of others for cultural, linguistic, and religious autonomy, and democracy is robust. These conditions are unlikely to be present at the end of contemporary civil wars. We cannot point to any case of clear-cut success in the years since 1945, demonstrating just how rare is successful territorial decentralization after a major civil war.

External actors can play either a positive or negative role in promoting territorial decentralization. Whether they be states, international organizations, or private actors, advocates of decentralization can help the cause of peace settlements only when a mutually hurting stalemate creates incentives to negotiate and when the warring parties are prepared to divide state power on an autonomous basis. In this case, external advocates reinforce the decentralization of power likely to be agreed upon by the parties themselves. Here, sanctions against violators of agreements or the deployment of external peacekeepers can facilitate political stability, but they cannot create stable decentralization by themselves. Conversely, for reasons we develop, placing too much pressure on groups to decentralize can be counterproductive. When the warring factions perceive themselves as relatively stronger, and each retains some hope of success on the battlefield, insisting upon political decentralization is likely to promote continued violence. The stronger party, with greater prospects of victory, will welcome external efforts to preserve the shell of the unified state—one that they are likely to organize and control with time. Here, the external advocates of peace and political decentralization become, perhaps unwittingly, the de facto allies of the more powerful actor group – but one that could not, nonetheless, achieve mastery of a unified state on its own. The weaker party, with fewer prospects of victory but greater fears of exploitation over time, will be spurred on to new and heightened efforts in the conflict, either to extract a better deal at the

negotiating table (i.e., even greater autonomy, more effective safeguards against centralization, a preferred formula for allocating resources, and so forth) or to obtain complete independence. Under these circumstances, the external advocates of decentralization may further an enduring partition or, if conflict becomes endemic, act against the long run interests of the very parties (commonly minorities) they are ostensibly trying to help.

Throughout this chapter the dependent variable is the success—that is, adoption and durability—of territorial decentralization as an institutional arrangement that is increasingly being pressed on states seeking to initiate a transition from civil war to peace. This chapter proceeds in four main steps. First, we examine the historical record since 1945. Since we find no cases of territorial decentralization following a civil war, we turn to states “born decentralized” as most nearly comparable cases and identify two standard trajectories for the subsequent development of these experiments with territorial decentralization in ethnically divided societies—the first toward greater centralization, the second toward disintegration. Second, we explain why parties to a civil war might agree to decentralization at the end of a civil war, by examining both the short-term role of decentralization in transitions to peace and the longer-term benefits of decentralization in creating more efficient government. Third, we explore three political dilemmas of institution-building in divided or post-conflict countries and explain why decentralization in ethnically divided societies tends to be an unstable arrangement that typically ends in either centralization or fragmentation. Fourth, we analyze the implications of our arguments for current policy.

### **I. The Fate of Territorial Decentralization**

To focus our discussion and motivate the inquiry in the rest of this chapter, we begin with two striking empirical regularities. First, since 1945, warring factions have never realized full political decentralization along territorial lines as part of a civil war settlement. There have been approximately 55 civil wars since 1945 that have reached a successful settlement, either by the

decisive victory of one side over the other or through a negotiated agreement. As Table 1 shows, in no case has full territorial decentralization been implemented with the peace.

*Table 1 About Here*

There have been nine instances of partial or semi-decentralized institutions being constructed after a war, but the majority of these cases come from the late 1980s or early 1990s and it may still be too early to assess their long term effect. There is also the case of Bosnia, excluded from the table because it is not covered in the sources from which we draw the data. Significantly, its new federal institutions were imposed from outside, reflecting more the current emphasis of the international community on territorial decentralization rather than any belief among the warring factions that federalism as a system of shared power is likely to produce a viable state over the long run.

The absence of any implemented decentralization accord should make all of us skeptical of federalism as a panacea for implementing durable peace after civil wars. There is simply no basis in the historical record to judge whether territorial decentralization is a possible foundation upon which to build stable post-civil war relations. Indeed, given the absence of attempts to create full territorial decentralization after civil wars, it suggests that the warring parties may know something that policy enthusiasts in the West have yet to learn.

Second, territorial decentralization is an extremely fragile political institution that, even when tried outside a civil war, is often quickly abandoned by dominant political groups and regions in favor of centralization and by weaker political groups and regions in favor of full political autonomy or secession. Most commonly, central governments quickly increase their power at the expense of regions and groups within the state. Less frequently, central governments unravel, ultimately leading to the disintegration of the state and the fracturing of the national territory into several sovereign pieces—each of which then tries, when possible, to centralize political authority within its own domain.

Given the absence of cases of territorial decentralization, it is difficult for us to validate some of our positive claims below on the conditions for successful decentralization. The determinants of success cannot be known without significant achievements to draw upon. As a result, we turn to the most nearly comparable cases of new states and ethnically divided states. Even in the absence of a civil war, however, we find territorial decentralization to be a fleeting institution.

Table 2 lists all countries that either possessed decentralized institutions as of 1815 or adopted such institutions at the time they were first created. Presumably, there was something about the size of the country, the political interests at stake, the ethnic diversity, or the nature of other political institutions that made territorial decentralization particularly attractive to the founders of these states. One can infer, therefore, that decentralization would be especially likely to succeed in these cases. Of the countries that were “born” decentralized, only half—including Australia, Czechoslovakia, India, the United States—maintained this form for more than 20 years. For the others, decentralization proved ephemeral. Argentina, Nigeria, Pakistan, Venezuela and other early decentralizers either moved steadily toward a more centralized posture or cycled from one form to the other and back again. Only one country, Malaysia, successfully moved from the semi-decentralized (at time of its “birth”) to the decentralized category. Even under what might be regarded as the most conducive circumstances, territorial decentralization proves to be unstable.

*Table 2 About Here.*

Decentralization also moves in the opposite direction, not toward greater centralization but unraveling into separation and secession. Table 3 identifies decentralized states with strong secessionist movements that subsequently disintegrated. This is not a full sample of all decentralized states, nor does it compare secessionism in decentralized and centralized systems. As a result, we cannot evaluate the propensity of decentralized states to disintegrate relative to centralized states. But the table does illustrate clearly the second trajectory. Decentralized states

that do not consolidate tend to disintegrate into multiple states, which are—in a way consistent with our first trajectory—then more unified.

*Table 3 About Here.*

Although the empirical regularities are striking, specific cases illustrate the two trajectories more concretely. South Africa has followed the first and more well-tread path of increasing centralization. In the transition to majority rule, African National Congress negotiators made concessions on the powers of the provincial authorities to secure minority (Inkatha Freedom Party, and Afrikaner Volksfront) support for the 1993 draft constitution. Legislative and executive authorities were established in the nine provinces and, within the limits set by the central legislature, given power to levy taxes and surcharges. Although the central government had overriding legal competence and financial capacity, the provincial legislatures were nonetheless vested with the authority to make laws for their provinces in such fields as agriculture, health services, housing, public transport, roads, tourism, and traditional authorities. The precise responsibilities of the provincial assemblies were left over until after the transfer of power and were to be determined by an elected, majority government. This procedure opened up the possibility of future controversy on this issue. At that time, ANC negotiators did hold out an olive branch to their opponents, indicating that they were prepared to negotiate over additional powers and increased representation in the central legislature (Rothchild 1997, 56-57).

With the move to majority government, the ANC, concerned mainly with responding to the legitimate claims of its constituents for greater economic and political opportunities, played down the issues of full federalism and minority safeguards. Although a number of responsibilities were in fact transferred to the provincial authorities, the central government maintained control through its dominant position in the areas of taxation and grant disbursement. Inkatha leader Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, who headed the government in KwaZulu-Natal, recognized the trend toward centralization, and therefore insisted that the final constitution give the provincial governments “significant powers” (*Africa Research Bulletin*, April 1-30, 1995,

11822). Some indication of what he meant by this emerged several months later, when the hard-line IFP members at a constitutional affairs committee called for exclusive powers over all constitutional, legislative, judicial, police and financial matters in the province, as well as the creation of a provincial army, “with the right to refuse intervention in the province by the South African National Defense Force” (*Africa Research Bulletin*, September 1-30, 1995, 11987). The dispute was ultimately brought before the Constitutional Court in September 1996. In a separate ruling on this matter, the Court refused to approve the provincial constitution drawn up by the KwaZulu-Natal legislature, contending that it far exceeded the powers that the provincial legislature could rightfully claim (*Africa Research Bulletin*, September 1-30, 1996, 12397). Buthelezi continued to fight a rearguard action, threatening to call for international mediation on the issue; however, the Constitutional Assembly approved the final constitution and the trajectory toward centralization became clear for all to see.

This same pattern of increasing centralization is found throughout the developing world. In Ghana and Kenya at the time that independence approached, for example, the dominant parties reluctantly agreed to quasi-federal compromises in an effort to allay minority misgivings and to smooth the way to decolonization. Then, with independence in hand, they quickly dismantled the concessions on regional autonomy and centralized political control over their societies (Rothchild and Curry 1978). In fact, there have been precious few examples of successful decentralization since World War II; most countries seem unable to defy the seemingly inexorable forces pushing them toward greater centralization.<sup>4</sup> Certainly Indian, Nigerian, and Ethiopian federalism stand out as exceptions in the developing world, but it is important to stress that these are still relatively centralized forms of government that are marked by considerable central-state control over revenue extraction and allocation. The successes of Nigeria and Ethiopia in maintaining federalism, moreover, do not conceal the same tendencies seen elsewhere toward the aggregation of power (particularly in regard to fiscal politics) by the

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<sup>4</sup> On the generally pessimistic prospects for decentralization, see Mawhood 1984.

political center (Suberu 2001, 44, 56; Keller and Smith forthcoming). In India, under the Congress party, the highly circumscribed autonomy granted to the sub-units—often termed quasi-federalism (Verney 1995)—was whittled down to some extent by constitutional interpretations and political practices.

Illustrating the second trajectory, a territorially decentralized Yugoslavia under intense ethnonationalist pressures was unable to make the transition to a united and democratic state, and splintered into pieces after 1989. Led by a former communist ruler, Josip Broz Tito, this state was federal in form but unitary in practice. Under the 1974 constitution, the state devolved limited political powers to the six republics and two autonomous provinces. Interregional conflicts took place largely behind the scenes, especially at the central cabinet level where representatives of the main nationality groups met behind closed doors to advance their interests and those of their constituents. "The result of this *de facto* confederalisation was a weakening of central federal power" (Vejvoda 1996, 15).

This federal-type relationship survived as long as Tito managed the hegemonic exchange relationship (Rothchild 1986). With his death in 1980, however, the centrifugal forces at work increased and the hold of the center weakened noticeably. As the republics became more and more identified with their heartland nationality group and their administrations and party organizations gained separate ethnoregional identities, the glue uniting Yugoslavia cracked. Assisted by international recognition, the leaders of the separate republics moved in the early 1990s to assert their political autonomy and independence. Elections at the republic level facilitated this process of separation, bringing strong and determined leaders to power who emphasized the interests of their republics at the expense of the Yugoslav federation (Cohen 1995, 163).

National and regional pressures also triumphed over federal ties in the former Soviet Union. In an effort to restructure the USSR in the 1988 to 1991 period, Mikhail Gorbachev, then secretary-general of the Communist party, initiated a series of reforms that devolved greater

powers to the fifteen union republics. This effort at political liberalization provided an opening for new nationalist demands for political autonomy. "Insisting that Soviet federalism be reformulated," Gail Lapidus and Edward Walker write (1995, 80), "political elites in the fifteen union republics grew increasingly assertive in their demands for greater autonomy from Moscow and centralized Soviet power." With Gorbachev unable to react to this deteriorating situation in an effective manner, the federation fragmented and the fifteen union republics became sovereign states in 1991. As was the case with Yugoslavia, federal ties proved no match for nationalist and regionalist pressures in the former Soviet Union, although elite responses to state deterioration were to prove less contested and therefore less violent in the breakup of the Soviet Union. What is most revealing in terms of the trajectory set out in this chapter is that the process of disintegration did not stop with the breakup of the Soviet Union. Shortly after the Russian republic declared its sovereignty, various autonomous republics within the Russian Federation, including Tartarstan, Checheno-Ingushetia, North Ossetia, and Tyva, called for a further devolution of sovereign powers and, in some cases, for full independence (Lapidus and Walker 1995, 81-84).

A trajectory of disintegration was also evident in federations in developing countries. Despite apparent success in crafting a structure of ethnic federalism in contemporary Ethiopia, the autonomy left to the provinces under the federal relationship still did not dissuade the Eritreans from using the opportunity of a referendum to go their separate way and become a sovereign state. In post-independence Sudan and Pakistan, leaders at the political center, deeply concerned over their loss of control over events in the periphery, took military action in an effort to strengthen the federations' capacity for governance. In both cases, regionalist leaders resisted these efforts to enhance the influence of the federation and brutal warfare ensued. In Pakistan, the regionalist conflict had greater finality, for the country of Bangladesh seceded and gained international recognition. Within what remained of the Pakistani federation, on the other hand, the trajectory was toward a high degree of central control and Punjabi domination (Burki 1996;

Etienne 1994; Ali 1995). The civil war in the Sudan is an ongoing one from which no formula of accommodation—including a redesigned federation or separate sovereignties—seems a satisfactory outcome (Danforth 2002). Although the Sudan government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army did accept a framework agreement in 2004, they appeared to deadlock in the following months regarding a comprehensive peace agreement, an impasse possibly explained by Northern fears that success in the negotiations with the South might contribute to a further upsurge in demands in Darfur and other Northern enclaves and by increasing uncertainties in the South that the Sudan government would honor its future commitments (*Africa Research Bulletin*, May 1-31, 2004, 15770).

Territorial decentralization has never been implemented after a civil war. In new states and ethnically divided societies, in turn, decentralization has been unstable, leading either to centralized power or continued secessionism. Alone and together, these empirical regularities bode poorly for current experiments with territorial decentralization. The federal compromise adopted under the Dayton Accords in Bosnia is very fragile; the Bosnia Serbs, in particular, reject federalism and desire to become part of greater Serbia. After peacekeeping forces withdraw, the Bosnian government must consider either centralizing political authority and asserting control over its disputatious republics or accepting separation. The attempt by the United States and Europe to create regional autonomy within Yugoslavia for Kosovo is also likely to fail. That the dominant ethnic Albanian majority in the province will, at some future date, vote for continued autonomy within Serbia seems fanciful. The choice today is between recentralization of authority under Serbian rule or complete independence for Kosovo. The maintenance of a compromise on regional autonomy over the long term is the least likely outcome of this tragic conflict.

## **II. The (Potential) Benefits of Decentralization**

Territorial decentralization is not an end in itself but is employed by societies around the globe and recommended for many more, because it is viewed as an effective means of sustaining the territorial integrity of the state while permitting minorities greater autonomy over cultural, economic, and social policies of intense concern. Territorial decentralization should benefit both the political majority, who gain from a unified state, and the political minority, who desire greater local control over important issues. These are what we refer to as the long-term benefits of decentralization. In addition, territorial decentralization can in the immediate aftermath of civil war serve as a costly signal of moderation by the majority. In this way, offers of territorial decentralization, if not decentralization itself, can contribute to the acceptance of peace accords. This costly signal is the short-term benefit of decentralization. We take up the long- and short-term benefits in this order.

### **The Long Term Benefits of Territorial Decentralization**

A central building block of our analysis in this chapter is that decentralization is at least as efficient as unitary states—and typically more efficient—in translating the preferences of citizens into effective public policy. It is also at least as efficient—and, again, typically more so—than division into separate sovereign states. “In principle,” as Bolton et. al. (1996, 698) conclude in a survey of the relevant literature, “any decentralization that is achieved with multiple nations could be replicated within a federal state by implementing the desired degree of subsidiarity.” In short, anything that a centralized state or multiple individual states can do, decentralization can do equally well if not better. Any rules or interactions that can be constructed within a single, centralized state or between independent states can be duplicated in a decentralized political system, but decentralized systems can produce welfare gains that are impossible in the alternatives. As a result, decentralization is a more efficient mechanism for

organizing politics and delivering goods and services that satisfy the needs and wants of citizens.<sup>5</sup>

Decentralization facilitates the efficient production of public goods in three ways. First, decentralization allows each good or service to be produced at its optimal scale. Defense from foreign predation, for instance, is typically characterized by large economies of scale: as area increases more rapidly than borders, it is often cheaper (per capita) to defend a larger rather than smaller territory (Bean 1973). Under many circumstances, then, the optimal area in which the good “security” can be produced is relatively large, at least compared to other public goods. Protection against fires, on the other hand, typically possesses small economies of scale: the good “protection” declines rapidly with distance from fire stations. Thus, where national defense appears properly located at the level of the central government, fire safety is most appropriately achieved at the local level (Stevens 1993, 332).<sup>6</sup> There is no particular reason to assume that all public services are produced best at the same scale by a single political entity with a fixed and limited territory.

Second, decentralization allows for a closer fit between policy and the preferences of citizens for different public goods.<sup>7</sup> A central problem for all governments is that public goods are, in fact, public; that is, a single good is produced that all citizens consume. By disaggregating the single countrywide basket of public services, decentralization permits individuals with heterogeneous preferences to pick and choose from a diverse array the particular services that best suit their needs and brings policy into closer conformity with citizen demands. Often the rationale that underlies the claim to autonomy by the minority, decentralization can benefit the majority as well if individual preferences are not entirely homogenous.

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<sup>5</sup> If local autonomy is valued for its own sake, and valued highly enough, decentralization may not be superior. See Rothstein and Hoover 2000.

<sup>6</sup> Scale economies can differ for reasons other than distance and area, including the degree of natural monopoly, technology, geography, and more.

<sup>7</sup> Our argument here rests upon models of public finance inspired by the work of Charles Tiebout (1956). See also Alesina and Spolaore (1997, 2003).

Third, decentralization breaks the monopoly power inherent in the state's specialized production of public goods and services. Given their comparative advantage in providing public goods, states acquire the ability to earn rents at the expense of their societies. Democracy is one instrument to regulate this monopoly power (see Lake and Baum 2001). Decentralization and the competition between fiscal jurisdictions this implies is another powerful tool (Qian and Weingast 1997). By creating multiple political entities all producing similar public goods and services (albeit in differing quantities and mixes), citizens create fiscal competition and place constraints on the monopoly power of their central governments.

In short, territorial decentralization should allow both the dominant political majority and minority to benefit. The majority retains the advantages of an integrated state, gaining from the more efficient production of public goods at their optimal scale and greater competition between levels of government. Minorities, in turn, acquire autonomy over policy areas of intense concern to themselves, even while sharing, perhaps, in the benefits of more efficient government. The resources saved from more efficient government can be used to lower rates of taxation, for additional goods and services, or for redistribution. Decentralization is an institution that, when properly designed, can potentially benefit both political minorities, who can be induced or compensated not to secede from the state, and political majorities, who can expand services, gain countrywide acceptance of state institutions, and possibly even reduce the overall burden of government on themselves. *If territorial decentralization fails, therefore, it is not because it lacks value to both the majority and minority, but because of strategic problems (see below) that make reaching an effective bargain between groups difficult.*

### **Decentralization as a Costly Signal of Intent**

Decentralization also provides more immediate benefits in post-Civil War settings as a costly signal of moderate intent. Central to nearly all civil wars is fundamental uncertainty about the preferences of one or more parties to the conflict.<sup>8</sup> Particularly important, the minority is often

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<sup>8</sup> On the role of uncertainty and fear in ethnic conflicts, see Lake and Rothchild (1996, 1998).

uncertain whether the majority will prove “moderate” and willing to share power in a spirit of amity and accommodation or will show itself to be “extremist” and seek to impose its authority and political preferences on others. Given that a civil war has occurred, the political minority is more likely to hold the latter belief -- and the war itself may have done little to moderate the majority or alter this perception. Post-civil war settlements are likely to remain fraught with uncertainty over the intentions of the former combatants. In such a setting, offers of territorial decentralization by the political majority to the minority can have beneficial effects, especially in the short term, even if it remains uncertain that they will endure in the long term.

Territorial decentralization is a costly and possibly effective signal of the majority’s political moderation. In South Africa, for example, the African National Congress’ willingness to concede a measure of territorial decentralization reassured whites and some more conservative blacks about their ability to influence policy at the subregional level in the future, and therefore acted as an incentive for them to agree to the new contract (Rothchild 1997). By the same logic, the failure of majorities to accede to minority demands for, say, local police powers can signal that the majority is more likely to encroach upon their interests and safety in the future. It is not that territorial decentralization safeguards the rights and interests of a minority. Rather, it reveals crucial information about the intent of the majority and how it is likely to rule when it does centralize power into its own hands.

Effective signals require that a moderate sender incur some cost that an extremist sender would not be willing to pay. By accepting this cost, the moderates, in the language of game theory, “separate” themselves from possible extremists. Territorial decentralization can be extremely costly to the otherwise centralizing majority because it enhances the political capabilities of the minority, at least in the short run. Internal autonomy often enhances the organizational capacity of the weaker group and allows legitimate leaders to emerge and gain greater political experience. By recognizing the political dominance of a group within a particular region and giving its leaders a political vehicle through which to strive for greater

political power, territorial decentralization allows for the more effective articulation of regional demands, facilitates the development of a regional identity, and – at the extreme – enhances the ability of the group to press for secession. It is perhaps no coincidence that all successful secessions since 1945 have occurred along previously determined internal administrative boundaries (Zacher 2001). The minority can use the greater leverage produced by territorial decentralization to claim greater material benefits for itself, to thwart the centralizing tendency of the dominant majority, or to ensure appropriate safeguards for minority interests. Territorial decentralization thus shifts a degree of political power and influence from the ruling majority to the minority.

This shift in political power, in turn, is exactly the cost that the dominant majority pays by decentralizing authority along territorial lines. The minority is now more influential, and the majority less influential, at the political center. Moderates may be willing to pay this cost to signal their accommodative preferences, but extremists are unlikely to do so willingly.<sup>9</sup> Precisely

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<sup>9</sup> But because it carries such a high cost, the majority may be less willing to offer territorial decentralization than is preferred by many would-be peace makers. Some signals may be just too costly to send, even when moderate majorities are otherwise committed to sustainable peace settlements. As a result, territorial decentralization will be infrequent relative to other means of group accommodation—as the historical record since 1945 clearly attests. Conversely, administrative decentralization along communal lines is less costly and therefore may be a more frequent form of conflict management (Deng and Morrison 2001, 2; Danforth 2002, 29). Through administrative decentralization, the state grants its minority communities special rights to arrange and oversee the cultural, linguistic, and religious affairs of their members. Granting political authority to communal groups strengthens group identity and thereby gives leaders greater power at the political center. Nonetheless, communal decentralization does not create the exit option available to groups under territorial decentralization. Individuals may migrate or flee as refugees, but in the absence of a territorial-base, secession is less feasible. As a result, administrative decentralization along communal lines does not shift political power to the minority to the same degree as does territorial decentralization. Extremists bent on nationalist purity or hegemony will oppose communal concessions to other groups, and thus will resist such a decentralization of authority; an extremist majority, therefore, is unlikely to offer communal concessions to others. Moderates, however, are typically not disturbed or threatened by demonstrations of cultural difference, and may, as a result, offer communal concessions. Moderate majorities will pay some political price for this action, once again losing political power at the center; the concession is thus costly and therefore a potentially credible signal of their intent. Nonetheless, the cost to the majority is lower than that for territorial decentralization, and thus communal concessions can be more readily made by moderate groups. This suggests that communal concessions may allow moderate groups to distinguish themselves more frequently from extremists and thereby to demonstrate their accommodationist desires to other groups more successfully. Thus, where territorial concessions are so costly that even moderates are often unwilling to pay this price, communal concessions may be sufficiently costly to prevent extremists from attempting to masquerade as moderates but not so costly as to prevent moderates from being able to offer them. At the same time, since communal decentralization is less costly to the majority, it sends a less clear and effective signal of moderation.

because it increases the minority's ability to mobilize and exert political influence at the center, territorial decentralization is an offer that extremists intent on dominating the minority will normally be unwilling to make. Thus, by offering territorial decentralization, majorities are able to signal effectively that they are, indeed, moderates. Observing such an offer, therefore, the minority can be more confident that it is, in fact, dealing with a moderate majority.

The true effect of territorial decentralization can be seen best when it is offered willingly and sincerely by majorities in pre-conflict situations. Devolutions of political authority to sub-national units prior to the outbreak of significant political violence, as in India, can help stabilize societies and prevent the outbreak of major internal wars. Even though political authority will typically be recentralized over time, the institutionally specific assets or vested interests in decentralization accumulated during the early years (see below) may be sufficient to maintain the credibility of the commitments previously extended to the minority. More importantly, however, the offer of decentralization reveals the moderate nature of the political majority, indicating that it is willing to bargain and establish constructive relations with the minority.

Yet, it is important not to be misled here. It is not the territorial decentralization itself that contributes to a sustainable peace in the short term, but the costly offer of decentralization that gives the minority greater confidence that it is negotiating and sharing a state with a moderate majority. This is a key attraction of territorial decentralization, and one of the reasons, perhaps, why it is so strongly advocated by scholars, diplomats, and others seeking to bring peace to war-torn areas. In our view, this is the principal contribution that territorial decentralization can make to sustainable peace settlements.

### **III. Explaining the Failure of Decentralization**

Despite its potential benefits for the parties, both long- and short-term, territorial decentralization fails because of at least three intractable bargaining problems that are especially acute in post-civil war settings. Since no states have implemented territorial decentralization

after civil wars, our argument and supporting evidence in this section necessarily draws heavily on the experience of territorial decentralization in states that have not undergone a civil war. Nonetheless, we explain why we expect at least as much (and probably more) instability in cases of post-civil war decentralization as we observe in cases of non-civil war decentralization.

### **The Governance Problem**

The *governance problem* emerges when the political rules of the game are insufficiently rooted in—and supported by—the society (Gourevitch 1999). To some extent, this indeterminacy exists in some form in all political systems, but it is particularly severe in the initial phases of constructing a new political system after a civil war. The effect of the governance problem is to make all post-conflict political institutions unstable.

There is a potential for institutional instability in all political systems. In any policy space of two (or more) dimensions, there may be no determinant equilibrium. Whenever two issues are on the table for decision, there may not be a stable policy outcome under majority rule. In McKelvey's (1976) influential chaos theorem, alternative majority coalitions may cycle through the entire two-dimensional issue space, with coalition AB v. C being replaced by BC v. A, and so on. It is sometimes argued that institutions induce equilibria (Shephers 1979), or create stable outcomes. This important insight drives much contemporary analysis of political institutions. William Riker (1980), however, demonstrated that if policy is unstable, and institutions are influential in shaping policy, then institutions themselves will fall prey to cycling: the battle over alternative policies will simply shift to a battle over the institutions that shape policy choice.<sup>10</sup>

In most political systems what keeps institutions from falling into chaos are social investments that are premised on particular institutions—what might be called institutionally specific assets. Once individuals expect a particular set of institutions to endure, they begin to make a host of private investment decisions—not only financial but also investments in

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<sup>10</sup> For an application of the general cycling problem to federalism, see Filippov et al. (2004).

educational, social, and cultural attributes, political associations, norms of political behavior, and so on—on the basis of expected policy outcomes. Anticipating that institutions will produce policies that protect private property, for example, individuals can then safely acquire such property. Or, as David Laitin (1998) has shown, expecting different language practices to emerge on the basis of varying institutions and norms, Russians in the near abroad are reaching different decisions on whether to invest in acquiring the titular language of the new countries in which they are living. Where they make such investments, individuals create a vested interest for themselves in preserving these particular institutions. If enough individuals expect the institutions to endure, the institutionally specific assets that are acquired may be sufficient to solidify the otherwise transient political system. Key here is the expectation of stable political institutions held by a sufficiently large number of individuals. As Laitin again leads us to expect, this is a quintessential tipping game: if enough people expect the institutions to be stable, they are likely to gain predictability.<sup>11</sup>

The governance problem will be found in all nascent political systems—until the accumulation of sufficient “vested interests” locks in a particular set of political institutions. In nascent political systems crises periodically arise that disturb the equilibrium and make politics “plastic” (Gourevitch 1986). To the extent that sub-national groups have more homogenous preferences over policy than all the citizens of a polity, the governance problem may be easier to solve in smaller states that reflect their preferences (Alessina and Spolaore 1997, 2003). As a result, groups may prefer secession and complete independence over continuing political instability in larger and more heterogeneous states.

The governance problem will also be particularly acute in the aftermath of civil war. Following internal violence, many issues are on the table, insuring that the actors face a multi-dimensional policy space. Existing political institutions have often been destroyed, leaving the actors to set rules and policies without a clear script. Cycling through policy and institutions is

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<sup>11</sup> Also see Kuran 1991 and Lohmann 1994.

very likely. In turn, many previously acquired assets have been destroyed or depreciated by the conflict; there are fewer vested interests in any political order, and thus lower expectations of future stability. Under these conditions, any set of political institutions that is formed is likely to be highly unstable.

In addition, expectations of the future are colored by hostile political memories and deep distrust between the previously warring factions. Each region or group expects the other to act opportunistically whenever circumstances permit. With fragile—indeed, often pessimistic—expectations of the future, individuals have little incentive to invest in institutionally specific assets.

The conditions that promote instability are, thus, particularly acute in post-conflict situations in ethnically divided societies. This explains why institutional solutions to violent internal conflicts, like territorial decentralization, are so seldom implemented in a meaningful way, and when tried why they so often break down. Post-conflict political institutions will be more stable and effective in moderating conflict the fewer the dimensions of policy being contested (e.g., when the conflict is arrayed along a single left-right political dimension), the greater the number of pre-conflict institutions that are preserved, the less extended the social distance between the adversaries, and the less destructive the conflict (i.e., the fewer assets destroyed or depreciated). In general, however, nearly all post-conflict situations are likely to be characterized by some polarization and underlying suspicion and uncertainty.

### **The Problem of Incomplete Constitutions**

All political constitutions, like all contracts, are incompletely specified, but especially so in decentralized political systems at the end of a civil war. Constitutions simply cannot cover all future contingencies that might arise and so must leave to some single authority the power to resolve conflicting interpretations of the constitution. The ultimate authority for determining

jurisdictional disputes is typically vested in the central government, inevitably creating a centripetal force in politics.

Although constitutions distribute rights and responsibilities across layers of government, they cannot define appropriate procedures or the division of authority under all conceivable future contingencies. There must therefore be some entity, such as a constitutional court, to resolve disagreements over the rules of politics as conditions evolve and unforeseen contingencies arise. In decentralized systems, multiple authorities may contribute to conflicting interpretations of the rules. As a result, there are distinct advantages to vesting powers of interpretation in a single entity at the political center. Thus, in the United States, again, the Supreme Court is charged with the ultimate power to interpret the meaning of the federal constitution, including deciding which political units actually possess what rights over what policy issues.

When the center is an explicitly political actor, especially in an authoritarian regime, its interests in aggrandizing its own power are clear: politicians at the center can best ensure their own political survival by controlling the primary levers of authority and resources, thereby enabling them to satisfy their interests and those of their support groups more easily. Even when the central arbitrator is a judicial actor and less overtly partisan, there are strong incentives for its members to aggrandize the power of the political center. This has been demonstrated most clearly in the centralizing decisions of the American Supreme Court and, most recently, in the centralizing interpretations of the European Court of Justice (see Alter 1998, Garrett, et al., 1998, Mattli and Slaughter 1998). Whether politicians or judges are the ultimate arbiters, branches of the central government may be limited by what the other, lower levels of government are willing to accept, and judges may be further constrained by norms of precedence and judicial behavior. Nonetheless, they can be expected to expand the residual rights of the central government much of the time. Consequently, there is a built-in institutional motor that drives states over time toward greater political centralization.<sup>12</sup>

It is the problem of incomplete constitutions that makes groups, especially political minorities which are likely to lose if policy is recentralized, oppose agreements short of complete independence. Knowing that strong centripetal forces are likely to exist, groups seeking autonomy and counting on decentralization to protect them from majorities at the political center will hold out for the guarantee of independence normally ensured only in a sovereign state of their own.

### **The Transient Majority Problem**

In politics, no present majority can bind a future majority. Territorial decentralization offered today, as we have seen in section one above, can be retracted tomorrow. This is a universal problem of all majority rule institutions, but is likely to be particularly acute in the case of territorial decentralization. As Friedrich (1968) argues, federalism is an ongoing, evolving process, not a static encounter between the leaders of different tiers of government. A political majority at the center can seize authority formerly enjoyed by lower levels of government. In an extreme case, even ultimate rights of secession, such as those provided under the former Soviet and current Ethiopian constitutions, can be revoked by the center. Although in principle the self-enforcing nature of a constitution could be used for either greater decentralization (pressures in Canada or Belgium) or greater centralization (South Africa or Pakistan), in practice this appears to be, for the most part, a one-way process: as the authors of the second United States constitution clearly recognized, it is easier to create a single majority at the political center to approve a change in the rules than majorities in a majority of the lower levels to block a proposed change. Thus, even though a majority at the center might be committed to decentralization and willing to pay the cost involved today, this commitment can be – and, if the historical record is any judge, is likely to be – overturned in the long run (see Bednar, Eskridge, and Ferejohn 2001).

Since majorities are transient and decentralization is likely to erode over time, minorities may choose to hold out or continue fighting today for full independence. International recognition of sovereignty is not, of course, a guarantee of continued independence nor an indication that the center is prohibited from intervening in the now “internal” affairs of the new state. But the norm of juridical sovereignty, coupled with the norm that sovereignty should not be eliminated by force, means that it is harder to revise a recognized international border than the sometimes slippery boundary of authority between majority and minority within a state. Knowing that their rights can never be permanently safeguarded within a unified state, minorities may hold out for the more robust guarantee of full independence and sovereignty.

The conditions under which significant measures of territorial decentralization are likely to emerge as a stable solution to the problem of transient majorities are extremely limited. Territorial decentralization is likely to be a credible protection of minority rights and status only when it reflects the true capabilities of the domestic political actors. Three factors matter: the relative capabilities of the regions or groups, the costs of continued or renewed fighting, and expectations of future treatment. Democracy may also reinforce the credibility of decentralization (Wantchekon and Simon 1998).

When there is a single dominant majority, significant forms of political decentralization will typically fail to promote a durable peace. Decentralization will be rejected by the majority, which does not want to give up politically sensitive powers to sub-national units. If imposed from the outside, decentralization is likely to lack legitimacy and, given the strategic interactions of elites, can be expected to evolve relatively rapidly into a centralized system of rule. If the political minority fears a future genocide or other catastrophe under central rule, it may choose to resist and, depending on the costs of continued fighting, hold out for complete independence. In most cases, however, it will simply acquiesce to centralization as the least bad alternative.

Where there are a small number of powerful regions, each of which has some realistic chance of victory and future dominance, the parties will also be wary of decentralization, as was the case

with the peace agreements in Sri Lanka (Bose 2002). Fearful of future centralization, each may choose to continue fighting now for dominance or complete independence tomorrow, depending on the costs of war and the probability of success. The greater the likelihood that the opponents will exploit one another upon victory, the stronger the incentives for each side to reject decentralization and seek full independence. In these circumstances, continued conflict is the most likely outcome.

Territorial decentralization is likely to be most stable and effective when there are multiple regions with numerous cross-cutting political cleavages and relatively balanced capabilities. That is, decentralization is most viable when no one region is sufficiently strong that it is likely to achieve dominance. These are, of course, the conditions normally associated with stable pluralist political systems. Here, regions combine and recombine in a domestic balance of power and are naturally checked and balanced. In this case, decentralized political institutions reflect the political equipoise between regions. Decentralization may reinforce this equipoise, but again it is the balance between the regions and not the institutions themselves that lead to stability. Decentralization will emerge naturally in these circumstances for all of the reasons addressed above. It will be more efficient, particularly allowing a closer fit between regional demands and policy, and it will help mitigate fears of future exploitation and violence. Decentralization can, in these circumstances, be a real force for peace because it conforms to the balance of political power between regions.

#### **IV. External Intervention and Implications for Current Policy**

As noted, political decentralization along territorial lines is emerging as one of the international community's preferred solutions for dealing with deeply divided societies. Decentralization is believed to respond to the need for both state unity and societal diversity. It is thus seen to contribute to internal state stability while avoiding the potential spread of turmoil

and insecurity to the wider region.<sup>13</sup> Not surprisingly, therefore, it is the centerpiece of the Dayton accords on Bosnia and featured prominently in the proposed Rambouillet agreement for Kosovo. Throughout the world, constitutions featuring different forms of autonomy arrangements are in effect or under consideration. Thus, constitutional provisions allowing for various degrees of regional autonomy are present in the basic laws of Ethiopia, Nigeria, the United Kingdom, and the Philippines. Moreover, such formulas have been proposed as solutions to the ongoing stalemates or wars in Cyprus, Sri Lanka, and the Sudan.

Our standard trajectories and our theoretical explanation for the paths outlined above both suggest that territorial decentralization is subject to strong centripetal and centrifugal pulls and therefore often fails over the long run. It has, to be sure, survived since independence in India and Russia. In Nigeria, President Olusegun Obasanjo, calling for "a return to true federalism," has declared that his regime will "redress the imbalance of power between the centre and the grassroots level, ensure devolution of power and reduce marginalisation" (Agbaegbu 1998, 21). However, in most cases, decentralization has failed, quickly giving way to greater centralization or secession.

External actors can facilitate efforts at effective decentralization—they can help push regions and groups in the right direction—but stability is ultimately dependent upon what the local actors believe will happen when the outside parties and possibly peacekeepers leave. It is the credibility of promises made by each group to respect the rights and safety of the others that matters in the end. Unless each is confident of its security, regions and groups may continue fighting or may take up arms again (as in Angola) once the interest of external states wanes and the peacekeepers plan their departure (see Lake and Rothchild 1996, 1998). Stability rests on the domestic conditions facing the parties.

External actors can be most helpful in transition periods. As noted above, the governance problem is solved by the creation of vested interests in a particular political order—the

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<sup>13</sup> For a provocative treatment of nationalism and the potential of federalism, see Hechter 2000.

accumulation of specific assets that lock in institutions. This process typically unfolds only over a number of years—although since stability depends upon anticipated effects, expectations of stability can become a self-fulfilling prophecy even in the short run. External actors can facilitate stability by guaranteeing a particular political order, but this also depends upon the expectations of the local actors that the external parties will enforce this guarantee until such time as sufficient vested interests have accumulated. As always, it is not the actions of the external parties today that really matter, but it is expectations of their future behavior that influence political stability in war-torn societies. During these transition periods, external financial and economic assistance can be important. By restarting growth and increasing public and private investment, external aid can accelerate the process of vesting interests in the new political order. The more political actors have at stake in the new regime, the more likely they are to defend it against new or renewed internal challengers.

In encouraging territorial decentralization, however, external pressure can be counter-productive. Decentralization works in part by distinguishing moderates from extremists. If external actors force a majority into making territorial concessions, the information normally conveyed by such an action is lost: if the external pressure is great enough, even extremists might make concessions and therefore the minority cannot infer anything about the intentions of the majority. External actors can cajole and encourage majorities to make territorial concessions, but bludgeoning majorities through force or sanctions to offer concessions they otherwise would not make may actually undercut their effectiveness (Kuperman 1996). In this case, less external pressure is usually preferable.

In sum, the trajectories toward greater political centralization or disintegration that we see occurring in many countries today gravely complicate the task of fostering a creative balance between conflict and stability in post-civil war contexts. The majority imperative to centralize control augments minority insecurities and consequently undermines a sense of common purpose. Bargaining and reciprocity become increasingly complicated. Although various forms

of territorial decentralization have some capacity to moderate conflict after civil wars, there clearly are no reliable safety nets. Peace will likely occur because of a general fatigue with war, the development of a commitment to resolve disputes through bargaining and reciprocity, and the emergence of respect and good will among the parties. Only as such conditions emerge can decentralization gain the ability to structure relations between former adversaries in a constructive direction. The international community does have a role to play in encouraging decentralization, but this policy is only likely to succeed if it reflects real conditions on the ground and is employed with full sensitivity to the message that moderate majorities must convey to their beleaguered minorities.

**Table 3.1. Territorial Decentralization and Civil War Outcomes**  
(Cases exclude Civil Wars Still Unresolved as of December 31, 1999\*)

	<u>Centralized States</u>	<u>Semi-Centralized States</u>	<u>Decentralized States</u>
Greece (1944-49)	Dominican Rep. (1965)	Argentina (1955)	None
China (1946-50)	Uganda (1966) <sup>a</sup>	Sudan (1963-72)	
Paraguay (1947)	Guatemala (1966-96)	Nigeria (1967-70) <sup>g</sup>	
Yemen Arab Rep. (1948)	China (1967-68) <sup>b</sup>	Cambodia (1979-91) <sup>h</sup>	
Costa Rica (1948)	Burma (1968-80)	Mozambique (1979-92) <sup>i</sup>	
Columbia (1948-62)	Cambodia (1970-75) <sup>c</sup>	India (1985-93) <sup>j</sup>	
Burma (1948-51)	Jordan (1970)	Sri Lanka (1987-89) <sup>k</sup>	
Indonesia (1950)	Pakistan (1971) <sup>d</sup>	Burundi (1988) <sup>l</sup>	
Philippines (1950-52)	Sri Lanka (1971)	Tajikistan (1992-94) <sup>m</sup>	
Bolivia (1952)	Burundi (1972)		
Indonesia (1953)	Zimbabwe (1972-79)		
Guatemala (1954)	Pakistan (1973-77)		
Indonesia (1956-60)	Lebanon (1975-90)		
Lebanon (1958)	Iran (1978-79)		
Cuba (1958-59)	Nicaragua (1978-79)		
Iraq (1959)	El Salvador (1979-92)		
Vietnam (1960-65)	Chad (1980-88)		
Congo (1960-65)	Uganda (1980-88)		
Laos (1960-73)	Iran (1981-82)		
Algeria (1962-63)	Nicaragua (1982-90) <sup>e</sup>		
Yemen Arab Rep. (1962-69)	South Yemen (1986)		
Rwanda (1963-64)	Liberia (1989-94)		
	Rwanda (1990-94) <sup>f</sup>		

\*Data missing for centralization for Romania (1989), Croatia (1991-92), Bosnia (1992-95).

*Notes:* <sup>a</sup>Uganda was a decentralized state prior to the civil war. <sup>b</sup>When DPI begins its series in 1975, auton = 1, muni=2, state=2; centralization = 0 from 1968. <sup>c</sup>Centralization and auton = 0, when coding began in 1980, muni and state = 1. <sup>d</sup>Pakistan was decentralized prior to the war. <sup>e</sup>Centralization, auton, muni, state = 0 before 1995, auton =1, muni = 2 beginning in 1995. <sup>f</sup>Muni=1 in 1995, but auton and state = 0. <sup>g</sup>Nigeria was decentralized or semi-decentralized before the war, semi-decentralized immediately afterwards and became decentralized in 1977. <sup>h</sup>Muni and state =1, centralization and auton = 0. <sup>i</sup>Muni = 1, state = 1, fed, auton and author = 0. <sup>j</sup>State, author, stconst = 1, auton = 0, centralization and muni are missing. <sup>k</sup>Muni = 2 and state = 2, centralization and auton = 0. <sup>l</sup>Muni = 2 and state = 1, centralization and auton = 0. <sup>m</sup>Auton = 1, other variables missing.

*Sources and definitions:* Civil wars are from Walter (2002). Countries classed by degree of centralization according to six variables. Centralization, defined by degree of decision-making authority vested in local or regional governments, is from Polity III dataset and ranges from zero to two (Gurr 1989 and Jagers and Gurr 1996). All others from Database of Political Institutions (as described in Beck et. al, n.d.), and take the form of questions: Auton = “are there autonomous regions?” (0,1); Muni = “are the municipal governments locally elected?” (0-2); State = “are the state/province governments locally elected?” (0-2); Author = “do sub-national governments have extensive taxing, spending or regulatory authority?” (0,1); Stconst = “are the constituencies of the senators the states/provinces?” (0,1).

**Table 3.2. States “Born” Decentralized**

<u>Stable</u>	
<u>Decentralized</u>	<u>Semi-Decentralized</u>
Australia (1901- )	<i>Azerbaijan (1991- )</i>
Belgium (1831- )	<i>Botswana (1966- )</i>
Canada (1867- )	<i>Georgia (1991 - )</i>
Czechoslovakia (1948-1991)	<i>Lesotho (1966- )</i>
Germany (1871-1945)	
Germany, Federal Republic (1949- )	
India (1950- )	
Papua New Guinea (1976- )	
Switzerland (1848- )	
United Arab Emirates (1971- )	
United States (1815- )	
<u>Unstable</u>	
	<u>Direction of Change</u>
Afghanistan (1920-1924)	Decentralized to Centralized
Argentina (1825-1829)	Decentralized to Centralized
Cameroon (1961-1971)	Decentralized to Semi-Decentralized (1962)
	Semi-Decentralized to Centralized
Cyprus (1960-1973)	Decentralized to Centralized
Libya (1952-1963)	Decentralized to Centralized
<i>Malaysia</i> (1957-1963)	Semi-Decentralized to Decentralized
Mexico (1822-1833, 1919-)	Decentralized to Centralized
	Centralized to Decentralized
<i>Mongolia</i> (1924-1928)	Semi-Decentralized to Centralized
Nigeria (1960-1993)	Decentralized to Semi-Decentralized (1966)
	Semi-Decentralized to Decentralized (1979)
	Decentralized to Semi-Decentralized (1984)
	Semi-Decentralized to Centralized
Pakistan (1947-1970)	Decentralized to Centralized
Sierra Leone (1961- )	Decentralized to Semi-Decentralized (1970)
Somalia (1960- )	Decentralized to Semi-Decentralized (1969)
<i>Thailand</i> (1815-1867)	Semi-Decentralized to Centralized
Turkey (1815-1919)	Decentralized to Centralized
Uganda (1962-1965)	Decentralized to Centralized
Venezuela (1830-1869, 1961-)	Decentralized to Semi-Decentralized (1858)
	Semi-Decentralized to Centralized
	Centralized to Decentralized

Italics indicates Semi-Decentralized

Source: As measured by the Centralization variable in the Polity III dataset; see Gurr 1989 and Jagers and Gurr 1996.

**Table 3.3. Decentralization and Secessionism**

<b><u>Decentralized State with Strong Secessionism</u></b>	<b><u>New State that Emerged (Year of Independence)</u></b>	<b><u>New State Regime: Decentralized or Centralized?</u></b>
Czechoslovakia	Czech Republic (1992)	Centralized
	Slovakia (1992)	Centralized
Ethiopia	Eritrea (1993)	Centralized
Indonesia	East Timor (1999)	Centralized
Malaysia	Singapore (1965)	Centralized
Pakistan	Bangladesh (1971)	Centralized
Yugoslavia	Bosnia and Herzegovina (1991)	Decentralized
	Croatia (1991)	Centralized
	Macedonia (1991)	Centralized
	Slovenia (1991)	Centralized
	Serbia and Montenegro (1991)	Decentralized
USSR / Soviet Union	Armenia (1991)	Centralized
	Azerbaijan (1991)	Centralized
	Belarus (1991)	Centralized
	Estonia (1991)	Centralized
	Georgia (1991)	Semi-Decentralized
	Kazakhstan (1991)	Centralized
	Kyrgyzstan (1991)	Centralized
	Latvia (1991)	Centralized
	Lithuania (1991)	Centralized
	Moldova (1991)	Centralized
	Russian Federation (1991)	Decentralized
	Tajikistan (1991)	Centralized
	Turkmenistan (1991)	Centralized
	Ukraine (1991)	Centralized
	Uzbekistan (1991)	Centralized

Sources: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, (ICPSR): <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu>, ICPSR Dataset # 9263: *Polity II: Political Structures and Regime Change, 1800-1986*, (by Ted R. Gurr). ICPSR Dataset # 6695: *Polity III: Regime Type and Political Authority, 1800-1994*, (by Keith Jagers and Ted R. Gurr). The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Reports & Country Profiles*, (by *The Economist*): <http://www.eiu.com>. Political Resources on the Web, (by Roberto Cicciomessere (ed.)): <http://www.politicalresources.net>. *The World Factbook 2000*, (by the CIA): <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/indexgeo.html>. Atlapedia Online, (by Latimer Clarke Corporation): [http://www.atlapedia.com/online/country\\_index.htm](http://www.atlapedia.com/online/country_index.htm).

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