Chapter 3

 

The Production of Pyschoactive Substances

 

“But the farmers feel misunderstood. ‘Smoking is legal, it's freedom of choice and I think it's time for people to get off the companies' backs, to get off our backs and let us do what we do,’ Mr Ray says…he pulls out a handful of seeds coated with a pink covering to distinguish them from the earth. ‘When you can take a seed that you can barely see and in half a year produce a crop that will potentially make $ 4,500 to $ 5,000 an acre, it's pretty incredible.’”[1]

“…our coca chewing is separate from all that. We are accustomed to it and have never had anything to do with cocaine. Why should we be deprived of our coca because of those narcotrafficantes? There is no justice in this.”[2]

 

The consumer cannot consume unless someone produces. In a relatively few cases, self-production is sufficient: meth labs in kitchens, marijuana plants in the bathroom. But virtually every user consumes a substance that has been produced by someone else because they may not possess the necessary ingredients for production (including climate), they may not want to run the legal and health risks associated with self production, or they may just want to consume in the most effortless way possible.

The pyschoactive commodity system gives us a way to think about the link between consumer and producer. A systemic approach tells us we cannot think of one without thinking of the other, that what affects one phase has an impact on the other. But a systemic perspective doesn’t answer some fundamental questions: Why do some people decide to become involved in the production of psychoactive substances? Can the tobacco and coca farmers’ decisions to produce dangerous psychoactive substances be usefully distinguished simply by referring to their legal status?  Why is it that people are able to produce illegal psychoactive substances?

Our three analytic perspectives provide different answers to each of these fundamental questions. Deviance analysis looks to the failure of individuals to determine who is attracted to production of illegal psychoactive substances and to the faults of governments to explain this illegal activity. Constructivists look to the ideas people have concerning the substances themselves and the power of ideas against the reach of governments attempting to impose a distinct set of ideas on individuals and subgroups. Political economists look to the profit motive and the ability of governments to impose a level of costs and an appropriate degree of risk to outweigh the attraction of profits derived from producing an illegal product.

If we know how and why production occurs and is linked to the consumer we stand a better chance of devising strategies to influence what is produced, by whom and under what conditions. Our interest in these latter questions can be driven by many different and even competing goals. For the drug prohibitionists, the goal is to eliminate illegal production entirely. Others may feel the drug phenomenon will always be with us but seek to minimize the environmental and human harm resulting from the toxic processes used to process coca into cocaine, produce synthetic drugs like methamphetamine, or that contaminate the product for the consumer. Still others may be interested in helping the producer defend herself against extortionists and get a “fairer” share of the profits. Finally, there may be those who worry that producers may wind up being the unwilling or unwitting accomplices of organized crime, rebellions and even terrorists.

 

Comparing Explanations for Production

MEDICAL MARIJUANA BILLBOARD OF CHILD & MOTHER W/SIGN “MY DAD IS NOT A CRIMINAL”

 

Each of our three analytic frameworks attempts to explain the production of psychoactive substances. In this section I will lay out the basic elements of such explanations and leave the development of specific hypotheses for the study questions. You should notice that each explanation looks to different causal factors; any effort to combine explanations will need to justify which factors are chosen and how they interact to produce the hypothesized outcomes.

 

 

Social Deviance analysts would argue that production of marijuana and other psychological substances is illegal because society has adopted norms against the consumption of those products. Although sociologists and psychologists may question the appropriateness or consistency of those norms as they are applied to different psychoactive substances, criminologists and prohibitionists would not. This group of analysts, therefore, do not see any utility for understanding the illegal drug markets in asking why someone would choose to produce a legal psychoactive substance that contributes to addiction and death.

 

The producer of illegal psychoactive substances is expected to be someone who cannot attain the social or economic achievements that would make him feel like a success in mainstream society. He thus turns to the production of illegal products because it generates wealth and may even generate prestige among a subgroup with whom he interacts now that he has chosen this job. The deviant’s motivation can be realized because the legal authorities (police, judiciary or politicians) are either absent (weak or failed states) or are deviant themselves (corrupt).

 

A constructivist would look beyond deviant producers without denying that some producers might be people who are unable to achieve within the dominant social norms. For constructivists the phenomenon is too big to be adequately understood in deviant or materialist terms. This perspective recognizes the potential clash between belief systems that see particular or even all psychoactive substances as acceptable and those that do not.  Hence the constructivist would look to the norms of the producers, not to the laws, to understand why some people might choose to produce psychoactive substances associated with addiction and death.

Traditional production is a legitimate enterprise in the eyes of people who have produced for centuries. These people have experience with the substance in religion, health and even culinary activities. Their own uses convince them that the production of the particular psychoactive substance is not inappropriate and shouldn’t be illegal. These producers may even know of the existence of other psychoactive substances that produce harms but may be legal and even subsidized by foreign governments that seek to eliminate their own production. Another set of producers would be those who promote an important set of values of the dominant value system --- individuality and freedom --- and see the prohibition of their chosen psychoactive substance as an unacceptable intrusion by the state into private affairs.

The constructivist would also argue that the clash of norms around the issue of producing psychoactive substances would be greater than the ability of any government to control. These ideas are internalized by individuals and no government is powerful enough to control ideas nor can it be omnipresent and thus preclude individuals from acting upon their beliefs.

Political economists would assume that producers of psychoactive substances choose these products because the profit generated by them, minus the risk (economic or legal) is greater than that they could earn producing a legal product or engaging in legal employment. For the political economist the important distinction between legal and illegal products is not normative but economic. The fact of illegality means that the supply of, and risks associated with these products produce retail prices that are particularly high relative to the costs of production. Consequently, profits are expected to be attractive.

Political economists would not attempt to identify which individuals would have preferences for wealth sufficient to lead them into illegal production. Instead she would argue that some individuals in every society would be tempted and the chief determinant of how much is produced will be the ability of institutions (social, political or legal; formal or informal) to generate risks that significantly drive down the enjoyment one gets from the fruits of illegal production.  Some production of illegal products would be expected by political economists but they would expect more production in countries that had institutions that were incapable of increasing the risks associated with such production.

Evaluating the different hypotheses requires that we collect relevant evidence. We should, therefore, begin our pursuit with some basic facts about the role of production in the phenomenon we are studying, as well as the characteristics (who, what and where) of production before moving on to how our analytical frameworks explain the existence and functioning of the production of illegal psychoactive substances.

 

 

PAS Commodity Systems Framework

The commodity systems framework tells us that we should conceive of the production of psychoactive substances as one phase in a multifaceted effort to supply the consumer. Production does not exist or function in isolation; hence, we need to understand its role in the system and the nature of the linkages between producers and the other people operating in the system.

We know that the producer, whether of an agricultural or a synthetic product, creates a product that gets to the consumer through a distribution system. Production requires the standard items (inputs) that producers of legal products also need: start-up capital, seeds if one is producing a hybrid crop, chemicals if one is producing a synthetic product, and equipment.

In the case of illegal products, producers may need a distinct set of inputs avoided by their counterparts operating within a functioning legal system. The illicit nature of their work renders producers of illegal psychoactive substances vulnerable to extortion by those traffickers who would purchase their production and introduce it into the distribution network, by corrupt law enforcement officials, or by someone who would steal their product. Since it would be folly to call the police, the only protection producers can get is either through their own means or through playing one extortionist off of another.

Playing one extortionist off another requires allying with one actor either by selling the product directly to them or by paying a “tax” or fee for protection. Coca farmers in Peru during the 1980s were confronted by corrupt representatives of the government, military personnel quite willing to use repressive and violent means to eradicate coca production and increased pressure from the US government against production. Growers responded by allying with the guerrilla group, Sendero Luminoso, against the government. The guerrillas offered to protect the crop if peasants paid a tax and adopted the political and social philosophy of the Senderistas. Coca growers were willing to pay the tax but soon rebelled against the philosophical revolution. Meanwhile, the Peruvian military and government decided that fighting guerrillas was a more pressing matter than trying to eradicate coca production, so offered to arm the peasants against Sendero Luminoso and ignore the illicit crop.[3] Once Sendero was neutralized, however, the Peruvian government relented to US pressure and actively pursued the coca crop.[4]

 

BOX with dogs

protecting marijuana in Sierra

 

Defending oneself and one’s production against those who would seize or destroy their crop requires the purchase of weaponry adequate to the task (pistols in remote mountains, greater power firepower in truly lawless zones like west Africa today) or dogs/booby traps in areas where the potential thieves may be chance passers-by (marijuana production in the California Sierra Nevada mountains). The U.S. small arms market as well as former soldiers and groups involved in recently resolved civil wars feed the illegal arms market that supplies people involved in illegal activities around the world. In some countries, like Mexico, private ownership of non-hunting weapons is prohibited but producers and others involved in the psychoactive commodity system are well armed.

Figure 3.1 illustrates the linkages that develop between the producer of an illegal substance and others who facilitate or hinder her enterprise. The producer, therefore, cannot be considered in isolation of the other actors who facilitate, determine the manner in which production can be carried out, or perhaps even make possible, his production.

 

 

Figure 3.1

Producer Phase of

Psychoactive Commodity System

 

 

 

 

PRODUCER

EXTORTION BY

BUYERS OF THE PRODUCT

 

 

 

EXTORTION BY CORRUPT

LAW ENFORCEMENT

 

 

PRODUCTION INPUTS;

START-UP CAPITAL

SEEDS

CHEMICALS,

 

 

DEFENSE INPUTS;

WEAPONS

DOGS, BOOBY TRAPS; MONEY LAUNDERERS

 

 

 

Precursor chemicals, those required for the production both of synthetic drugs and the processing of coca into cocaine is another aspect of illegal production since there are international conventions and national laws prohibiting the production or diversion of these chemicals for illegal psychoactive substances. This situation is a major issue for prohibitionists, as evidenced by the fact that the biggest drug bust in North America did not involve Mexican gangs and cocaine or heroin, but Canadian citizens providing ephedrine to meth superlabs in the US.[5]

 

 

 

 

The producer’s role in the system may not be limited to simply providing a supply. Pharmaceutical companies and scientists are constantly producing synthetic drugs. In the case of new synthetic drugs approved for prescription use only, a pharmaceutical company interested in fomenting a demand for its particular drug, advertises its benefits on television, recommending that viewers ask their doctors if the drug is appropriate for their particular ailment. Even something as ambiguous in the viewers mind as “social anxiety syndrome” can be overcome if the viewer gets his doctor to prescribe Zoloft. (If the TV viewer also reads magazines he can try a different approach, as --- beer suggests in their print ad showing young people interacting in a friendly manner and the words “Be Yourself” alongside their logo.)

Such advertising promotes the social norm of a pill for every ailment, alerts deviants to new products and helps generate an increased supply of psychoactive substances that can be diverted to the illicit market. Oxycontin is currently the most notorious example because the manufacturer chose a formulation that would give their pain reliever a competitive edge over competing synthetic opioides but also made them more attractive on the illegal drug market.[6] Even when a new drug is not approved for prescription use, or a previously approved drug is decertified, the creators may have an incentive to promulgate the recipe. Timothy Leary went from legally experimenting with LSD for psychiatric purposes to advocating its production and use for counter-culture experiences after it had been removed from the legal prescription drug schedule.[7] Producers of legal psychoactive substances at times seek to market their product to those whose consumption would be illegal, e.g. alcohol and cigarette advertisements geared to underage consumers.[8]

 

What types of psychoactive substances are produced?

 

The dorm party was a hit. The next day everybody marveled at how many people were able to dance late into the night. Of course, they also lamented that a few people drank too much and became obnoxious.

There are numerous ways in which one can classify “types” of psychoactive substances. The specific classification used, however, should be directly related to the question under discussion. Since this chapter examines the production of psychoactive substances in order to better understand the psychoactive commodity system rather than what happens to consumers of specific substances (hallucinogens, tranquilizers, etc.) it may be most useful to distinguish substances according to their legal regime for production and consumption. The first two chapters should have convinced you that there are too many dangerous substances that are legal for the issue of danger to be the dividing line between psychoactive substances whose production we simply take for granted and psychoactive substances whose production we insist must be explained.

There are three general categories of production: legal, illegal or that in-between territory of decriminalization, in which the act itself is not legal but the authorities either do not pursue it or provide for minor penalties. Consumption can be legal, illegal or decriminalized. The relationships can be illustrated in a 3x3 table.

 

INSERT TABLE 3.--

Table 3.1

The Legal Characteristics

Of the Consumer-Producer Link

(some countries in 2003)

 

 

 

The table illustrates quite nicely that there is no simple relationship between production and consumption. We are most familiar with the extremes. Legal production and legal consumption, though even here we find limitations that can turn production illegal (e.g., not paying taxes on it or not adhering to health and safety regulations) or renders consumption illegal (e.g., alcohol while driving). And there are some surprising examples here: Switzerland today has, and the British earlier had heroin maintenance programs in which registered addicts could get prescriptions for heroin, which means that doctors and pharmacies have to have a legal source for the heroin they provide. Illegal production and illegal consumption would quickly bring Ecstasy and cocaine to mind. However, in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Luxembourg the use of these substances has been decriminalized while production remains illegal: one may face a fine and confiscation of the substance but cannot be arrested nor serve time in jail for such use. In Denmark, Germany and Austria first time apprehended is decriminalized.

Readers will also be quite familiar with the rest of the relationships among legal production and decriminalized or illegal consumption. Underage smoking or drinking itself brings no criminal action in the U.S. and since no use of psychoactive substances in Italy, Spain or Portugal is subject to criminal sanction, the use of prescription drugs (which are legally produced) without a prescription is decriminalized there. In the U.S., the non-prescription use of legally produced prescription drugs is illegal.

As we continue to explore the table we find more variations. Perhaps the most interesting combination from the perspective of a U.S. reader is the case where the use of a substance is legal, but its production (as well as sale or possession) is either illegal or decriminalized.  In countries where states (NEED EXAMPLES) register heroin addicts and provide them with safe injection rooms (SIR) but do not supply the substance, production is illegal and consumption is legal for those registered addicts. Since individual use in private is not an offense in Belgium[9] and in January 2001 the government decided not to prosecute cultivation of marijuana for personal use,[10] this represents a legal consumption-decriminalized production combination.

The decriminalized-decriminalized combination is currently found in Holland and Switzerland. The production of marijuana and hashish for sale in coffee houses and personal consumption is decriminalized in Holland as is consumption under those terms. I could not find an example of decriminalized production for which consumption is illegal. Decriminalized production and illegal consumption can be illustrated in cases in which Dutch coffee houses sell their marijuana and hashish to customers who violate the ban on consuming alcohol in these establishments or when US tourists bring their Belgian marijuana home.

 

 The High Peaks of Europe:
On The Ground In The New Stoned Switzerland

“At Growland, a two-story marijuana emporium in the up-scale shopping arcades of Bern, Switzerland, the product is remarkably inexpensive.  Growland is one of fifteen stores here in the nation's capital that openly sell marijuana, and one of 250 nationwide.  While it is technically not legal to deal pot in Switzerland, it is also not illegal.  Store manager Peter Zysset has been in business for nine years and has only been visited by the cops once.

Whatever the Deadhead on your gift list wants, Growland sells, including ten sticky strains of marijuana -- all grown in Switzerland, according to Zysett.  "The product is 100 percent Swiss, mostly grown outdoors," he says.  "Already some former vineyards here have turned to growing pot."

Source:  Media Awareness Project, “Europe: Europe Loosens its Pot Laws” citing Rolling Stone, 20 June 2002, pp. 55-57 http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v02/n1144/a01.html?2004, accessed 8/30/03

 

 

 

Where does production of illegal psychoactive substances occur?

 

A few party-goers tried to impress their companions by discussing the origins and merits of MDMA. During the pause in the music the topic of conversation became whether Ecstasy produced in Holland, Germany or Poland was ‘better’ and if anyone could tell the difference.

Many countries in the world produce some type of illegal substance that is consumed for its psychoactive properties. None of the ready distinctions of rich and poor countries, nor developed and underdeveloped economies, nor corrupt or honest governments gives us any insight into where illegal production occurs. Certainly, Afghanistan and Bolivia are poor countries with economies based on agriculture, they have suffered under corrupt governments for many years and illegal crops are produced there (opium poppies and coca for export, respectively). But Holland and Germany produce ecstasy and hi-potency marijuana is produced in Canada and France. The U.S. provides a cornucopia of illicit drug production, including both types of marijuana, methamphetamines, LSD, heroin, etc, and there have even been efforts to produce a synthetic cocaine.[11]

 

Production of illicit psychoactive substances boomed in the late 1990s as new markets in Japan, Asia, South Africa and Russia came on line. New production zones include coca being grown in Africa, marijuana in sub-Saharan Africa, and poppies in central Asian Caucasus, Balkans and Ukraine republics of the former Soviet Union.[12]

 

Ecstasy Labs

A portable Ecstasy lab can produce up to 12 million tablets a day. Portability also contributes to concealment, since an Ecstasy lab can be hidden on the back of a flatbed trucked and constantly on the move. Source:  Elizabeth Joyce,  Current History


Table 3.2

Illegal Production of Psychoactive Substances

Some Comparative Evidence

(Not all Producing Countries Listed)

 

 

 

Substance

Major Producers

Smaller Producers

Opiates

(Heroin, etc)

Afghanistan, Thailand, Myanamar, N. Korea, Colombia, Mexico

Russian Federation, China, India, Turkey, US, France, Ukraine, Poland

Coca

Colombia, Peru, Bolivia

Africa

Cocaine

Colombia

Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Spain, Portugal, Italy, USA

Ecstasy

Netherlands, Poland

USA, Canada, Belgium, Lithuania, Ukraine, Thailand, Indonesia, South Africa

Methamphetamines

USA, Thailand, Myanamar, N. Korea

Slovakia, Mexico, China, Canada, Peru, Czech Republic, S. Korea, Egypt, Philippines, Malaysia, United Kingdom

LSD

USA

 

Marijuana

USA, Mexico, Colombia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Philippines, S. Africa, Morocco

Jamaica, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Guyana, St. Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, Sub-Saharan Africa

High Potency Marijuana

USA, Canada, Netherlands

France

Hashish

Morocco

 

Sources: OGD; List of Major Illicit Drug-Producing or Major Drug-Transit Countries

 http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011102-13.html

 

 

The diversion of legitimate production to illegal traffic is a factor not only for the legal pharmaceuticals sold without prescription. Opium poppies are used not only for opium and heroin, but also for medicinal products such as codeine and morphine. The UN International Narcotics Control Board oversees the legal market for narcotics. Under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961,[13] the Board requires importing countries to estimate their need and exporting countries to report sales to specific countries. Production and import are done via regulated channels. Legal producers, except in India, harvest the entire poppy including the stocks and they are processed in factories to remove the alkaloids; this means of harvesting renders the product useless for the opium and heroin markets. Heroin and opium are produced by slicing the poppy bulb to harvest the sappy opium, which can subsequently be processed into heroin. India produces its legal alkaloids using methods that could lead to their diversion into heroin.

Turkish production of poppies has largely gone legal since 1974 when the US helped it get certified for the legal market. But what had been a traditional crop in Turkey became an attractive industrial crop in France, Spain and Australia. The resulting increase in supply drove world prices down for the alkaloids, thereby undermining Turkish poppy farmers’ willingness to remain within the legal regime. Production of poppies beyond the licensed amount became authorized by the Turkish government in 1999.[14]

The decline in Turkish production for the illegal market was offset by increases elsewhere. Afghani production was among those increasing. After consolidating their domestic hold on the country the Taliban government instituted a ban on poppy production that was extremely successful because the government was willing to tolerate a dramatic decline in the standard of living of already poor farmers and had demonstrated that it would deal harshly with those who questioned its policies.[15] But opium production has thrived under US occupation as soldiers ignore crops and supplies in their pursuit of Al Qaeda terrorists and the U.S.-supported government tries to maintain its support among regional war lords deeply involved in the heroin trade.[16]

 

Why is illegal production possible?

Paris Cannibis Market

Indoor production using high-pressure sodium lamps and hydroponics watering systems. Import seeds from Netherlands, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Germany, USA and Canada. Suburban ‘farms’ in Paris can produce up to 500 grams per square meter of plants three to four times a year. Local Cannabis Cups hold fairs to compare varieties. OGD, 1998/99 p.. 101-02

Readers were probably surprised to discover the broad range of countries in which the illegal production of psychoactive substances occurs. Certainly media and government reports in the US do not prepare us to think of “producing countries” in this way. We have become accustomed to explain production of illicit psychoactive substances as the result of the infamous troika of poverty, corruption and “weak states.” But the evidence provided here demonstrates that the relationship between illegal production and the troika is probably better understood as spurious, rather than causal.

If poverty, corruption and weak states are not causal factors, what determines the ability of deviants, or those pursuing alternative lifestyles, or profit maximizers to act upon their motivations? The main requirement for production of illicit substances may best be understood as concealment. If so, then even if we eliminate poverty and corruption and reform failed and weak states, the production of illegal psychoactive substances can be expected to continue.

Concealment might come from paying off local police or farming in locales with little transportation infrastructure. But the ability to be free from prying eyes also comes from laws that protect the civil liberties of citizens, including their right to be free from “unreasonable search and seizure.” It is these laws that keep the U.S. and California state governments from simply having thousands of law enforcement officers, supplemented by National Guard and U.S. Army troops, sweep through the California central valley and, in a matter of days, dismantle the labs that supply 60% of U.S. consumption of meth and cause environmental damage to one of the most productive agricultural zones in the world. It is also these civil liberties laws that make it possible for people to access GHB Internet recipes to produce a “date-rape drug” in the privacy of their home kitchen. Since civil rights tend to be better protected in middle and upper class neighborhoods, it should also not come as a surprise that exclusive neighborhoods become attractive to producers, e.g., high potency marijuana production in the exclusive parts of Vancouver, Canada.[17]

Recognizing the importance of legal means of concealment is not to say that governments are helpless in pursuing production, or that poverty, corruption and state weakness do not facilitate production. In the U.S., the production of high potency marijuana is pursued using thermal imaging equipment in National Guard helicopters to detect “intense heat” in buildings and monthly electricity use is monitored in suspicious cases. Despite the high tech capabilities, the paper trail, the relatively lower incidence of poverty, and only a modest amount of corruption, the illegal production of psychoactive substances continues in the U.S., Canada and all the countries considered “most developed.”

 

This isolation is both beneficial and detrimental to the producer. While the secrecy and isolation protects the producer from the police who would imprison or extort him, it also renders him vulnerable to the law of the jungle. Her only defense against those who would steal her production or extort her is her own firepower. If the production is valuable, violence will be an ever-present threat for most producers.

Another counter to the advantage of physical isolation is that alternative products are not easily substituted for the illegal product once a producer has tired of illegality. The very inaccessibility that kept people (except those seeking products with low bulk, long shelf-life and high value), out of the area make it difficult to produce legitimate crops for a domestic or international market. Here the producer who depends upon civil liberties to hide his illegality has an advantage: the infrastructure connecting him to ready markets (including labor markets) for legal products reduces his opportunity costs for switching to a legal commodity. Lack of transportation infrastructure means that it is expensive to get things in (thus her input costs are high) and out (marketing costs and perishableness are the issues here).

Why do people produce illegal psychoactive substances?

Concealment is only an enabling factor for production. Clearly, not everyone who has the benefit of concealment engages in illegal activity. If that were the case, most societies would be mired in anarchy.

 

Our three frameworks for analysis provide answers to the question of why some people take advantage of concealment to produce illegal drugs. These answers can be competing, or in some formulations, complementary. So we return to the hypotheses set out at the beginning of this chapter and gather data to evaluate them.

 

Microgram Bulletin, Published by the Drug Enforcement Administration Office of Forensic Sciences Washington, D.C. 20537 http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/programs/forensicsci/microgram/mg0703/mg0703.html 

 

 

Why do people produce pyschoactive substances?

Barriers to entry for production

Four main reasons for people to choose to produce illegal psychoactive substances are often given.

 

Tradition: Pyschoactive substances harvested from natural products have been used for ages by people for religious, medicinal and culinary purposes. For cultures in which people still have links back to those traditions, we

 

Peyote harvested by the North American Church, under protection of the US Constitution, is legal but limited to traditional religious use by members of the Church. We’ve already mentioned that coca production for traditional chewing, as well as for the newer tees and soups to help tourists deal with the affects of altitude in highland Bolivia. Although used by non-indigenous people its purpose is consistent with a traditional purpose and context (to deal with altitude sickness).

 

The tradition argument for production cannot deal with the expansion of that production by traditional producers who then sell their product to non-traditional buyers who produce substances for new uses in new places (e.g., Turkish opium for use as heroin in Europe, coca for cocaine). Nor can it deal with new producers who move into new areas to produce traditional crops for non-traditional markets. If production were limited to traditional purposes in the developing world, Europe and the U.S. would not be consuming heroin or cocaine, but they would still have large illegal markets for the many drugs produced in laboratories and modern kitchens: pain killers and tranquilizers without prescriptions, methamphetamine, Ecstasy, LSD, GBT, etc.

 

Poverty. Many producers of coca and opium poppies are mired in poverty. For some the production of illegal psychoactive substances provides an escape from poverty (Bolivia?) or an opportunity for their children’s future (opium growers in Afghanistan) but for others production brings little relief (opium growers in Chan province Myanamar). How much such illegal activity contributes to poverty relief depends on the local conditions under which such production occurs. The two key items here are infrastructure and the degree of control non-producers involved in the illegal trade have over producers.

Poor farmers who are poor because they have land that is marginally fertile may relieve their poverty by planting hardy though illegal crops. Other farmers can have fertile land but little effective access to the inputs necessary to produce high value licit crops because local monopolists keep prices exorbitantly elevated. These farmers might be able to sell illicit crops and purchase electricity, potable water, telephone and television, health care and education for their children, thereby finding a path out of poverty.

But many poor farmers in the developing world live in regions characterized by a total lack of infrastructure: no highways, no electricity, no local health care, one room schools for multiple grades, no potable water or sewage. For these farmers higher prices for illegal crops do not translate into higher standards of living as long as they live in the same area. But leaving the area most likely means losing the ability to earn an income above the one they are likely to earn in irregular work in the informal and unskilled economy. These farmers may have bank accounts in the regional cities but the lack of infrastructure can still mean having the living standard of poverty.[18]

Unemployment is not necessarily indicative of poverty, but it does contribute to the same type of argument about why people produce: their economic condition forces them into it. Some producers move in and out of production depending upon their legal job situation. Some people in Paris use their involuntary free time when unemployed to grow high potency marijuana and tide them over until they can find employment in the legal economy again.[19]

 

Figures on how much coca grower gets per kilo of cocaine sold in US and opium grower per gram of heroin sold in US or Europe

 

profit,

 

Finance Rebellion and Terrorism. Rebels are ordinarily at a financial disadvantage against established governments that can tax legal activities to recruit, arm, train and mobilize police and the military. Traditional sources of income for rebellions have been kidnapping, extortion such as levying their own ‘taxes’ in territory controlled by them, and contraband sales of natural resources and commodities under their control (such as timber or diamonds).   (Independence in Asia or Africa financed by drugs, diamonds, etc?). During the Cold War many rebel groups garnered important financial and military support from either the US or the Soviet Union; but with the end of the superpower rivalry such “free” money and weapons are hard to come by.

Rebels and terrorists who use proceeds from contraband trade are most likely to tax or traffick that production rather than produce it. But the reason we put them here is the perception by some that producers may be forced to produce illicit substances by rebels who want to tax the production. The Shan rebels in Burma coerced farmers into expanding their opium production in the 1970s. Yet most places where rebels and terrorists tax production are areas where production existed prior such as Sendero Luminoso in Peru and the FARC in Colombia. CHECK TO SEE IF FARC PROMOTE EXPANSION OF CULTIVATION AND LABS

 

 

 

Summary:

Production for the Consumer

Conditions of production determined by substance characteristics & legal                                        framework

Producer rarely makes direct contact with consumer

Therefore, a distribution phase is necessary to link consumer and producer

 

 

If Mr. Ray, the tobacco farmer, were legally liable for the damage caused by the tobacco he produced ……………….



[1] . Elaine Monaghan,  Whiff of doom over US tobacco fields” The Times (London)
June 28, 2003 accessed via Lexis/Nexis March 30, 2004

[2] . Andean peasant, quoted in Catherine J. Allen, The Hold Life Has: Coca and Cultural Identity in an Andean Community n.p.:Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002, 2nd edition,  p. 193

[3] . “Arciniega’s War” PEW Case Study

[4] . Pursuit of coca eradication in Peru after Sendero

[5] . Canadian drug bust ephedrine

[6] . The New York Times,

[7] . Leary

[8] . newspaper article re: cigarette ads geared to minors

[9] . Drug Enforcement Agency, Drug Intelligence Brief  “The Changing Face of European Drug Policy” Intelligence Division, Office of International Intelligence, Europe, Asia, Africa Strategic Unit April  2002 http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/02023/02023p.html accessed 8/29/03

[10] . NORML, “European Drug Policy: 2002 Legislative Update” http://www.norml.org/index.cfm?Group_ID=5446  accessed 8/29/03

[11] .

[12] . Geopolitical Drug Watch, “A Drug Trade Primer for the Late 1990s” Current History

 

[13] . SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS, 1961, AS AMENDED BY THE 1972 PROTOCOL AMENDING THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS, 1961 www.

 

[14] . Observatere Global de Drugs, 1998/99 pp. 30-32

[15] . Barbara Crossette, “Taliban’s Ban on Poppy A Success, U.S. Aides Say” New York Times, May 20, 2001 p. A5

[16] . poppies in current Afghanistan

[17] .

[18] . In the 1970s, at the height of Mexico’s heroin boom, the author met a Mexican heroin farmer in exactly these conditions when the heroin producer was bringing his infant child, suffering from a gastrointestinal infection that had him on the verge of dying of dehydration, to the city.

[19] . Paris marijuana & U