Analysts of international conflict tend to ignore Latin America, believing
that little military conflict exists and that whatever wars in which these
nations may engage are minor. Even those who specialize in the politics
of the region, including Latin Americans themselves, tend to perceive interstate
conflict as sporadic and generally, a non-issue. This chapter examines
the historical record to demonstrate that the use of violence across national
boundaries has been a consistent trait of Latin America’s international
politics. In fact, violence in the region escalates to war in much the
same proportion as in the rest of the world, with the exception of the
Middle East.
The historical record of military conflict suggests that the Latin
American experience is appropriate for evaluating competing explanations
for why decision makers choose to use force. This chapter serves as an
historical overview of the empirical experience which will be explained
and related to specific theoretical arguments in Part Two. In the first
section, I define the security complex to which Latin America belongs and
identify its security problematique. A second section quantitatively examines
the history of Latin American wars and MIDs, both intra- and inter-regionally.
A concluding section examines past and current Latin American efforts to
eliminate the use of violence in the region’s international politics. These
failures, I argue, were the result of not understanding the dynamics which
lead to the use of force.
The Latin American Security Complex and Its Problematique
The primary security concerns which tightly link a group of countries
in Latin America’s security complex arise from both self-perceptions and
political competition. These factors link the U.S., Latin America, Belize,
Guyana and Surinam into a security complex, but have historically
kept Canada out. Even Canada’s decision to join the Organization of American
States has not yet effectively incorporated it into the security complex.
Self-perceptions link the former Spanish and Portuguese colonies with
the former British colony which defined itself in opposition to the mother
country (the U.S.), but not with the one which never severed those political
links (Canada). After independence the idea of a "Western Hemisphere",
culturally and politically distinct from Europe, permeated the diplomatic
rhetoric, if not actual foreign policy, of these states. There was even
discussion of "American" (i.e., western hemisphere) international law.
At various times different Latin American countries have tried, unsuccessfully,
to make the Monroe Doctrine (promulgated unilaterally by U.S. President
James Monroe in 1823) a security policy of the Americas as a whole.
But self-perceptions are usually a deceptive guide to behavior and
outcomes when they clash with material interests and power. The U.S. has
always opposed multi-lateralizing the Monroe Doctrine, while in the early
19th Century Simon Bolivar in Colombia, as well as Argentine leaders quickly
discovered that the U.S. would not jeopardize its relations with Europe
to defend other American nations. In the mid-19th century Mexico
found to its dismay that South American states were unwilling to play a
role in limiting U.S. expansion at the expense of its American neighbors.
Further examples of perceptions themselves not defining security complexes
abound in the 20th century. Among the most notable instances were Brazil's
frustrated claim to membership in the great power concert in the Council
of the League of Nations, Argentine perceptions that it belonged to a British-centered
security complex during W.W.II, and revolutionary Cuba's belief that it
could leave the regional security complex.
Central American balance of power dynamics, the Nicaragua-Colombia
territorial dispute, and the 1995 war between Ecuador and Peru provide
a more contemporary example of the indirect links among distinct bilateral
conflicts. In 1993 Colombia accused Nicaragua of seeeking missile boats
from North Korea in order to contest Colombian sovereignty over the San
Andres Islands. Nicaragua denied the charges, noted that it was downsizing
its military establishment in accord with Central American confidence building
measures, and cited the sale of helicopters to Ecuador as an example. These
purchases, in turn, increased the operational capacity of the Ecuadorian
armed forces and contributed to its provocative behavior in the disputed
territory. Peru responded with a full scale attack on Ecuadorian positions.
The security externalities which combine with self-identification to
make "Latin America" a security complex, arise from three different arenas:
international, regional and domestic. At the international level, the U.S.
is a great power which, irrespective of Latin American wishes, has historically
identified all of Latin America as belonging to its unique sphere of influence.
U.S. power and geography meant there would be no great power concert or
balancing in Latin America. The U.S. has never recognized the right of
any other great power to a sphere of influence, yet has insisted on its
right to unilaterally pursue and defend its interests anywhere in the western
hemisphere. U.S. foreign policy has been consistent on its right
to regional paramountcy from the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 through the Hay-Pauncefote
Treaty (1901), the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (1904), the
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (1947), and the invasion
of Panama in 1989. The security implication for Latin America has been
that U.S. defense interests produce fundamental security externalities
for each and every Latin American nation.
A second security externality is a remnant of Spanish colonialism and
nation-building after Independence. Latin American interstate conflicts
historically have most often revolved around how to resolve the overlapping
ecclesiastical, administrative, and military colonial boundaries affecting
the territories of national states. One reason why Latin American international
politics appears so geared to legal argumentation is because most states
have a treasure trove of colonial documents supporting expansive claims
over territory.
The prevalence of disputed territorial borders in the region means
that the method of resolution of a particular conflict, whether diplomatic
or military, takes on more general significance. This may explain why some
countries, frustrated by their own diplomatic failures to solve territorial
disputes, supported Argentina’s military seizure of the disputed Malvinas
Islands in 1982. For example, Peru, which provided military and diplomatic
aid to Argentina, was itself engaged in a long-standing dispute with Ecuador
in which the latter rejected Peru’s territorial gains by force of arms
in 1941.
A domestically-rooted externality develops out of the highly stratified
social structure in Latin America and the developing nature of its economies.
When the social structure in one country is threatened by revolutionary
upheaval, elites in the rest of Latin America begin to worry. These Latin
American perceptions of threats to regional stability are re-reinforced
by the U.S. in two ways. The U.S. attempts to organize regional opposition,
and thus engages in rhetorical excesses, if not the actual fabrication
of "evidence" of revolutionary internationalism. In addition, the
willingness of the U.S. to act militarily in these situations raises the
specter of internationalizing domestic conflict (as occurred in Central
America during the 1980s).
Transborder spillovers of revolutionary upheaval are not merely perceptual
overreactions by Latin American and U.S. elites. Historically, many of
those seeking to change the social structure within their country have
both appealed for support from and offered assistance to their Latin American
brothers and sisters facing the same problems. Sandino's fight against
the U.S. intervention in Nicaragua during the 1920s, Cuba's Revolution,
Chile's Popular Unity administration, and the Nicaraguan Sandinistas in
the 1970-80s all had significant extra-national participation. In
addition, neo-fascist agents from Brazil's Estado Novo traveled South America
in the 1930s to build a regional front against "Communists", Peron's Argentine
labor movement and Peru's progressive APRA party tried to reproduce themselves
elsewhere on the continent, Caribbean democrats cooperated loosely in the
notorious Caribbean Legion to overthrow dictators, and Che Guevara tried
to reproduce the Cuban Revolution in the heart of South America.
Note, however, that Latin America’s security complex does not include
an issue which characterizes developing countries in other regions: the
nation itself is not an issue. Political regimes which claim
to represent the nation often have legitimacy problems, but in the 20th
century these have not led to separatist movements. Indigenous people,
as well as the descendants of Africans brought to the Atlantic coast in
Central America, have demanded their rights as citizens, and in cases where
communities are split physically by national boundaries, dual citizenship.
Not even the recent political movements for varying degrees of autonomy
by some of these communities call for full independence.
If Latin America can be thought of as a security complex, what is its
security problematique? From a Latin American perspective, extra-continental
threats largely ceased to be major issues once the U.S. became powerful
enough to defend the hemisphere. (Mexico did worry about a Japanese attack
during W.W.II, but neither Brazil nor Argentina was seriously concerned
about German aggression; indeed, when the U.S. provided Brazil with equipment
and supplies to defend its "bulge" on the Atlantic, the Brazilians chose
to focus resources on their southwestern border with Argentina. ) Although
Germany tried alternately to woo and threaten Mexico, Chile, Argentina
and Brazil, these American states understood that the costs of playing
balance of power politics were enormous, the chances of the U.S. accomodating
such an alliance small, and the threat from Germany if they did not ally,
minor.
Given the forced isolation of the region from great power politics,
its security problematique arises from the region's own internal characteristics.
In a security complex characterized by disputed borders, unequal levels
of economic development and broad disparities in the distribution of power,
the main security threats for Latin American states revolve around sudden
attempts at military resolutions of long-standing border issues, massive
movements of migrants, and the spread of revolution. Included in this regional
security agenda is the manner and timing of U.S. intervention in the hemisphere.
U.S. unilateralism and its inconsistent application (meaning that a country
cannot count on U.S. aid if attacked ) produce security benefits and costs
for Latin American states which are largely beyond their capacity to control.
The unpredictability of U.S. behavior thus becomes a security risk.
The History of Militarized Disputes in the Region
Table 2.1 lists the 23 wars in which Latin American nations participated
after their wars of Independence, both in the Western Hemisphere as well
as in Europe (WWI and WWII) and Asia (WWII and Korea). The standard international
relations definition of war, which requires at least 1,000 battlefield
related deaths, is quite arbitrary, but accepted in the field. My analysis
conforms to standard usage in the interest of developing a study which
can be used by researchers outside of the region. In consequence, many
of the events which observers of, and participants in, the region call
“war” are excluded from this analysis; they are, however, included
in the analysis of militarized disputes.
Two exceptions merit comment. The Leticia War in 1932 produced 868
battlefield related deaths. Although this number falls below the 1,000
threshold, the 800 Peruvian losses in a population estimated at 5.65 million
in 1930 were the equivalent of over 17,000 losses in a U.S. population
estimated at 123 million in 1930 and would be more than 38,000 for a population
of 270 million in 1996! I find it difficult to accept that this military
clash should not be considered a “war.” I have therefore included it in
the list of Latin American wars, but not in the discussion of wars across
regions, since I do not know if other regions had similar “near misses.”
I have not, however, included the 1937 attack by Dominican forces on Haitian
migrants which killed up to 12,000. Because the Haitian government responded
diplomatically, not militarily, the Dominican action produced a “massacre,”
but not a “war.”
Table 2.1
Latin American Wars Since Independence
Year Name Participants
1825-28 Uruguayan War
Argentina v. Brazil
1836-39 Peruvian Confederation
Chile (Argentina) v. Bolivia, Peru
1841 Peruvian-Bolivian
Peru v. Bolivia
1846-48 Mexican-American War
United States v. Mexico
1851-52 La Plata War
Brazil v. Argentina
1861-67 Franco-Mexican War
France (United Kingdom, Italy) v. Mexico
1864-70War of the Triple Alliance
Paraguay v. Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay
1863 Ecuadorian-Colombian War
Ecuador v. Colombia
1865-66 Spanish-Chilean War
Spain v. Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia
?1876 First Central American War
Guatemala v. El Salvador
1879-84 War of the Pacific
Chile v. Peru, Bolivia
1885 First Central American War (?) Mexico,
El Salvador v. Guatemala
1906 Second Central American War Guatemala,
Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua
1907 Third Central American War
Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua
1932-35 Chaco War
Bolivia v. Paraguay
1932 Leticia Wara
Peru v. Colombia
1939-41 Zarumilla Warb
Peru v. Ecuador
1969 Soccer War
El Salvador v. Honduras
1982 Malvinas/Falklands War
Argentina v. Great Britain
1995 Cenepa War
Peru v. Ecuador
Latin American Combat Participation in Other Warsc
1918 WWI
Brazil
1944 WWII
Brazil, Mexico
1950 Korea
Colombia
a. 868 battlefield deaths, below the 1,000 COW cutoff. See discussion
in text.
b. MID data records a fatality level of over 999, but miscodes hostility
level at 4 rather than at 5.
c. In WWI Brazilian shipping was sunk by the Germans and a Brazilian
naval squadron participated in Allied patrolling of the north-west African
coast. During WWII Brazil fought in Italy, sustaining 400 dead and capturing
13,000 German and Italian troops; Mexico flew 785 ground attack missions
in the Pacific. Colombia sent 4,000 troops to Korea, suffering 120 dead,
proportionately equivalent to 1,612 U.S. dead. English, Armed Forces of
Latin America pp. 101, 109, 318, 171, respectively
Source: MID data base, revised version to 1992; MID labels both the 1876 and 1885 conflicts as “First Central American War”; Osny Duarte Pereira, La seudo-rivalidad argentino-brasileno Buenos Aires: Corregidor, 1975 notes 8,000 Brazilian deaths in the Uruguayan War. On the War of the Peruvian Confederation, St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru, pp. 34-40; Peru-Ecuador 1996 field research.
Of the 23 wars, 17 have been among Latin American nations. Nine of those
Latin American wars occurred in the 19th century and eight in the 20th
century. The wars of the first 60-80 years of independence had tremendous
consequences: states were created, states ceased to exist, and the position
of states in the regional hierarchy was dramatically altered. Uruguay was
created by British mediation as a result of the Argentine-Brazilian war
of 1825. The creation of Panama in 1903 was partly the result of civil
war in Colombia, but the dispatch of US forces to the region to prevent
the central government from defeating the secessionist movement was a fundamental
determinant. Gran Colombia split into three states, one of which (Ecuador)
struggled constantly to keep itself together. The break-up of the United
Provinces of Central America led to the establishment of five independent
states, and 70 years of war to attempt to recreate it under either Guatemalan
or Nicaraguan leadership. War thus also had implications for the regional
distribution of power: a Central America united under the auspices of one
state would make that state a more important player in regional politics.
Perhaps the greatest impact of war on the regional hierarchy of states
comes from the War of the Peru-Bolivia Confederation (1836-39) and the
War of the Triple Alliance (1863-70). Those wars thwarted two powers which
appeared poised to create the most powerful states in the region; that
Bolivia and Paraguay are today the poorest states by far in South America
is testimony to the importance of the stakes of war at the time.
The stakes of international conflict in Latin America declined around
the turn of the century (after roughly 1885 in South America and 1907 in
Central America). National existence and international hierarchy solidified
as national identities took hold, states developed centralized and effective
governments and military capabilities increased. Some analysts attempt
to deprecate the significance of Latin America’s 20th century wars as a
result, noting that they fall just over the threshold, with the exception
of the Chaco War (Bolivia and Paraguay sustained approximately 100,000
deaths). In studying the use of violence, however, we should not rigidly
adhere to definitions out of context. In the 1969 war Honduras (the poorest
country in the region at the time) suffered 2,000-5,000 deaths as result
of the Salvadoran invasion, equivalent to the US today losing approximately
200,000-500,000 people. The US lost “only” 53,000 service people in Vietnam,
but few would call it an insignificant war for the US. In addition to the
loss of human life, the 1969 war effectively interrupted for almost 30
years the Central American economic integration project which had been
progressing rapidly and stimulating strong growth in the region.
In the Zarumilla War, Ecuador lost 40% of the territory it claimed to Peru.
Over the next 42 years there were 20 militarized disputes between the two
parties, resulting in another war in 1995.
While war may happen in Latin America, some analysts believe that it
is less common in this region than elsewhere. Tables 2.2 and 2.3
use two different conceptions of region for thinking comparatively about
Latin America’s experience with war. Table 2.2 uses the four standard regions
in the literature to situate Latin America comparatively. In terms of total
international wars since 1816 (the start date for quantitative studies
of war) Latin America is not exceptionally peaceful. Europe (30) is by
far the most warlike, followed by Asia (22) and Latin America (21, not
counting the Leticia War), each of which has significantly more experience
with war than the Middle East (10) or Africa (5). Latin America’s ranking
is not entirely different when we just examine the 20th Century, when virtually
all of the African, Asian and the Middle Eastern wars occurred. (The distribution
of wars in these regions is a function of the way in which war is coded
in the literature, rather than a reflection on the use of force in the
region: only conflicts between recognized members of the international
state system count as interstate wars, the other conflicts are either colonial
wars or extra-systemic wars.) The frequency of Latin American wars (7)
in this century keeps the region in the middle of the group: well below
Europe (15) and Asia (19), slightly below the Middle East (9), but above
Africa (4).
Table 2.2
War Occurrence by Region
(Among Sovereign States in the International System)
Total Wars 1816-1997 (standard comparison)
Europe Asia Africa Middle East Latin America
30 22 5 10 22*(23)
20th Century Wars to 1997 (standard comparison)
Europe Asia Africa Middle East Latin America
15 19 4 9 7*(8)
* Because of our comparative interest here, the Leticia War has not
been added since I do not know if other regions have near misses in the
battlefield related deaths count.
Source: MID data base, hostility level 5, revised version to 1992,
plus author’s addition of the following post 1992 wars: Europe two (Croatia-Yugoslavia;
Bosnia, with Croat and Serbian participation), Latin America one (Ecuador-Peru).
The Zarumilla War is added because it is listed with a fatality level of
over 999, but was miscoded as a hostility level of 4, rather than 5.
Table 2.3 focuses on post WWII wars and organizes the regional categories into groups which actually share immediate security concerns and interact over security issues (e.g., India and Korea have few security related interactions), and adds a North America category consisting of Canada, the U.S. and Mexico (The fact that Mexico is in two regions, North and Latin America, does not matter since the country has been involved in no post WWII wars.) Viewed in this light, the Latin American experience appears even less unique. In the post W.W.II period Latin America has had more wars (3) than northeast Asia(1) and Africa (2), and just 1 fewer than Europe, Southeast Asia and the Indian subcontinent (each with 4). Only in comparison with the Middle East’s 9 wars can we think of Latin America (and the rest of the world!) as being relatively peaceful.
Table 2.3
Post WWII Wars 1945-1997
(security community comparisons)
Middle East ...........................9
Europe...................................4
Southeast Asia.......................4
Indian Subcontinent..............4
Latin America.......................3
Africa.....................................2
Northeast Asia........................1
North America........................0
For the period after MID II, I have added two European wars (Croatia-Yugoslavia,
and Bosnia) and one Latin American war, Ecuador-Peru.
If we turn our attention to interstate disputes in which official military
violence is threatened or used without producing war, the picture for Latin
America is even more violent. In the twentieth century alone, Latin American
states threatened, used military force against each other or were the subject
of such threats or force by non-Latin American countries more than two
hundred times. The occurrence of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs)
actually increased in the 20th century.
In comparative perspective, Latin America’s MID behavior also does
not distinguish the region either. The occurrence of MIDs in the international
system has increased over time, even taking into account the increase in
number of states in the system. Examining the MID behavior of individual
nations, we find that of the 21 most dispute prone non-great power states
between 1816-1976, seven are Latin American. Among the forty-four
enduring rivalries over the period 1816-1992, Latin American states were
involved in ten, including the two longest rivalries in the study (Ecuador-Peru
over 100 years, and Chile-Argentina with 112 years) And finally,
analysis of dispute behavior between 1816-1976 demonstrates that the patterns
of MID behavior are generalizable across geographic boundaries.
Table 2.4 analyzes the MID data in terms of five categories:
total MIDs; average number of years between militarized disputes;
the escalation of MIDs to war; total participants; and whether force is
used by the initiator of the conflict. Data limitations precluded analyzing
the behavior of the target countries in a MID. The data are also only analyzed
from the end of the National Period through 1993 because my research on
MIDs after 1993 did not produce reliable evidence about the initiating
action.
Table 2.4
Latin American
Militarized Interstate Disputes
(After the National Period)
Total MIDs
total years
war/
MIDsa per dispute
MID
South America 127 110/127
3/127
1884-1993
0.87 0.024
Central Americac 110
87/110 3/110
1907-1993
0.79 0.027
Participation Characteristics
total
forceb by forceb by
participants
initiators targets
South America 290 91/147
--d
1884-1993 0.62
Central Americac 170
51/73
--d
1907-1993
0.70
a. Excluding W.W.I, W.W.II and Korea. see explanation in text.
b. Force is defined as having a hostility level of 4 or greater in
the MID data set (using rather than merely threatening or displaying force).
c. Includes Central America, Panama, Mexico, Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican
Republic
d. Data has too many missing force values to be meaningful.
Source: MID data set
From Table 2.4 we can see that MIDs occur on average more than once every year (every 0.87 years in South America, every 0.79 years in Central America). Disputes tend to begin with the overt use of force, rather than merely a threat: 62% in South America and 70% in Central America. Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient data to evaluate the response of the target of such threats. Although disputes do escalate and become militarized, it is extremely rare that they develop into war (1,000 battlefield deaths): only around 2.4% for South America and 2.8% in Central America. These data support the claims of other analysts that Latin American states militarize issues for diplomatic and domestic purposes, rather than in preparation for war, This behavior is well in line with the general finding that disputes involving only non-great powers “have a very high likelihood of involving the use of force, but the probability of these disputes escalating to war has been quite small.
Contemporary Latin American Disputes
Many analysts, commentators and policy makers consider serious intra-Latin
American disputes, as well as their possible militarization as belonging
to another era, specifically that characterized as pre-redemocratization
and Cold War, if not pre-economic liberalization and free trade. Chapters
3 and 4 present quantitative and qualitative analyses over time to dispute
the notion that conflict in the region is time bound in any significant
way. In this section I simply want to present the data which demonstrate
that violent interstate conflict has not halted in the contemporary period.
The contemporary era can be defined in two ways for an examination
of MID behavior in Latin America; alternative dating criteria reflect views
about why Latin American states used violence before the contemporary era.
For some observers a watershed in Latin American politics began after 1979
with redemocratization (Ecuador started the latest “wave” in 1979), while
others are more inclined to utilize 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell and
signaled the end of the Cold War.
Disagreements with other states is inherent in the very nature of sovereignty.
The question is not whether Latin American states ceased having disagreements
once they re-democratized or the Cold War ended; rather it is whether they
stopped using, or significantly decreased the use of military force in
their international bargaining over these disputes.
My definition of democracy uses the Polity III rankings up to 1993,
with countries scoring 6 or better on the 0-10 democracy scale. For analysts
who believe 6 to be too low, we need to remember that Chile in the 1960s
scored a 6; few students of Latin America would claim Chile was non-democratic
at the time. By the 1990s most Latin American democracies garner
scores in the 8-10 range. I have disagreements with Polity III rankings
for El Salvador (1984), Guatemala (1993) and Honduras (1990). The first
two countries were engaged in serious civil wars in the 1980s, during which
human, civil, and political rights were drastically curtailed for large
portions of the population; hence I date their democratic transitions at
a later time when their peace agreements were implemented: 1992 and 1997,
respectively. Honduras began its transition to democracy in 1982 and by
the second presidential election in 1986 had adopted the institutional
and procedural mechanisms to give elections real meaning, as well as promote
civil and human rights sufficiently to merit a 6. After 1993 the characterizations
are mine and generally follow Polity III, except that I return Peru to
democracy by 1994 and drop it in 1997 after a major newspaper was expropriated
for criticizing President Alberto Fujimori.
Table 2.5
Contemporary Democracies in Latin America
Haiti 1990-91, 1994- Dominican Republic 1978- Cuba-NO
Costa Rica 1948- Guatemala 1993 (1997) Honduras 1990 (1986)
El Salvador 1984- (1992-) Nicaragua 1990- Panama 1990-
Colombia 1957- Venezuela 1958- Guyana 1992-
Ecuador 1979- Peru 1980-91 (1994-6) Brazil 1985-
Bolivia 1982- Paraguay 1989- Chile 1990-
Argentina 1983 Uruguay 1985- Mexico-NO
Source: Polity III TO 1993, democracy score of 6 or better; Mares classifications after 1993. Mares revisions in parentheses and discussed in text
The data in Table 2.6 provide information on the intra-Latin American
MIDs occurring from 1980-1997. The MID II data base terminates in 1992
and the latter years are compiled from my own search. The highest
level of hostility reached in the MID is provided either directly from
the MID data base or based on my calculation according to MID criteria.
The last column of the table indicates whether or not the countries in
the dispute were democratic.
Examination of Table 2.6 reveals that there was no shortage of MIDs
among Latin American states after 1979. Based on the incomplete data, 1990-94
appears to represent a significant decrease in MID activity. But by 1995
Latin America seems to return to its historical pattern of multiple MIDs
per year.
Let’s look first at the empirical record of the relationship between
democracy and the use of military force in foreign policy. From 1980-97
there were at least 52 MIDs. Of these MIDs 15 occurred between interstate
dyads combining democratic and non-democratic regimes, 27 MIDs were between
democratic pairs, and only 10 MIDs occurred among non-democratic dyads.
Incredibly, after 1990 all of the 16 MIDs occurred between democratic dyads,
although Table 2.5 indicates that there were still many non-democratic
countries in the region. El Salvador and Guatemala experienced post Cold
War MIDs only after democratizing in 1993 and 1997, respectively. Peru,
which shifted back and forth between democracy and authoritarianism in
this period, became engaged in militarized disputes only during its democratic
years. While the data set is much too limited and incomplete to allow strong
conclusions, at a minimum the data in Table 2.6 clearly dispute the argument
that democratic states are absolutely peaceful. Further analysis of the
democratic peace question is found in Chapter 4.
Let’s turn to the question of whether the end of the Cold War means
the end of militarized behavior. (Chapter 3 examines the question of whether
the Cold War increased the level of conflict in the region.) The evidence
in Table 2.6, although incomplete, provides strong evidence for rejecting
this claim. Since the end of the Cold War there have been 16 MIDs, including
one war, between Latin American countries.
Table 2.6
Intra-Latin American MIDs 1979-92
1980-1989
Year Dyad Hostility Level Democracy
1980 Colombia/Nicaragua 3 yes/no
Chile/Argentina 4 no/no
1981 Ecuador/Peru 4 yes/yes
Nicaragua/Honduras 3 no/yes
Venezuela/Guyana 3 yes/no
Chile/Argentina 4 no/no
Argentina/Chile 4 no/no
1982 Argentina/Great Britain 5 no/yes
Venezuela/Colombia 4 yes/yes
Venezuela/Guyana 4 yes/no
Guatemala/Mexico ? no/no
1983 Nicaragua/Costa Rica 4 no/yes
Argentina/Brazil 4 no/no
Argentina/Chile 3 no/no
Ecuador/Peru 4 yes/yes
1984 Guatemala/Mexico 4 no/no
Peru/Ecuador 4 yes/yes
Argentina/Chile 4 no/no
1985 Honduras/El Salvador 3 yes/no
Nicaragua/Costa Rica 4 no/yes
Ecuador/Peru 4 yes/yes
Ecuador/Peru 4 yes/yes
1986 Dominican Rep/Haiti 3 yes/no
Nicaragua/Honduras 4 no/yes
Nicaragua/Costa Rica 4 no/yes
Venezuela/Colombia 2 yes/yes
1987 Dominican Rep/Haiti 3 yes/no
Nicaragua/Costa Rica 4 no/yes
Colombia/Venezuela 4 yes/yes
1988 Honduras/Nicaragua 3 yes/no
Panama/Costa Rica 4 no/yes
Colombia/Venezuela 4 yes/yes
Ecuador/Peru 4 yes/yes
1989
Honduras/Nicaragua 4 yes/no
El Salvador/Honduras 4 no/yes
Peru/Ecuador 3 yes/yes
Table 2.6 cont.
End of the Cold War
Year Dyad Hostility Level Democracy
1990 NONE
1991 Honduras/Nicaragua 4 yes/yes
Peru/Ecuador 3 yes/yes
1992 NONE
End of MID II; begin internet search by Mares
1993 None
1994 Ecuador-Peru 2 yes/yes
1995 Ecuador/Peru 5 yes/yes
Ecuador/Peru 4 yes/yes
Colombia/Venezuela 4 yes/yes
Nicaragua/Honduras 4 yes/yes
Nicaragua/Colombia (?) 2 yes/yes
1996 Nicaragua/Honduras 4 yes/yes
Nicaragua/El Salvador 4 yes/yes
Honduras/El Salvador 4 yes/yes
1997 Honduras/Nicaragua 4 yes/yes
Nicaragua/Costa Rica 3 yes/yes
El Salvador/Honduras 3 yes/yes
Venezuela/Colombia 4 yes/yes
Belize/Guatemala 4 yes/yes
Sources: MID II to 1992; my research after 1992; democracy classification
from Table 2.5
What specific issues are associated with the use of interstate
violence in Latin America? Table 2.6 lists the 11 major, 4 minor and 4
latent disputes covering a wide variety of issues which confront the region
today. I consider a dispute as major if one side is actively discussing
revision of the status quo or a MID has occurred in the current activation
of the dispute. A minor but active dispute is one in which disagreements
over implementing an agreement occur, but in which military force has not
been utilized by either party. A latent dispute is one in which disagreements
exist but neither side raises it for discussion.
Table 2.7
Interstate Disputes in Contemporary Latin America
Countries Issue
Major Disputes
Guatemala-Belize Border demarcation
Honduras-El Salvador Implementation of Interamerican Court
of Justice decision on
border demarcation; migration
Honduras-El Salvador-Nicaragua Maritime demarcation in Gulf of Fonseca;
depletion of fisheries
Honduras-Nicaragua Maritime demarcation in Atlantic; migration
Nicaragua-Costa Rica border demarcation; migration; transit
rights in San Juan river
Nicaragua-Colombia Territorial dispute over San Andres
& Providencia Islands
Colombia-Venezuela 34 points on border in dispute; migration;
guerrillas; contraband, including
but not limited to drugs;
Venezuela-Trinidad & Tobago Maritime boundaries; natural resources
Haiti-Dominican Republic Migration, border demarcation?
Ecuador-Peru Border demarcation
Bolivia-Chile Territorial dispute: outlet to the
Pacific
Minor but Active Disputes
Argentina-Chile Ratification of Campos de Hielo agreement
Chile-Peru Final implementation of 1929 treaty covering
Peruvian access to Chilean port at Arica
Panama-Colombia Guerrilla incursions into Panama
Colombia-Costa Rica Territorial sea in the Pacific
Latent Disputes
Venezuela-Guyana Territorial dispute: Venezuela claims 40%
of Guyana
Antarctica Treaty puts national claims on hold
Argentina-Great Britain Malvinas/Falklands, Georgias & Sandwich
Sur
United States-Cuba US naval base in Guantanamo
Border demarcations dominate the list of current grievances, but competition
for fishing and petroleum resources is also significant. Migratory flows
add fuel to the tensions generated by border and resource disputes, most
significantly between Colombia-Venezuela, El Salvador-Honduras and Costa
Rica-Nicaragua. It is a particularly difficult issue between the latter
two countries, since the Nicaraguan economy is in such bad shape that about
1/2 million Nicaraguans (1/7th the population) have migrated to Costa Rica
illegally; the money they send back represents an important source of income
for many Nicaraguan families. Costa Rica has expelled many such undocumented
workers; a truce was recently worked out, but the agreement expires on
October 31, 1997 and Costa Rican officials are reluctant to extend it.
Even when a dispute has been “officially resolved” at the negotiation
or arbitration stage, problems persist in the implementation stage. Many
examples exist in the current “peaceful” environment. Argentina and Chile
are presently holding up ratification of an agreement resolving their last
outstanding dispute because the Menem government apparently fears that
it will not be ratified in Congress, and that potential political fallout
would affect his next presidential campaign. More ominously, although the
Hondurans and Salvadorans have accepted the World Court decision delimiting
the border between them, there have been military mobilizations and confrontations
by vigilante groups on the border disputing whether repatriation of citizens
on the “wrong” side of the border should be forcibly carried out, as well
as what the compensation should be for the property of those choosing to
move.
Ecuador and Peru have been in the process of negotiating a resolution
of their dispute since the last war between the two ended in early 1995.
The military forces were separated in the immediate area of fighting, a
number of secondary issues have been dealt with, and an important process
of confidence building among the militaries is underway. But the militaries
still seem to be positioning themselves outside of the last area of fighting
and the diplomatic negotiations are stalling over Ecuadorian insistence
on sovereign access to the Amazon. There was some movement in early 1998
on the Ecuadorian position, but a breakthrough has yet to occur.
Finally, the Bolivia-Chile dispute re-activated in 1996 after 20 years
of dormancy. During 1976-78 Bolivia was engaged in what appeared to be
fruitful negotiations to resolve the issue created by Chilean seizure of
Bolivia’s Pacific coast province in the 1879 War of the Pacific. By the
provisions of the Treaty of 1929 which resolved the Peru-Chilean dispute
resulting from the same war, however, Peru had to second any Chilean grants
of sovereign access to the Pacific for Bolivia which traversed previously
Peruvian territory. The Peruvians vehemently protested the 1976-78 negotiations,
and a war scare ensued, convincing the Chileans to cease discussions. Bolivia
severed full diplomatic relations with Chile in 1978. In 1996 Bolivians
began actively discussing the issue and the new government of President
Hugo Banzer brought up the issue at the United Nations in the fall of 1997.
Although the dispute has not militarized to date, Bolivia has attempted
to garner international support by accusing Chile of maintaining half a
million mines on their border. (Chile also maintains mines on its border
with Peru.)
SUMMARY PARAGRAPH ON USE OF VIOLENCE
Latin American Efforts to De-Legitimize the Use of Force
Many Latin Americans have often been troubled by the use of force in
their international relations. In the early to mid 19th century they sought
to banish interstate violence from their foreign policies through a variety
of integrationist schemes, all of which failed. By the latter half of the
19th century statesmen turned to an international law approach, focusing
on treaties, arbitration and mediation. The heyday of such efforts was
from 1885-1925 when many interstate disputes were not just managed, but
resolved.
Political integration was the dream of some of Latin America's great
liberators and statesmen. Political integration would build on cultural
and political regime affinities (Spanish American and Liberal Republican),
integrating markets and turning interstate military competition into the
politics of federalism. Bolivar himself created Gran Colombia, consisting
of present day Venezuela, Ecuador and Colombia. Peru and Bolivia became
a confederated state, and the Central American communities formed the United
Provinces of Central America at independence.
The integrationist approach to common security was defeated throughout
Latin America by the force of arms. To avoid civil war, Gran Colombia disbanded
in 1830. Chile and Argentina feared the potential of the Peru-Bolivia Confederation.
War ensued and although Argentina was defeated, Chile prevailed in 1836-39.
The United Provinces of Central American succumbed to civil wars in 1838-42
and Central American leaders fought until 1907 to recreate an integrated
national entity.
The U.S. perception of security (as well as destiny) in its immediate
continental sphere was governed by a unilateral integrationist logic which
would have serious consequences for at least one Latin American country,
Mexico. According to this logic, security lay in incorporating all westward
territory to the Pacific Ocean into the same political unit, that of the
U.S.. The U.S. approach was based on the military conquest of those areas,
instead of negotiated integration. Rather than reject the use of military
force as a path to security, the U.S. embraced it as a legitimate and useful
tool to develop continental security. The price, nevertheless, was high
for all states involved. Indigenous peoples were herded into reservations,
Mexico was despoiled of almost half of its territory and the U.S. Civil
War was the second bloodiest war of the 19th century (second to the Napoleonic
Wars).
There were other Latin American attempts at de-legitimating the use
of force in a community of sovereign states. These were oriented around
the creation and application of a hemispheric jurisprudence.
Latin Americans joined with the U.S. in perceiving the Americas as
a special place, far from the power politics of Europe. This uniqueness
was expected to produce a special style of international politics. For
the U.S., uniqueness meant that the U.S. would remake the hemisphere in
its own image and be its leader. Latin Americans, however, were generally
more interested in de-legitimizing the use of force (military and otherwise)
by powerful states in their disputes with weaker states. "American Law"
was expected to protect the sovereignty of all states, rather than give
great powers rights to police small power behavior. Hope in an “American
system” remained, even when it became clear that this perspective did not
prevent the U.S. or even Latin American states from violating the sovereignty
of American states, or that not all Latin American states rejected the
great power legal international order.
In a rebuke to European practice, Latin American diplomats and jurists
formulated the first attempts to legally limit the ability of nations to
use force to collect debts owed their national citizens by foreign governments
(Calvo and Drago Doctrines). Latin American efforts to limit the use of
force extended to the U.S. as well. In the early 1900s the U.S. claimed
to be promoting civilization, democracy and stability by refusing to recognize
governments which had come to power in non-democratic ways. Recognition
was an important factor since the Marines and the Navy were dispatched
throughout the world when no “legitimate” government was in place to protect
the lives and property of U.S. citizens. In addition, lack of “legitimacy”
affected the ability of the domestic opposition to a government to arm
itself and call on outside support. The U.S. used this policy to reward
pro-U.S. actors and punish those who sought to balance the U.S.'s growing
domination with European connections. Many Latin American countries consequently
sought to make recognition of governments in power automatic, rather than
subject to U.S. scrutiny of their "legitimacy".
Latin Americans also tried to marginalize the use of force among themselves.
Between 1826 and 1889 at least 50 conventions among Latin American states
forswore the use of force to resolve disputes. Yet this was the period
of the bloodiest wars in the Latin American security complex. Between 1929
and 1936 seven major treaties and protocols forswore the use of force,
but none was ratified by every state. Even states which ratified often,
including the U.S., did so with reservations. And once again, this was
a period of intense violence in the region (the Chaco War, the Leticia
War, the Dominican massacre of Haitian migrants, and the build-up to the
Zarumilla War in 1941 all occurred at this time).
Mediation and arbitration by both regional and extra-regional actors
have a long history in the region. From 1885-1925 arbitral settlements
of interstate conflicts in Latin America flourished. Their use declined
over time, but El Salvador and Honduras and Chile and Argentina arbitrated
their border disputes in the 1980s and 1990s. The resolutions by the arbitors
have not been easy to implement, but they have not been rejected. The Central
American countries dragged their feet on the 1992 World Court ruling, but
in 1998 agreed to work out the terms of implementation. Chile and
Argentina settled thirteen of fourteen border disagreements after 1984,
including many which had already escalated to militarized conflict, including
a near border war in 1978. Domestic protests of the 1994 arbitral decision
favoring Argentina in the Laguna del Desierto controversy, initially made
Chile reluctant to submit the final disagreement to arbitration, but the
government ultimately did so.
Latin American calls to declare the region a Zone of Peace in the early
1980s were not efforts to eliminate the role of violence in international
politics. The rhetoric was directed at the superpowers, to keep them from
confronting each other in the hemisphere and thereby contribute to the
militarization of regional disputes. But the calls were not oriented toward
changing the manner in which states in the Western Hemisphere themselves
managed their disputes. Instead, it attempted to create stability partly
based on states legitimate right to maintain adequate defense forces (thereby
defusing the tensions created by the Sandinista military build-up after
deposing the dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle). Thus the concept of a
Zone of Peace lost its relevance with the end of the Cold War.
It took the Central American presidents themselves, under the leadership
of Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, to examine the role of military force.
The Esquipulas agreements focused on democratic resolution of civil strife
and targeted military establishments as one of the obstacles. They therefore
called for a significant reduction in the size of defense establishments,
with Arias himself arguing for their abolishment. Although the civil wars
ended, and initial progress was made in questioning the need for defense
establishments, only Panama (after the US invasion in 1989) abolished the
military.
Only in the U.S.-Mexican relationship since the 1930s can we find evidence
of an effective pluralistic security community. Mexico lost half its territory
to the U.S. in 1848, suffered a war scare in the 1880s, and experienced
two military interventions during the Mexican Revolution (1914 and 1916).
But after 1928 both sides began to accommodate each other: Mexico toned
down some aspects of its Revolution and the U.S. accepted others, including
a socialist-like rhetoric and nationalization of the petroleum industry.
Mexicans had come to appreciate that militarizing its relations with the
great power could not benefit Mexico and the U.S. came to accept the importance
of Mexican domestic stability. While they subsequently had a border demarcation
disagreement (in the Chamizal), neither sought to militarize it.
Even in this case, however, the perception that military force is unable
to produce security in this complex relationship is increasingly under
challenge. Faced with an inward flow of drugs and people the U.S. has been
steadily militarizing its southern border in a largely futile attempt to
control these new “threats”. The U.S. public and their leaders may not
believe war is thinkable with Mexico, but they are coming to believe that
using military force against Mexico is a legitimate way to address particularly
pressing problems.
CONCLUSION
Latin America is actually quite a “standard” region when it comes to
the use of military force in foreign policy. While not as war or violence
prone as some regions (notably Europe) it does use force more than others
(mainly North America, Africa and Northeast Asia). The region is thus not
an anomaly for security studies and can provide a data set for evaluating
competing arguments about the determinants of the use of military force.
Sporadic efforts to de-legitimize the use of force in interstate disputes
demonstrate that states in the region understand the benefits of such a
principle. A reading of the historical record, nonetheless, demonstrates
that American nations were reluctant to place full confidence in it. The
issue of interstate conflict in Latin America was, and continues to be,
important. There are many issues which produce tensions in international
affairs both among Latin American countries, as well as with the U.S. That
conflict rarely escalates to full scale war and cooperation often wins
out, at least in the short term. The threat to use military force, nevertheless,
is ubiquitous, while the actual use of that force occurs too often to see
it as aberrant behavior.