J. Lawrence Broz

Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies, Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego

Research (work in progress, recent articles, books) 

I study the institutions of monetary and financial policymaking - central banks, exchange rate regimes, the IMF, etc. - which vary widely across countries and over time.  I use both quantitative and case study methods and draw analytically from open-economy macroeconomics and positive political economy. 

For a full list of my work, see my C.V.

Recent articles:

  "Exchange-Rate Policy Attitudes: Direct Evidence from Survey Data," (with Jeffry Frieden and Stephen Weymouth). IMF Staff Papers 55, 3 (2008)   Data for replication are available from the Dataverse Network.

  "Congressional Politics of Financing the International Monetary Fund," (with Michael Brewster Hawes). International Organization 60, 2 (Spring 2006): 367-399.

  "U.S. Domestic Politics and International Monetary Fund Policy," (with Michael Brewster Hawes). In Delegation and Agency in International Organizations. Edited by Darren Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney. Cambridge University Press, 2006.   Data available from the Dataverse Network

"The Political Economy of Exchange Rates," (with Jeffrey A. Frieden). In  The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy.  Edited by Barry R. Weingast and Donald Wittman. Oxford University Press, 2006.

"Changing IMF Quotas: The Role of the United States Congress." In Reforming the Governance of the IMF and the World Bank. Edited by Ariel Buira, pp. 283-308. London: Anthem Press, 2005.

 "Congressional Politics of International Financial Rescues,"  American Journal of Political Science 49, 3 (July 2005): 479-496.  Data available from the Dataverse Network

"Paying for Privilege: The Political Economy of Bank of England Charters, 1694-1844" (with Richard S. Grossman).  2004. Explorations in Economic History 41, 1 (January): 48-72

"Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes." 2002. International Organization 56, 4 (Autumn):863-889. Reprinted in Benjamin J. Cohen (ed.), International Monetary Relations in the New Economy. Edward Elgar, 2004. Translated into Spanish as "Politica Legislativa de Rescates Financieros Internationales." 2004. La Gaceta de Ciencia Politica, Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico, 4, 1 (Summer):53-86.  Data available from the Dataverse Network

“The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions." (with William Bernhard and William R. Clark).  2002.   Introduction to a Special Issue of International Organization on the Political Economy of Monetary Institutions.  56, 4 (Autumn):693-723. 

"The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations." (with Jeffry Frieden).  2001. Annual Review of Political Science 4:317-43.

"Origins of the Federal Reserve System: International Incentives and the Domestic Free-Rider Problem." 1999. International Organization 53, 1 (Winter):39-70.

 "The Origins of Central Banking: Solutions to the Free-Rider Problem." 1998. International Organization 52, 2 (Spring):231-68.

Recent Presentations/Work in Progress:

"The Effectiveness of Monetary Policy Anchors: Firm-Level Evidence," (with Michael Plouffe). presented at the conference on "The Political Economy of Monetary Anchors," The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, May 25-26, 2008.

"Congressional Voting on Funding the International Financial Institutions." (Keynote Paper): Political Economy of International Organizations Conference, Ascona, Switzerland, February 3-8, 2008.  Also presented at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30th-September 2, 2007.

"Exchange-Rate Policy Attitudes: Direct Evidence from Survey Data," (with Jeffry Frieden and Stephen Weymouth). Prepared for the International Monetary Fund's Eighth Annual Jacques Polak Research Conference. Washington, DC, November 15-16, 2007. Also presented at the International Political Economy Society (IPES) Conference, November 9-10, 2007, Stanford University.

  "The Political Economy of IMF Voting Power and Quotas," (with Brock Blomberg).  Prepared for the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30th-September 2, 2007. An earlier draft was presented at The International Political Economy Society (IPES) Conference, November 17-18, 2006, Princeton University.

"Institutions and the Credibility of Government Promises: Evidence from Survey Data," (with Stephen Weymouth). Prepared for the Annual International Society for New Institutional Economics Conference (ISNIE), Boulder, CO, September 21-24, 2006.  Also presented at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30th-September 3, 2006, and the 47^th Annual International Studies Association Convention, March 22-25, 2006, Town & Country Resort and Convention Center San Diego, CA..

"Changing IMF Quotas: The Role of the United States Congress." Prepared for the International Economic Cooperation for a Balanced World Economy conference, March 12-13, 2005, Chyonking, China.  Sponsored by the World Economic Forum, the Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee (RBWC), the Ministry of Finance of China, and the People’s Bank of China.  Also presented at the Political Science Seminar, Brigham Young University, March 17, 2005.

"U.S. Domestic Politics and International Monetary Fund Policy," (with Michael Hawes). Delivered at the (1) Annual International Society for New Institutional Economics Conference (ISNIE), Tucson, AZ, September 30 - October 3, 2004; (2) IGCC Colloquium for Junior U.C. Scholars in International Relations, February 6, 2004, University of California, San Diego; (3) Delegation to International Organizations Conference, September 19-20, 2003, Del Mar, CA; (4) The Public Lectures Seminar at the UCLA Department of Political Science, June 2, 2003; (5) The 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA  August 28-31, 2003.

  "The Domestic Politics of International Financial Rescues: Congressional Voting on Bailouts in the 1990s."  Delivered at (1) The Research Group on Political Institutions and Economic Policy Conference (PIEP), December 14, 2002, Harvard University; (2) Political Economy of International Finance Conference (PEIF), October 24-25, 2002, Georgetown University, sponsored by the Research Department of the International Monetary Fund and The McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University; (3) Politics Department Seminar, New York University, April 1, 2002; (4) the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA  August 30 - September 2, 2001.

"Political Economy of Commitment to the Gold Standard." Prepared for delivery at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 29 - September 1, 2002.  Copyright by the American Political Science Association.  First presented at the conference on Understanding the Gold Standard: New Lessons from an Old Rule, University of Notre Dame, May 3-5, 2002.

"Paying for Privilege: The Political Economy of Bank of England Charters, 1694-1844" (with Richard S. Grossman).  Working Paper No. 01-05. Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Working Paper Series, Harvard University.  May 2001.  Presented at the Workshop in Money, History, and Finance, Economics Department, Rutgers University, April 2, 2001. Also presented at the Politics Department Seminar, New York University, May 17, 2001.

"The Politics of Monetary Transmission in a Large Open Economy: Congressional Pressure on the Federal Reserve, 1973 - 1998." Paper presented at the Seminar in International Political Economy, Columbia University, March 25, 1999. Also presented at the  Macroeconomics Seminar, Economics Department, Indiana University, October 1999.

"International Capital Mobility and Domestic Monetary Politics: Empirical Evidence from the U.S. Congress, 1960-1997." Paper presented at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

Books:

1.  International Origins of the Federal Reserve System (Cornell University Press, 1997). 

Reviews of     can be found in the following journals (click on the links to see scanned copies):

• Journal of Economic History (by Mark Toma)

• Political Science Quarterly (by Peter Gourevitch)

• American Historical Review (by Anna J. Schwartz)

• American Political Science Review (by Andrew J. Taylor)

• Journal of American History (by Wyatt Wells)

• Harvard International Review (by Jeffry Frieden)

• H-Net Reviews in the Humanities and Social Sciences (online - by David C. Wheelock)

2.  The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions.  Edited with William Bernhard and William Roberts Clark (MIT Press, October 2003).  

Teaching

Click on the links to go to the course web pages.

UCSD

POLI 200C:  Markets and States. Graduate Seminar  This module in the "Principles of Political Science" core sequence provides an overview of the normative and positive issues associated with decentralized (market) and centralized (state) mechanisms of allocation. It is motivated by two questions at the heart of the discipline: (1) What is the appropriate role of government in the economy? (2) How do we explain the actual role of government in the economy?

POLI 245 International Political Economy. Graduate seminar. Read and discuss recent research in international political economy, with an emphasis on directed empirical work. Covers five types of cross-border flows and the policies that regulate them: the flow of goods (trade policy), the flow of capital (financial and exchange rate policy), the flow and location of production (foreign investment policy), the flow of people (immigration policy), and the flow of pollutants (environmental policy). Evaluates the relative explanatory power of arguments in each policy issue area.

POLI 283A: Workshop in International Relations. Graduate seminar. This workshop emphasizes the development of dissertation proposals and other publishable product. It offers a constructive venue within which graduate students can present their research to an audience of committed and informed peers.