

Rogowski's argument

Figure 1. Four Main Types of Factor Endowments

		Land-Labor Ratio	
		High	Low
Advanced Economy		Abundant: Capital Land Scarce: Labor	Abundant: Capital Labor Scarce: Land
Backward Economy		Abundant: Land Scarce: Capital Labor	Abundant: Labor Scarce: Capital Land

Figure 2. Predicted Effects of Expanding Exposure to Trade

		Land-Labor Ratio	
		High	Low
Advanced Economy		Class cleavage: Land and capital free-trading, assertive Labor defensive, protectionist	Urban-rural cleavage: Capital and labor free-trading, assertive Land defensive, protectionist (Radicalism)
Backward Economy		Urban-rural cleavage: Land free-trading, assertive Labor and capital defensive, protectionist (U.S. Populism)	Class cleavage: Labor free-trading, assertive Land and capital defensive, protectionist (Socialism)

Figure 3. Predicted Effects of Declining Exposure to Trade

		Land-Labor Ratio	
		High	Low
Advanced Economy		Class cleavage: Labor gains power. Land and capital lose. (U.S. New Deal)	Urban-rural cleavage: Land gains power. Labor and capital lose. (Western European Fascism)
Backward Economy		Urban-rural cleavage: Labor and capital gain power. Land loses. (South American Populism)	Class cleavage: Land and capital gain power. Labor loses. (Asian & Eastern European Fascism)

Magee's Test of Stolper-Samuelson vs. Ricardo-Viner: Lobbying on the Trade Reform Act of 1974

		<i>Position of industry's labor</i>	
		1. Protectionist	2. Free trade
<i>Position of industry's capital</i>	1. Protectionist	11 Distilling Textiles Apparel Chemicals Plastics Rubber shoes Leather Shoes Stone products Iron and Steel Cutlery Hardware Bearings Watches	12 Tobacco
	2. Free trade	21 Petroleum	22 Paper Machinery Tractors Trucks Aviation

Source: S.P. Magee, et al, *Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory* (Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 108.

Hiscox: Changing Factor Mobility and Trade Politics

FIGURE 1. Interindustry Variation in Wages





FIGURE 2. Interindustry Variation in Profits



Scheve-Slaughter: Individual-level tests

Table 3
Determinants of individual opinion on international-trade restrictions: factor-income models^a

Explanatory variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Constant	1.642 (0.168)	3.648 (0.350)	0.696 (0.054)	0.711 (0.051)	1.625 (0.170)	1.642 (0.168)	3.651 (0.355)	3.650 (0.351)
<i>Occupation Wage</i>	-1.716 (0.288)				-1.711 (0.288)	-1.720 (0.288)		
<i>Education Years</i>		-0.217 (0.025)					-0.217 (0.025)	-0.217 (0.025)
<i>Sector Tariff</i>			2.730 (2.994)		2.420 (3.089)		-0.137 (2.976)	
<i>Sector Net Ex Share</i>				-0.697 (0.612)		-0.720 (0.614)		0.027 (0.615)
# of observations	1736	1736	1736	1736	1736	1736	1736	1736

^a Notes: these results are multiple-imputation estimates of logistic regression coefficients based on the 10 imputed data sets. Each cell reports the coefficient estimate and (in parentheses) its standard error. The dependent variable is individual opinions about U.S. trade policy. The measure is coded a 1 for those individuals favoring new restrictions and 0 for those opposed.

Scheve-Slaughter: importance of the effect

Table 4
Determinants of respondent opinion on international trade restrictions: factor-income models^a

Variable	Change in probability of supporting trade restrictions as a result of a one standard deviation increase in the independent variable for each model ^b							
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
<i>Occupation</i>	-0.074				-0.074	-0.074		
<i>Wage</i>	(0.012)				(0.012)	(0.013)		
	[-0.095, -0.053]				[-0.094, -0.055]	[-0.097, -0.054]		
<i>Education</i>		-0.132					-0.132	-0.133
<i>Years</i>		(0.015)					(0.016)	(0.016)
		[-0.158, -0.107]					[-0.158, -0.106]	[-0.161, -0.106]
<i>Sector</i>			0.012		0.011		-0.001	
<i>Tariff</i>			(0.012)		(0.013)		(0.012)	
			[-0.010, 0.032]		[-0.011, 0.032]		[-0.021, 0.019]	
<i>Sector Net</i>				-0.014		-0.014		0.000
<i>Export Share</i>				(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.013)
				[-0.035, 0.008]		[-0.035, 0.008]		[-0.021, 0.021]

^a For each of the eight factor only models, we estimated using multiple imputation with a logit specification the effect of factor and industry exposure to international trade on individuals' trade policy opinions. The parameter estimates from this analysis are reported in Table 3. Here we interpret those results by presenting the impact of a one standard deviation increase in each independent variable, holding other variables constant, on the probability that the respondent supports trade restrictions.

^b Each triple of entries in the table begins with the mean effect from 1000 simulations of the change in probability of supporting trade restrictions due to an increase of one standard deviation from the independent variable's mean, holding all other variables constant at their means. The standard error of this estimate is reported in parentheses. Finally, a 90% confidence interval for the probability change is presented in brackets.

Dutt-Mitra: SS theorem and protection across countries

Table 4: Countries (Tariff-Ideology Relationship)

Negative Relationship

Madagascar
Ethiopia
Uganda
Mozambique
Sierra Leone
Burkina Faso
Angola
Guinea
Tanzania
Senegal
Bangladesh
Benin
Pakistan
China
Congo
Sri Lanka
Zimbabwe
El Salvador
Papua New Guinea
Thailand
Zambia
Guatemala
Mauritius
Nicaragua
Paraguay
Bolivia
Tunisia
Jamaica
Colombia
Guyana
Turkey
Costa Rica
Barbados
Peru
South Korea
Brazil
Chile
Ecuador

Positive Relationship

Uruguay
Taiwan
Portugal
Algeria
Mexico
Argentina
Cyprus
Trinidad & Tobago
Greece
Venezuela
United Kingdom
Ireland
Japan
Spain
Denmark
Austria
Sweden
New Zealand
Canada
Belgium
Netherlands
Italy
United States
France
Finland
Germany
Norway
Luxembourg
Switzerland

D&M categorize countries into those that exhibit a negative relationship between protection and leftwing ideology (those with a low capital-labor ratio) and those that exhibit a positive relationship (those with a high capital-labor ratio). The critical (turning point) capital-labor ratio in this case is roughly 9.9 which is slightly lower than the capital-labor ratio for Ecuador.