

Origins of World War I

- I. Puzzle: Why Did the Century of Peace Come to An End?
 - II. Events Leading to World War I
—10 Steps [See Supplement available on-line, return to PS 12 homepage]
 - III. Answers #1 and #2: The “War Guilt” Debate
 - A. The War Guilt Commission
 - B. The Revisionist View
—Harry Elmer Barnes
 - IV. Answer #3: Decisions Under Unfavorable Constraints
 - A. Immediate Causes: Four Decisions
 - 1. Austria’s Response to Serbia
 - 2. Germany’s Blank Check
 - 3. Russia’s Full Mobilization
 - 4. Germany’s Two-Front War
 - B. Constraints on Choices
—Sidney Fay
 - 1. Nationalism
 - 2. Militarization of Policy
 - 3. Alliance System
 - Triple Alliance [Germany-Austria-Italy]
 - Triple Entente [France-Russia-England]
- N. B. Second Image versus Third Image

Origins of World War II

- I. Background: Europe After World War I
 - A. New nation-states in Eastern Europe
 - B. Collapse of monarchies
 - C. Limits on German power

- II. Answer #1: Deterrence Failure
 - Appeasement
 - A. Nine German Assaults on “Versailles”
 1. Withdrawal From League of Nations
 2. Intimidation in the Saar Plebiscite
 3. Repudiation of the Versailles disarmament clause
 4. Remilitarization of the Rhineland
 5. Intervention in Spanish Civil War
 6. *Anschluss* with Austria
 7. Demands for Sudetenland: the Munich Conference
 8. Invasion of Bohemia-Moravia
 9. Invasion of Poland
 - B. The Other Axis Powers
 1. Japan in Manchuria and China
 2. Italy in Ethiopia (Abyssinia)

- III. Answer #2: Sources of Aggression
 - A. Dissatisfaction with “Versailles”
 - B. Hyper-nationalism
 - C. Failure of Domestic Economies

- IV. Two Third-Image Models of Origins of War
 - A. Crisis Spiraling Out of Control
 - B. Failure of Balancing / Failure of Deterrence

Origins of the Cold War

- I. Background: Major Changes at the End of World War II
 - A. Defeat and occupation of the Axis Powers and their allies
 - B. Decline of Britain and France as great powers
 - C. Growing involvement of USA and USSR in European and Asian affairs

- II. From Collaboration to Confrontation:
 - A. Disagreement Over Shape of Peace, 1945
—Yalta and Potsdam Conferences
 - B. Communization of Eastern Europe, 1945-1948
 - C. Growing Western Solidarity, 1947-1949
 - D. Division of Asia, 1945-1949
 - E. Direct East-West Confrontations, 1948 and 1950

- III. Orthodox Answer
 - A. Soviet Expansionism
 - 1. Three Orthodox Explanations
 - a. The Soviet Leader—Joseph Stalin
 - b. The Soviet Ideology—Marxism-Leninism
 - c. The Soviet system—Totalitarianism
 - 2. Patterns of Soviet Expansion
 - B. USA Response—“Containment”
—George Kennan [Mr. X]. *Foreign Affairs*, March 1947.

- IV. Revisionist Answer
 - A. Soviet Security Interests in Eastern Europe
 - B. Explaining American Expansionism
 - 1. The American Leader—Harry Truman
 - 2. American Political Culture—Paranoia about communism
 - 3. The American system—Capitalism

- V. The Systemic Answer
 - A. Bipolarization
 - B. Power Vacuum on the Eurasian periphery

Was 9/11 the End of a Long Peace?

- I. Debate #1: Was the Cold War a Long Peace?
 - A. The Cold War as a Protracted Conflict
 - 1. Central System—Two Blocs
 - a. Superpower crises
 - Berlin 1948, 1959, 1961
 - Cuba 1962
 - b. Military standoff in the central system
 - c. Arms races
 - 2. Superpower Expansion in the Peripheral System
 - a. Superpower fight over decolonization
 - b. Use of political instability in new states
 - c. Harnessing inter-state conflicts
 - Arab-Israel Wars
 - India-Pakistan Wars
 - B. Challengers' Case: Absence of war among the major powers in the central system
 - 1. John Mueller: No war among 48 wealthiest since 1945
 - 2. Jeffrey Record: Europe 1600-1945 (29 wars or one new war every 12 years)
vs. Europe 1945- (0 wars among great powers)
 - C. Response from the conventional analysts
 - 1. Central war by substitute means—arms races and crises
 - 2. Displacement of warfare to the periphery
 - J. David Singer
 - Warfare through proxies
 - D. Rebuttal by the challengers
- II. Debate #2: Why the Long Peace?
 - A. Bipolarity
 - Kenneth Waltz
 - 1. Consequences: Negotiating peace and caution
 - 2. Rules of engagement: Avoiding direct conflict
 - B. Nuclear Weapons
 - Costs of warfare and great-power restraint
 - C. American economic hegemony
 - Rules of conduct in a liberal economic order
 - D. The democratic peace
 - Democracies do not fight other democracies
 - E. Obsolescence of war
 - John Mueller
 - A cognitive shift so that war is *unimaginable*

III. Debate #3: Will the End of the Cold War Bring More Conflict?

N.B.: Even political scientists cannot study the future. So we ask: Have comparable shifts in the international system in the past produced more or less conflict?

- A. If polarity is most important:
 - 1. Shift to multipolarity from bipolarity will produce more conflict
 - 2. Shift to unipolarity will produce less conflict
- B. If technology of warfare is most important:
 - 1. End of Cold War is insignificant
 - 2. Proliferation will generalize the restraining effect of nuclear weapons
- C. If hegemony is most important:
 - American hegemonic decline will lead to more conflicts
- D. If the democratic peace is most important
 - The end of the cold war may expand the democratic peace
- E. If ideas are most important:
 - 1. The rejection of war will deepen
 - 2. *Or* a new Clash of Civilizations will produce new and more intense conflicts

Theories of Foreign Policies, I

- I. Images and Levels of Analysis
 - A. Level = Cases That Are Compared
 - ▶ Comparative Foreign Policies *OR*
 - ▶ Comparative International Systems

The level of analysis affects both
how you ask your question
and how you frame your answers
 - B. Three Intellectual Traditions
 - 1. Political Realism
 - 2. Political Economy
 - 3. Political Sociology

- II. Political Realist Approach
 - A. Classical Realism
 - 1. Three assumptions about all states
 - ▶ Unitary actor
 - ▶ Rational decisionmaking
 - ▶ Pursuit of national interest defined as power

Of course, these cannot explain why some states
pursue different foreign policies
 - 2. Three differences among states that explain why they behave differently
 - ▶ Power capabilities
 - ▶ Threats to their power interest
 - ▶ Opportunities to defend or expand power
 - 3. Application: Foreign policies at the end of the Cold War
 - 4. Hans Morgenthau
 - ▶ 6 Principles
 - B. Domestic power constraints on leaders
 - 1. Civil-military relations and cult of the offensive
 - ▶ Jack Snyder
 - 2. The theory of totalitarianism
 - ▶ Survival of totalitarian regimes necessitates expansion
 - 3. Democracies are less likely to pursue aggressive foreign policies
 - ▶ Electoral connection
 - ▶ Institutional checks on decisionmakers

Theories of Foreign Policy, II

III. Political-Economic Tradition

A. Origins and premises

1. Adam Smith: Individuals as consumers
2. Karl Marx: Individuals as producers
3. Economic foundations of conflict and cooperation

B. Marxian tradition

—Vladimir Lenin. *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*

1. Monopoly capitalism as a stage of capitalism
2. Division of the Third World (colonialism)
3. War among imperialist powers

C. Positive political economy

—Joseph Schumpeter. *The Sociology of Imperialisms*

1. Capitalists' interests harmed by war
2. Mercantilism and empires prior to capitalism
3. Non-capitalist states and modern empires

IV. Political-Sociological Tradition

A. Origins and premises

1. Emile Durkheim
2. Max Weber
3. Conflict and cooperation due to diverging or shared identities, beliefs, or values

B. Idiosyncrasies of leaders

—Truman's learning: Trauma of Munich

C. Regime or Leadership Ideologies

D. Political Culture

—Louis Hartz. *The Liberal Tradition in America*

1. Lockean liberalism (John Locke)
2. Liberal absolutism
3. Pragmatism at home, crusades abroad

V. Two Notes About Theory

A. Counterfactual claims

Given the importance of a particular causal factor (x_1),
the outcome (y) would have been different in this case,
if the value of x_1 had been different.

This is *not* the same as saying that another causal factor (x_2) was more important.

B. Why Theory?

1. To identify the most important causes
2. To identify patterns (generalize) across many cases
3. To predict (extrapolate into) the future (particularly when making policy choices)

Power and Strategy

- I. Power
 - A. Power: A political actor has power over another to the extent that the first can get the second to do something that the second would not otherwise have done.
 - B. Power=Influence and Force
 - 1. Simple influence
 - 2. Brute force
 - 3. Threat of force as influence
 - 4. Use of force as influence

- II. Instruments of Power
 - A. Economic Rewards and Sanctions
 - B. Diplomacy and Propaganda
 - C. Military Forces
 - 1. Brute *force*
 - 2. Armed *influence*
 - a. Deterrence: *Do not* change your current behavior
 - b. Compellence: *Do* change your current behavior

- III. Strategy: The Prudent Use of Power
 - A. Three Essential Elements of Influence
 - 1. Influencing other's choice by influencing other's expectation of your reaction
 - Threats and promises
 - 2. The problem of "cheap talk"
 - Costless commitments vs. costly fulfillment
 - 3. Making threats and promises credible
 - B. Tactics for Making Credible Commitments
 - 1. Inflating the apparent importance to you
 - Invoking a principle
 - Staking a reputation
 - 2. Tying your hands
 - Physically eliminating option of non-fulfillment
 - Delegating fulfillment to third party with incentive to fulfill
 - 3. Incremental Implementation of threat or promise
 - Costly signals
 - Generating risk

The International System of States


- I. The Levels of Analysis Distinction: One Last Time
- II. The Modern State System
 - A. The Medieval Order
 - 1. Diversity of Types of Actors
 - 2. No Supreme Rulers
 - B. Rise of the Sovereign State, circa 1500-
 - Centralizing Monarchies
 - Jean Bodin: The Sovereign
 - C. International Recognition of the Sovereign State
 - 1648. Peace of Westphalia
- III. Six International Systems
 - 1667-1713 Wars of Louis XIV
 - 1713-1792 The *Ancien Régime*
 - 1792-1814 Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars
 - 1815-1914 The Century of Peace
 - 1914-1945 Wars of German Ascendancy
 - 1945 (or 1992)-? The Twentieth-Century Long Peace
- IV. The Classic Balance of Power Peace (1713 to 1789)
 - 1. Flexible alliances
 - 2. (Example) War of the Spanish Succession
- V. The Nineteenth Century's "Century of Peace," 1815-1914
 - A. The Concert of Europe, 1815-?
 - 1815. Congress of Vienna
 - 1. Routine summit conferences
 - 2. Domestic as well as international threats to the peace
 - B. The Pax Britannica
 - 1. Military and economic hegemony
 - 2. Imposing and enforcing an order
 - C. Challenges to the Peace in Nineteenth-Century Europe
 - 1. Nationalism
 - 2. Imperialism

Security Dilemma

- I. Analytic Perspectives in the Third Image (See chart on next page)
 - A. Realists
 - B. Idealists
 - C. Neo-Liberals
 - D. Constructivists
- II. Realists and the Security Dilemma
 - A. Prisoners' Dilemma

	Palm	Fist
Palm	+1	+5
Fist	-5	-1

- B. Security Dilemma
- III. Structural Sources of the Security Dilemma
 - A. Sovereignty
 - 1. Peace of Westphalia (1648)
 - “pro rege, pro religio” (as the ruler, so the religion)
 - 2. Background: Rise of Modern State
 - 3. Thirty Years' War
 - 3. Fundamental Principle in International Diplomacy
 - sovereignty = exclusive territorial jurisdiction of the state
 - B. Anarchy
 - C. Self-Help
 - D. The Security Dilemma
 - In a world of self-help every attempt by a state to increase its power to defend its security diminishes the power and security of others.



ANALYTIC APPROACH

LEVEL OF ANALYSIS	POLITICAL REALISM		POLITICAL ECONOMY	POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY
STATE-ACTOR	CLASSICAL REALISM	DOMESTIC POLITICS		
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM	STRUCTURAL REALISM	IDEALISM	NEO-LIBERALISM	CONSTRUCTIVISM

TRADITIONALISTS MODERNISTS

The diagram features two labels at the bottom: 'TRADITIONALISTS' and 'MODERNISTS'. From 'TRADITIONALISTS', two arrows point upwards to the 'STRUCTURAL REALISM' and 'IDEALISM' cells of the 'INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM' row. From 'MODERNISTS', two arrows point upwards to the 'NEO-LIBERALISM' and 'CONSTRUCTIVISM' cells of the 'INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM' row.

Unipolarity—Hegemonic Stability?

- I. Realists and International Power
 - A. Polarity
 - Unipolar, Bipolar, Multipolar
 - Kenneth Waltz. “Structural Realism”
 - B. Technology of Warfare
- II. Hegemonic Stability—The Theory
 - A. Mechanisms of Stability
 - 1. Hegemon as enforcer of order
 - 2. Rules of order created by the hegemon
 - 3. Willing compliance by most subordinate powers
 - 4. Self-interest of hegemon to provide order
 - B. Why War?
 - 1. Hegemonic decline
 - 2. Alternating periods of war and long peace
 - George Modelski. Long Cycles
 - 3. Engines of Change
 - A. F. K. Organski. Power-transition theory
- III. Is This a Model for the New World Order?
 - A. Case for Pax Americana
 - 1. American military predominance
 - 2. The liberal international order
 - B. Critics of Pax Americana
 - 1. The transitory nature of unipolarity
 - Christopher Layne. Unipolar illusion
 - 2. America’s economic decline
 - Paul Kennedy. Hegemonic decline
 - 3. A democracy will not pay the costs of hegemony
 - 4. There are no longer any benefits to being #1
 - Robert Jervis

Multipolarity—Balance of Power

I. The Case For the Balance of Power

Definition: The balance of power is an international order that emerges almost automatically in a multipolar world, that maintains the status quo through a flexible alliance mechanism, and that has important spillover consequences, including security and peace for all states.

- A. Multipolarity
- B. Automaticity
- C. Status Quo Equilibrium
- D. Flexible Alliance Mechanism
- E. Consequences—Peace and Security

II. Case Against the Balance of Power

- A. Missing Preconditions—Irrelevant
 - 1. Multipolarity
 - 2. “Dynastic Diplomacy” (the Diplomatic Game of Chess)
 - a. Fluid alliances
 - b. Moderation
 - c. Maintaining alliance partners
 - d. Balancing by shuffling territories
- B. Implications of Polarity for Deterrence and Cooperation
 - 1. Deterrence and Aggression under Multipolarity
 - a. Uncertainty whether anyone will balance: Difficulty of coalition formation
 - b. Uncertainty whether anyone will balance: Problem of free-riding
 - 2. Peaceful Settlements under Multipolarity
- C. Undesirable Means to Maintain the Balance
 - 1. Intervention in Small States
 - 2. Reciprocal Compensation
 - 3. Warfare

III. Concert of Great Powers

- A. Example of Concert of Europe, 1815-
 - 1. Proactive responses to international and domestic threats
 - 2. Routine summit diplomacy
- B. Critics’ Case: Sustained Great Power Unity Unlikely

Balance of Terror

- I. Strategic Nuclear Weapons
- II. Mutual Hostage Relationship
 - Definition: The balance of terror is a relationship of mutual deterrence in which each side has a second-strike or retaliatory capability to inflict unacceptable damage on an enemy.
 - A. Mutual Deterrence
 - B. Second-Strike Capability
 - Retaliation
 - C. Unacceptable Damage
 - D. Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)
- III. Differences with Balance of Power
 - A. The Role of Armed Forces
 - 1. BOP: Armed forces balancing armed forces
 - 2. BOT: Retaliation with unacceptable damage
 - B. The Role of Alliances
 - 1. BOP: Strengthening the defenders of the status quo
 - 2. BOT: Extending nuclear commitments to non-nuclear states
- IV. Responses from the Critics
 - A. Nuclear Weapons are Largely Irrelevant
 - B. Technology Will Undermine Stability
 - 1. First-Strike Technologies
 - Accuracies + Yields
 - 2. Defensive Capabilities
 - C. Proliferation Undermines Stability
 - D. Nuclear Weapons Do No Inject Restraint
 - 1. Overextending Nuclear Commitments
 - 2. Nuclear Utilization Targeting Strategy
 - MAD vs. NUTS
 - 3. Nuclear Brinkmanship

International Institutions, I

- I. Traditional Idealist Response to Realists: Institutionalizing Inter-state Power
- II. International Adjudication
 - A. Proponents' Case
 - 1. The settlement of disputes by judicial bodies
 - 2. Parallel With Domestic Order
 - 3. The Evidence
 - a. World Court
 - {1} Permanent Court of International Justice, 1920-45
 - {2} International Court of Justice (ICJ), 1945-
 - b. Disputes Before the World Court
 - {1} Territorial Disputes
 - {2} Disputes Over Law of the Seas
 - {3} Disputes Over Citizenship and Diplomatic Law
 - {4} Commercial Disputes
 - {5} International Peace and Security
 - B. Skeptics' Case—Impracticality
 - 1. Compulsory Jurisdiction
 - 2. Impartial Judges
 - 3. Fair Procedure
 - 4. Binding Judgments
- III. Collective Security
 - A. A commitment by all member states to preserve the peace among themselves, not an alliance against a common enemy)
 - B. The Proponents' Case
 - 1. Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations
 - 2. United Nations, 1945-
 - Security Council
 - Record of Peace-keeping Operations (PKO)
 - C. The Skeptics' Case
 - 1. Great-Power Disagreements over Aggression
 - 2. Only Some Willing to Pay the Price of Enforcement
 - 3. Evidence: Deadlock in the League and the United Nations

International Institutions, II

III. Supranational Governance

A. Proponents' Case

1. The Necessary Steps
 - a. Common law-making institutions
 - b. Common executive-administrative agencies
 - c. States relinquishing powers
2. Paths to Supranational Governance
 - a. Federalism
 - b. Functional Integration

B. Conflicting Interpretations of the European Union

1. Development of the EU
 - 1951. Treaty of Paris
 - European Coal and Steel Community
 - 1957. Treaty of Rome
 - European Economic Community
 - 1965. European Community (EC)
 - 1986. Single European Act
 - 1992. Maastricht Treaty
 - European Union
 - 2004-5. The European Constitution
2. Pillars of European Union
 - a. Common Market and Currency
 - b. Common Foreign and Defense Policies
 - c. Common Justice and Home Policies
3. Where Power Resides in the EU
 - International vs. Supranational Organs
 - a. Council of the European Union
 - b. European Commission
 - c. European Parliament
 - d. Court of Justice of the European Communities
4. What Has Been Accomplished by the EU?
 - a. The Common Market
 - Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
 - b. Obstacles
 - {1} Defense and security
 - {2} Taxation
 - {3} Immigration
 - {4} Home policies

C. Skeptics' Rebuttal

1. Impractical
 - a. Europe is far from supranational governance
 - b. The European model does not “travel”
2. Undesirable

- a. It makes government even more remote
- b. Why would world government be democratic or even stable?

Transformation of Global Culture

- I. Political-Sociological (Constructivist) Approach
- II. Stable vs. Revolutionary Systems
 - Stanley Hoffmann
 - A. Consensus over Fundamental Rules
 - 1. Who should be the primary actors?
 - 2. What rules of conduct should they observe?
 - B. Normative Consensus vs. Dissension
 - Classification of different international systems
- III. Contemporary International Society
 - A. International Society
 - 1. Rooted in shared norms not enforcement
 - 2. Bases of compliance with norms by states
 - a. Extended sense of self-interest
 - b. Internalization of rules as appropriate behavior
 - B. International Regimes
 - Norms for specific realms of behavior
 - a. Example: International diplomatic practice
 - b. Example: Geneva Accords
 - C. International Law
 - 1. Formalization of international norms
 - 2. Multilateral Treaties and Conventions, not bilateral agreements
 - Accession through ratification
- IV. If Norms are Important, in What Direction are Norms Developing?
 - A. Optimistic Constructivists
 - 1. Kantian Internationalism and the Democratic Peace
 - Michael Doyle
 - 2. Revulsion Against War
 - John Mueller
 - 3. Postmaterialism
 - Ronald Inglehart
 - B. Pessimistic Constructivists
 - 1. Persistence of the norm of sovereignty
 - 2. Resurgent nationalism
 - 3. Clash of civilizations
 - Samuel P. Huntington
- V. Critics of Constructivism: Are Norms Really All That Important to Peace?
 - A. No Enforcement Mechanisms
 - B. No Regimes in the Security Realm
 - C. No Security Spillover from Socio-economic Regimes

Transformation of Global Relations

- I. The Neo-Liberals' Challenge
 - Robert Keohane
- II. New Actors in Global Relations
 - IGO: Inter-Governmental Organization
 - INGO: International Non-Governmental Organization
 - MNC: Multi-National Corporation
- III. New Relations Among Societies
 - A. Transnational Relations
 - (vs. Inter-State Relations)
 - B. Complex Interdependence
 - Trade
 - Labor Movement
 - Financial Transactions
- IV. Transformation of Societies
 - A. Breakdown of Inequalities
 - B. Internationalization of Societies
 - Elites
 - Interest Groups
 - Political Cultures
- V. New Agenda of Politics
 - Growing Irrelevance of State
- VI. Cooperation and Conflict

Economic Self-Interest and Cooperation

- I. The Positive Political Economy of Cooperation
 - A. Political Actors as Consumers
 - 1. Increasing consumption through cooperation
 - 2. Compare political sociology—moral community
 - 3. Compare political realism—politics as base, culture and economics as superstructure
 - B. Collective-Action Problem
 - 1. Realizing joint gains (such as a public good)
 - 2. Free-rider problem and cooperation
 - 3. Prisoners' Dilemma
 - C. Cooperation Even Under Anarchy
 - 1. Rules
 - 2. Decentralized monitoring
 - 3. Decentralized sanctioning
- II. Mutual Gains in International Economics
 - A. Free Trade and Joint Gains
 - B. Bretton Woods System
 - 1. GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)
 - Most-Favored Nation Principle
 - Uruguay Round (1986-1993)
 - WTO (World Trade Organization)
 - 2. IMF (International Monetary Fund)
 - Convertible Currencies
 - Stable Exchange Rates
- III. International Environmental Cooperation
 - A. Tragedy of the Global Commons
 - B. Cooperation to Save the Environment
 - 1. Earth Summit (1992)
 - 2. Climate Treaty and Kyoto Agreement (1997)

Are International Relations Really Changing?

- I. Relative Power
 - A. Unequal Power: State vs. New Actors
 - B. New Actors as Tools of States
 - 1. Extending Great Power Policies to Other Countries
 - 2. Directing Economic Development of Other Countries
 - 3. Influencing the Domestic Politics of Other Countries
- II. How Interdependent Are We?
 - A. Limits of Interdependence
 - B. Decline of Interdependence Over Time
 - Stephen Krasner
- III. Persistence of Inequalities
 - North-South Gap
- IV. Nationalization of Politics
 - A. Winners vs. Losers from Globalization
 - B. New Agenda of Protection
- V. Continued Primacy of the State as Decisionmaker
 - A. The Failure of International Organizations
 - 1. IMF
 - 2. GATT / WTO
 - B. Continued Importance of State as Decisionmakers and of Bilateral Ties
- VI. Conflicts Even Among the Interdependent
 - A. Interdependence and Conflict
 - B. The New Agenda as a Source of Conflict
 - C. Trends over Time
 - Lester Thurow: Niche / Head-to-Head Competition
 - D. Defensive State Policies