

January 11, 2007

Competition for Geopolitical Position in Central Eurasia

I. Traditional Geopolitical Views

A. Mackinder and Heartland Theory

Halford J. Mackinder

1904. "The Geographical Pivot of History"

"Who rules East Europe commands the heartland;
who rules the heartland commands the world-island;
who rules the world-island controls the world."

B. Russian Empire vs. British Empire

"The Great Game" in Central Asia

C. Zbigniew Brzezinski and George Kennan

1947. Mr. X. "*Source of Soviet Conduct*"

1986. *Game Plan: How to Conduct the US- Soviet Contest*

II. Degradation of Moscow's Position, 1991

Debate between Eurasianists vs. Atlanticists in Russia

III. US Security Interests in Central Eurasia

A. Geostrategic positions in Asia

1. vis-à-vis China

2. vis-à-vis South Asia

3. vis-à-vis Middle East

B. Preparing for Contingencies: Confrontation with Russia

IV. Commonwealth of Independent States

A. Yeltsin's Ambitions

1. Joint CIS Armed Forces

2. Defensive Alliance

B. Vehicle for Piecemeal Arrangements

1. Nuclear umbrella / monopoly

2. Peacekeeping

3. Bi-lateral basing agreements

4. Economic integration

III. NATO and Central Eurasia

A. 1991. Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

B. 1994 Partnership for Peace (PfP)

C. 2002 NATO-Russia Council

D. 2004 Expansion of NATO to Baltic States

E. 2005 Washington Promises to Ukraine

IV. Competition in Southern Tier

A. Initial Search for alternatives to Russia

1. Turkey

2. Iran
3. China
Shanghai Cooperation Organization
4. USA

B. Expanded Western Involvement

1. GUUAM
2. Operation “Enduring Freedom”

V. Competition Picks Up in 2005

A. NATO Expansion

1. Intensified Dialogue with Ukraine and Georgia
2. Individual Partnership Action Plan with Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Moldova

B. GUAM-ODED

Organization for Democracy and Economic Development

C. Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)

D. Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

January 16, 2007

International Energy Politics in Central Eurasia

I. American Interest in Energy Security

National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2006)

“ . . . the key to ensuring our energy security is diversity in the regions from which energy resources come . . . ”

“ . . . work with resource-rich countries to increase their openness, transparency, and rule of law . . . ”

II. Central Eurasia in the Global Gas and Oil Markets

III. Western Concerns About Reliability

A. Government Domination of Energy Sector

Russia: Gazprom, Transneft

B. Russian Control of Pipelines in Central Asia

C. Three Energy Crises 2006-2007

1. The Russia-Ukraine Crisis January 2006

Gazprom raises price of gas from \$50 to \$220

Gazprom proposes swap of pipeline control

January 1 shut-off of gas

Uncertain deal: Rosukrenergo

2. The Russia-Georgia Crisis January 2006

Shut-off of gas and electricity

Terrorists or coercion?

3. The Russia-Belarus Crisis January 2007

Gazprom raises price from \$46 to \$100

Gazprom offers swap for 50% of Beltransgaz

Belarus raises oil transit fee and syphons oil

January 8 shut-off

Uncertain deal

IV. Pipeline Politics: Who's in control?

A. Caspian Sea Oil and Gas

B. European Pipelines

C. Pipelines and Asia security

January 18-23, 2007

Weak States and Weak Democracies

I. US Interest in Democracy

National Security Strategy of the USA (2006):

“It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. In the world today, the fundamental character of regimes matters as much as the distribution of power among them. The goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. This is the best way to provide enduring security for the American people.”

II. The Problem of Weak States

A. Samuel P. Huntington. *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968).

“The most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government, but their degree of government. The differences between democracy and dictatorship are less than the differences between those countries whose politics embodies consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness, stability, and those countries whose politics is deficient in these qualities.”

B. Dimensions of State Strength

1. Institutionalization of Political Participation

a. Huntington on the role of political parties

b. Weak parties in post-Soviet democracies

(eg) Lithuania: Paksas’s Liberal Democratic Party

c. Still weaker parties in hybrid regimes

(eg) Ukraine’s 2006 Parliamentary Election

45 parties participated in the election

5 parties won seats

Party of Regions	32.12%	(created 2001)
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Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc	22.27%	(created 2006)
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Our Ukraine	13.94%	(created 2005-6)
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Socialist Party	5.67%	
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Communist Party	3.66%	
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d. Extra-constitutional turnover of government as indicator of low institutionalization

2. Rule of Law

“The rule of law implies that government authority may only be exercised in accordance with written laws, which were adopted through an established procedure.”

a. Alternative: Personalism (personalistic politics)

[1] Shifting centers of decisionmaking

- [2] Shifting relationships with leader
- [3] Patron-clientage
- b. Corruption as indicator of limited rule of law
 - (e.g.) Kazakhstan: Nursultan Nazarbayev
 - (e.g.) Azerbaijan: Ilham Aliyev
- c. Cult of personality
 - (e.g.) The Cult of Turkmenbashi
- 3. State (administrative) capacity
 - a. Bureaucratic capacity (size, skill, resource)
 - (eg) Latvia: Part-time bureaucrats, rural administrations
 - b. Bureaucratic accountability
 - c. Indicators of state weakness
 - 1. Tax arrears
 - 2. Unpaid government pensions and salaries
 - 3. Breakdown in municipal services
 - 4. Corruption at lower levels of government
 - (e.g.) August 2004. Twin Airline Bombings

III. The Challenge of Building Democracy

A. Initial hopes and disappointment

B. Democracies and Autocracies in Central Eurasia

C. Tasks for Democratization

- 1. Multiple Candidates with Parties
 - a. The Baltic democracies
 - b. Limiting competition for presidency
 - Turkmenistan
 - Uzbekistan
 - Belarus
 - c. Controlling the succession
 - Russia: Yeltsin-Putin succession (1999)
 - Russia: After Putin (Ivanov v. Medvedev)
 - Kazakhstan: Dargina Nazarbayeva v. Timur Kulibayev
 - d. Limiting parliamentary competition
 - Turkmenistan
 - Kazakhstan: Fatherland, Civic and Agrarian Block, “All Together”
 - Russia: Unity (1999), Unified Russia (2002)
 - Motherland (Rodina), Justice Russia
- 2. Freedom of Expression and Association
 - a. The Baltic democracies
 - b. Intimidation of journalists (assassination)
 - c. Restrictions on press
 - Turkmenistan
 - Uzbekistan
 - Belarus

- d. Weakness of civil society
 - Turkmenistan
 - Uzbekistan
- 3. Balloting Free of Corruption
 - Ballot box stuffing
 - The “carousel”
 - Assistance in voting
 - Voting for others
 - Counting precinct ballots without monitors
 - “Misaggregation” above precincts

IV. The “Colored Revolutions

A. Georgia: The Rose Revolution, Nov 2003

- 1. Background
 - 1990: Zviad Gamsakhurdia and the Round Table
 - 1991-4: Secessions and Civil War
 - Eduard Shevardnadze
- 2. Warning of Problems: Municipal Elections
 - June 2002: Citizen’s Union of Georgia vs. New Right
- 3. Legislative Elections, November 2003
 - Mikhail Saakashvili and National Movement Bloc
 - November 2003 Georgia’s Rose Revolution
- 4. Presidential Elections, January 2004
 - Mikheil Saakashvili 96.94%
- 5. Legislative Elections, March 2004
 - National Movement Party (135 of 150 contested seats)

B. Ukraine: Orange Revolution, December 2005

- 1. Background: Divided Country
- 2. Leonid Kuchma’s Presidency
 - Warning of difficulty: Verkhovna Rada rejects constitutional amendment on presidential powers
- 3. Viktor Yushchenko announces candidacy
 - Pact with Yuliia Tymoshenko (*Sila Naroda*)
- 4. Kuchma picks Viktor Yanukovich
- 5. Presidential Elections
 - October 31, 2004: First Round
 - Yanukovich 39.87%
 - Yushchenko 39.32%
 - November 21, 2004: Run-off
 - Yanukovich 49.46%
 - Yushchenko 46.61%
- 6. Protests in the Streets
- 7. Split in Kuchma-Yanukovich Forces
- 8. Compromise: Powers and Elections

9. December 26, 2004 Elections

Yushchenko 52%

Yanukovich 44%

C. Kyrgyzstan: "Tulip" Revolution, March 2005

1. Legislative Elections, Feb 27- Mar 13, 2005

2. Uprising in Osh Spreads to Bishkek

3. March 25. March on the White House

Oskar Akaev flees

Kurmanbek Bakiev appointed interim leader

4. July 11. Presidential elections

Bakiev: 89.5%

January 25-30, 2007

Growing, Reforming, and Integrating Post-Soviet Economies

I. Patterns of Economic Performance

- #1. Soviet successor states are poorer than East European post-communist states
Why have the successor states performed poorly?
- #2. Major variation among successor states
Baltic states (GDP per capita > \$12,000)
Oil-producing states (GDP per cap = \$7,460)
Non-oil Central Asia (GDP per capita = \$1,572)
- #3. Economic downturn after break-up
European successor states: Recovery begins 1993 (Estonia, Latvia),
1994 (Lithuania), 1995 (Belarus), 1998 (Russia)
Recovered to 1990 level by 1999 (Estonia), 2002 (Belarus and Latvia),
2003 (Lithuania)
Asian successor states: Recovery begins 1994 (Armenia),
1997 (Turkmenistan), 1998 (Kazakhstan)
Recovered to 1990 level since 2001 (same three)

II. Patterns of Economic Reform

A. The Soviet Economy

1. State ownership of the means of production
2. Central control of production, pricing, marketing, and investment
3. Extensive social safety net and social provision of collective goods

B. Price Liberalization

1. Price Controls: Imbalance of supply and demand
vs. Decontrol: Pricing consumers out of market
January 1992 Price Liberalization in Russia
2. How far should price liberalization go?
Should government end all subsidies?

C. Privatization

1. Should all sectors be privatized?
2. What mechanism should be used to privatize?
Privatization within enterprises
Voucher privatization (October 1992)
Shares for loans privatization (1995): Rise of the oligarchs
3. Continuing problem of privatization of land

D. Stabilization

1. Reducing the issuance of credit
2. Balancing the budget
3. The costs of cutting credits and expenditures

4. The costs of collecting taxes

E. Different Paths of Reform

1. First-wave reformers
 - Baltic states and possibly Armenia
 - a. Liberalizing prices (and eliminating subsidies)
 - b. Privatizing the state sector
2. Statist economies
 - Belarus, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
 - a. State-managed gradualism
 - b. Socially-oriented market economies
 - State ownership of strategic sectors
 - State determination of prices
 - State control of trade
 - c. Implications for growth?
3. Second-wave (Late) or Inconsistent Reformers
 - Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
 - a. Late introduction of reform
 - b. Retaining social programs
 - c. Partial privatization
 - d. Implications for growth

III. Limited Integration within Global Economy

A. Participation in Global Economy

1. World Trade Organization (WTO)
2. Foreign Direct Investment
3. European Union v. Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC)

B. Tasks Ahead for Fuller Integration

1. Limit Role of Government in Economy
2. Stable Structure of Legislation
3. Security of Property Rights
4. Contract Enforcement
5. Reduction of Bureaucratic Corruption

IV. Example: The Russian Economy

A. The Economic Depression, 1992-8

1. Decline in economic output
2. Industrial output
3. Agricultural output
4. Investment
 - Problem of decaying infrastructure

- B. What depression meant to average Russians
 - 1. Decline in Household Incomes
 - 1999: Household income 40% of 1991 level
 - 2. Individual coping mechanisms
 - USIA Survey (October 1998)
 - 3. Decline in Social Services

- C. The Economic Meltdown of 1998
 - 1. Roots of Crisis Prior to 1998
 - a. Debt Crisis: Payments Arrears
 - b. Tax Arrears
 - 2. Crisis Heats up in Early 1998
 - a. Asian Financial Crisis (Fall 1997)
 - b. Output Downturn and Government Deficit
 - c. Government Sale of Assets Fails
 - d. Downward Pressure on Ruble
 - e. Government Difficulties Borrowing
 - 3. Precipitating Factors of the Meltdown
 - a. Paralysis in Government
 - Government Anti-Crisis Program vs. State Duma
 - b. Expected Devaluation of Ruble
 - George Soros
 - Black Tuesday (August 13)

- D. Economic recovery since 1999
 - 1. Global Price of Oil
 - 1999-2005: From \$12 to over \$65 per barrel
 - 2. Devaluation of Ruble in 1998
 - 1998-2005: From 6.5 rubles/dollar to 26.5 rubles/dollar
 - 3. Continuing Anxieties

February 1-6, 2007

Helping Failed States

I. Secessions *from* the successor states

II. Why failed states are a problem

- A. Regional stability
- B. Economic reform and integration
- C. International drugs and arms trade
- D. Terrorism

III. Common Origins

- A. “Matryoshka federalism”
 - 1. Official homelands
 - 2. Creation of national elite within homeland
 - 3. Moscow as protector of elites
- B. Reaction to nationalism in union republics
 - 1. Union-republic sovereignty and independence
 - 2. Union-republic nationality legislation
(e.g.) language
- C. Secessions (or Attempted Secessions)
 - Moldova: Transdnistria, Gagauzia
 - Ukraine: Crimea
 - Georgia: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Adjaria
 - Azerbaijan: Nagornyi Karabakh
 - Russia: Chechnya (?)
 - Tajikistan: Gornyi Badakhshan
 - (Underscore indicates agreement to end conflict.)

IV. Chechnya

- A. Background
- B. 1991 Crisis
 - First Secretary Zavgayev and Communist Control
 - Boris Yeltsin and Gen. Dzhokhar Dudayev
 - Sept-Oct: Chechen Coup and Independence
 - Nov: Russia’s first attempt to retake Chechnya
 - 1992-3. Russian neglect, de facto independence
- C. First Chechen War, 1994-6
 - 1994 Moscow support for Chechen opposition
 - Dec 1994: Russian offensive opens
 - Dudayev → General Aslan Maskhadov
 - Aug 1996: Khasavyurt Agreement

D. Second Chechen War, 1999-?

1. Reasons for new offensive
Oct 1999: Russian offensive into Chechnya
2. Reestablishing Russian control
February 2000 Russian administration established
March 2003 Referendum on Chechnya constitution
October 2003 Presidential elections (Akhmed Kadyrov)
August 2004 Presidential elections (Alu Alkhanov)
November 2005 Legislative elections
3. Tenuous control and insurgency in mountains
4. The campaign of terror

V. Nagorny Karabakh

- A. Azerbaijani and Armenian claims
- B. 1987. Karabakh demands transfer
- C. 1988-9. Refugees and pogroms
Yerevan demonstrations
Sumgait pogrom
- D. December 1991-May 1994 War
- E. Ceasefire without a settlement
Minsk Group (OSCE) negotiations
Azerbaijan: Armenian Withdrawal from Azerbaijan
and Return of Displaced Azeris
Armenia: Not Recognize Azeri Sovereignty over Karabakh
and Demand Karabakh as Third Co-Equal Party

VI. Abkhazia and South Ossetia

- A. Rise of Zviad Gamsakhurdia in Georgia, 1991
- B. South Ossetian secession and war, 1992
- C. Abkhazian secession and war, 1992-1993
UNOMIG
- D. Growing Concern from USA, EU, OSCE, and UN
- E. Mikhail Saakashvili and New Georgian Pressure
 1. Campaign against Ajaria (May 2004)
 2. Brief crisis with South Ossetia (June-August 2004)
 3. Hints of a crisis with Abkhazia (August 2004)
Kodori Gorge crisis (2006)

VII. Transdniestria (Transnistria)

- A. Minority response to Moldovan nationalism
- B. 1990 Trans-Dniester Moldovan Republic
- C. Role of Russia's 14th Army
- D. Ceasefire of July 1992
- E. Stalemate and Western concerns
Confederation vs. Federation

February 8, 2007
Controlling Arms

I. Soviet Capabilities in the Cold War

II. Controlling Nuclear Arms

A. Russian Control over Nuclear Weapons

Turning over arms to Russia
Nunn-Lugar Program

B. US-Russian Arms Reduction

1. START-2 (January 1993)
 - a. Eliminate Heavy ICBM / MIRV
 - b. Reduce Weapons and Warheads
2. Mutual De-targeting (January 1994)
3. Moscow Treaty
Reduce deployed warheads to 1700/2200
4. On-going START-3 Negotiations
Strategic Nuclear Forces, 2004

III. Preventing Proliferation

A. The Problem: Rogue States and Terrorists

1. Central Eurasia as major source of materials
2. Evidence of willing sellers
3. Evidence of willing buyers
4. First-wave (1992-5) versus Second-wave (2000-)
2003. Georgia-Armenia border interception
2006. Georgia interception

B. The Complexity of the Problem

1. Re-establishing security at facilities
2. Deterring rogue officers and scientists
3. Establishing border/customs control

C. US-Russian Cooperation for Security

1. Retraining / employing scientists
2. Improving security at facilities
3. Accounting for / disposing of materials
4. Decontamination
5. Border control

IV. Limiting Arms Sales to Rogue States

A. Decline in Defense Industry, 1992-98

- B. Recovery Strategy
 - 1. Carve out Market in Poorer Countries
 - 2. Sell to Embargoed Countries
- C. Russia's Rise to Leading Arms Exporter
 - 1. China
 - 2. India
 - 3. Iran

February 13, 2007

Terrorism in the Successor States

I. General Patterns

II. Recent Incidents

A. The Chechen Conflict and the North Caucasus

October 2002. Dubrovka Theatre Siege

October 23 (pm). Terrorists seize theatre

October 25 (pm). Terrorists threaten executions

October 26 (am). Terrorists shoot 2

October 26 (6 am). Russian special forces

Immediate death toll: 37 hostage-takers

119 hostages

August 2004. Twin Airline Bombings

September 2004. Beslan School Siege

Sept 1 (9:10 am) Hostage-takers seize school

Sept 3 (1:00 pm) Emergency workers arrive

Sept 3 (1:10 pm) Russian special forces storm

Official death toll: 332 (plus 31)

B. Andijon and the Fergana Valley

Andijon, May 2005

Protest turns to assault on prison

Confrontation in central square

Flee to the border (Kara-Su)

February 15-20, 2007

Course Transition:

Context and Constraints on Securing American Interests

Historical Background

I. The Russian Revolution, 1917

A. Background: Tsarist Autocracy until March 1917

B. Revolution and Civil War

1. February & October Revolutions, 1917

Petrograd (St. Petersburg)

Provisional Government (March-October)

Bolshevik Revolution (November 7, 1917)

Vladimir I. Lenin

2. The Civil War, 1918-1921

3. Treaty of Union, 1922

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR or Soviet Union)

4. Why were the Bolsheviks successful?

a. Establishing network of soviets (councils) to govern

b. Military and police organizations (Red Army & Cheka)

c. Establishing political monopoly

II. The Stalinist System, 1927-1953

A. Before Stalin: New Economic Policy (NEP) 1921-27

January 1924. death of Lenin

B. Stalin's Personal Dictatorship

Culmination: The Great Terror (1934-38)

C. The Command Economy

1. Central planning

2. Mobilization of labor

3. Collectivization of agriculture

D. Regimentation of Society

(e.g.) Socialist realism in art

E. Post-War Stalinism, 1945-53

F. Recap: Hallmarks of the Stalinist System

1. Political monopoly by the CPSU

2. Marxist-Leninist ideology
3. Central control of the economy
4. Regimentation of society
 - Social organizations
 - Agitation and propaganda (Agitprop)

III. After Stalin: Reform or Stagnation?

A. Nikita Khrushchev and Destalinization, 1956-64

The Secret Speech (February 1956)

1. New investment in consumer goods
2. Intellectual relaxation
3. Socialist legality

B. Leonid Brezhnev and Crisis of Stagnation, 1964-82

1. Avoiding social experiments and reforms
2. “Respect for cadres”
3. Stagnation
 - a. Declining economic growth
 - b. Aging leadership

C. The Post-Brezhnev Interregnum, 1982-85

IV. The Soviet System

A. Soviet “Democracy”

1. Supreme Soviet
2. Council of Ministers
 - Ministries and State Committees

B. The Command Economy

1. Original ideological justification
2. Centrality of the Plan
 - a. Gosplan (State Planning Committee)
 - b. Production quotas and material balance
 - c. Manager’s Tekhpromfinplan
3. Bureaucratic Control: Command-administrative system
 - a. Ministries
 - b. Specialized economic agencies
 - c. Political controls
 - d. Procuracy and the courts
 - e. Police

C. Soviet Ethnofederalism

1. Structure of “Matryoshka federalism”
 - 15 union republics

- 20 autonomous republics
- 8 autonomous oblasts
- 10 autonomous okrugs
- 2. Indigenization of leadership
- 3. Cultivating national cultures
 - “National in form, socialist in content”
- 4. Common institutions and policies
- 5. Tension between centralized bureaucracies and union-republic governments

D. Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)

- 1. Politburo
 - a. Composition
 - b. Decisionmaking
- 2. General Secretary
 - a. Secretariat
 - b. *Apparat (apparatchiki)*
 - c. Party control over society
 - [1] Cadres policy
 - [2] *Kontrol'* and verification of fulfillment

V. Gorbachev's Reforms and the End

A. Mikhail Gorbachev and *Perestroika*, 1985-91

- 1. Making politics public: *glasnost'*
- 2. Holding policymakers accountable: *demokratizatsiia*
- 3. Decentralizing power

B. The expanding policy debate

- 1. Socialist vs. market economics
- 2. Ending the Communists' leading role
- 3. Independence for the constituent republics

C. End of the Soviet Union 1991

- 1. Pressure from union republics
- 2. Proposed new Union Treaty
- 3. August 19, 1991 Coup by the Conservatives
- 4. November. Union Treaty comes to dead end
- 5. December 1. Ukrainian referendum
- 6. December 8. Belovezhskii Agreement creates CIS
- 7. December 25. Gorbachev formally resigns

February 22-March 1, 2007

Context and Constraints on Securing American Interests

Political Culture in the Successor States

I. How does the past influence the present?

- A. Political culture
- B. Institutional (bureaucratic) legacy

II. Political culture and rule of law

- A. Historical legacy
 - 1. Tsarist autocracy
 - 2. Communist rejection of law and bourgeois parliamentary democracy
Limits of “socialist legality”
- B. Post-Soviet Political Cultures
 - 1. Desire for strong leadership
 - a. Desire for *крепкий хозяин* (“strong master”)
Approval ratings for President Putin
 - b. Low approval for democratic institutions
 - 2. Limited support for Western democratic proceduralism
Democratic pragmatism: Democrats, Authoritarians,
and Pragmatists
 - 3. Manifest in elections
 - a. Russian presidential elections
 - June-July 1996 elections
 - First round (June 16)
 - Yeltsin 35.3%
 - Zyuganov 32.0%
 - (and 9 others)
 - Second round (July 3)
 - Yeltsin 53.8%
 - Zyuganov 40.3%
 - March 26, 2000 elections
 - Putin 53.4%
 - Zyuganov 29.5%
 - March 14, 2004 elections
 - Vladimir Putin 71.3%
 - Nikolai Kharitonov 13.7%
 - (4 other candidates)
 - b. State Duma elections (450 members)
Elections (1993, 1995, 1999, 2003)

III. The weakness of civil society

- A. What is civil society?

- B. Consequences of strong/weak civil society
 - 1. Strong: Organization, skills training, attitudes (trust)
 - 2. Weak: Limited participation, arbitrary rule, particularistic contacts in administration
- C. Relative weakness in Soviet successor states
- D. Marc Howard's explanation
 - The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe* (2003)
 - 1. Regimented participation in Communist period
 - 2. Persistence of face-to-face networks
 - 3. Dissatisfaction with the politics of the transition

IV. Economic Culture

- A. Failure to develop entrepreneurship
 - 1. Divorce of decisionmaking from production and production from market conditions
 - 2. Producers' security and limited risk
- B. Focus on fulfilling output relative to quota
 - 1. Inefficient use of inputs
 - 2. Minimize expansion of output
 - 3. Ignoring marketability
 - Low quality output
- C. Support for dominant state role in economy
 - 1. Protests against reform of social programs (2005)
 - 2. Weak performance of pro-market parties
 - 1993. Russia's Choice (15%)
 - 1995. Russia's Democratic Choice (<4%)
 - 1999. Union of Rightist Forces (8.5%)
 - 2003. Union of Rightist Forces (4%)
 - 2003. Unified Russia: "state pragmatism" "civilized market"
- D. Sequencing of political and economic reform
 - J-curve Theory
 - 1. Short-term vs. long-term impact of reform
 - 2. Voters punish the reformers
- E. "Perils of Polarization" over Reform
 - 1. Timothy Frye
 - a. Uncertainty about the future
 - b. War of attrition in policymaking
 - 2. The Spectrum
 - a. The Left (Communists)
 - b. The Right (Market Reformers, "Liberals")
 - 3. Prominent Issues
 - a. Role of the state in the economy
 - b. Role of industry in the economy
 - c. Social safety net

V. Contested Nations

- A. Nations and states / Nations and ethnic groups
- B. Defining the nation: The National Basis of Russia
 - 1. Who belongs to the nation?
 - Civic over ethnic nationalism
 - 2. Symbols: Naming the state and its people
 - R. S. F. S. R.
 - Rus vs. Russia vs. Russian Federation
 - (Русь vs. Россия vs. Российская Федерация)
 - Ruskiis vs. Rossiianins
 - (Русские vs. Россияне)
 - Flag, Coat of Arms, and Hymn
 - 3. Cultural values of the state
- C. The relationship to the nation outside the state
 - 1. Armenia and Nagornyi Karabakh
 - 2. Debate: Legitimate borders of Russian nation-state
 - Russian diaspora (25 million Russians in the “near abroad”)
 - a. Ultranationalist position (Vladimir Zhirinovskiy)
 - b. Pan-Slav position (Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn)
 - c. Border adjustments
 - d. Gathering in the Russian diaspora
 - e. Yelstin and Putin policies
 - No border changes
 - Right of return and dual citizenship for Russian diaspora
 - 3. Uncertain nations
 - Belarus
 - Moldova
- D. Status of residents not part of nation
 - 1. Civic and ethnic nationalism
 - a. Kazakhstan: Kazakhstanis vs. Kazakhs
 - b. Reaction of second-class citizens
 - 2. Ethnic nationalism and non-citizens
 - a. Estonia and Latvia
 - b. Reaction of the new non-citizens
- E. Minorities who do not consider themselves part of the nation
 - See discussion of failed states: Abkhazians, South Ossetians, Chechens, Transdnestrians

March 6-13, 2007

Context and Constraints on Securing American Interests

Institutional Legacy from the Soviet and Transitional Periods

- I. CPSU apparat and Presidential administrations
 - A. The CPSU Secretariat and apparat
 - 1. Supervisory departments
 - 2. Hierarchy of party secretaries
 - 3. Cadre policy
 - 4. *kontrol'*
 - B. First secretaries become Presidents
 - C. Presidential Administrations
 - (eg) Russia's Presidential Administration
 - 1. Policy planning
 - 2. Verification of fulfillment (*kontrol'*)
 - 3. Cadres policy
- II. Enterprises and economic ministries
 - A. Collective and state farms
 - B. Defense-industry
 - C. Energy ministries
 - Gazprom
 - (eg) Viktor Chernomyrdin
- III. Homeland administrations
 - A. Breakup of USSR and successor states
 - B. Homeland administrations in RF
 - 89 subjects of the federation
 - 55 provinces (oblast' or krai)
 - 2 federal cities (Moscow and St. Petersburg)
 - 21 republics
 - 1 autonomous oblast'
 - 10 autonomous okrugs
 - C. Russia's debate about ethnofederalism
 - 1. Republic demands for special status
 - 2. Oblast and krai demand for equalization
 - 3. Deadlock over Russian constitution (1991-3)
 - 4. Yeltsin coup and compromise with republics
 - December 1993 Constitution
 - Treaties with individual republics
- IV. Power ministries (*siloviki*)
 - A. Russia's *siloviki* today
 - Federal Security Service (FSB)

- Federal Intelligence Service (SVR)
- State Communications Service
- Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD)
- Ministry of Defense (and General Staff)
- B. The *chekists* (intelligence and police)
 1. Felix Dzerzhinsky and the Cheka
 2. NKVD under Stalin
 3. Post-Stalinist attempts to control
 - [a] Division into KGB (Committee on State Security) and MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs)
 - [b] Party oversight
- Administrative Organs Department
- C. Armed Forces
 1. Leon Trotsky and the Red Army
 2. Political commissar control
 - Main Political Administration (MPA) and *zampolit*
 3. Stalin's Purges in the Great Terror
 4. Prominence in World War and Cold War
- D. Entry into political leadership
 1. Brezhnev's Politburo
 2. Yuri Andropov becomes General Secretary
 3. Power ministries in the August 1991 coup
- E. Yeltsin's ambiguous relationship
 1. Weakening the KGB by division
 2. Reliance on the power ministries
 - a. The war in Chechnya
 - b. Defeating Yeltsin's opponents in 1993
 - c. Aid in the 1996 presidential campaign
 - d. Strategic alliances
 - Aleksandr Lebed
 - Evgenii Primakov
 - Sergei Stepashin
 - Vladimir Putin
- F. Putin and triumph of *siloviki*?
 1. *Siloviki* in government posts (early 2005)
 - >1/3 of Government
 - apx. 1/6 of legislature (each chamber)
 - apx. 1/10 of regional leaders
 - Heir apparent: Sergei Ivanov
 2. *Siloviki* in the economy
 - Gazprom
 - Rosneft'
 - Aeroflot
- G. A *siloviki* political program?
 1. Resisting reform that weakens state
 2. The patriotic project to strengthen the state

3. Confronting enemies abroad and at home

V. Early Institutional Choices During the Transition to Independence

A. The Partial Reform Trap

Joel Hellman

1. Consequences of reform vs. partial reform
2. Winners empowered in initial stages of reform
3. Resistance to further economic reform and to full democratization

B. Constitutional Engineers' Case

1. What is superpresidentialism?
2. Immediate temptation of Superpresidentialism in transitional regimes
3. Longer-term consequences
 - a. Resisting institutionalization of participation
 - b. Resisting rule of law
 - c. Resisting professionalization of administration

C. Example: Russian Superpresidentialism

1. Quick Fix in the Late Soviet Crisis, 1990-1
 - a. Democratic elections, Spring 1990
Congress of People's Deputies
Chairman of Supreme Soviet (Boris Yeltsin)
2. Confrontation with USSR: Strengthening the Presidency
 - a. Emergency powers of president
 - b. Popular election of president (June 1991)
—Ruslan Khasbulatov as Congress chair
3. Executive vs. Legislature, 1992-3
 - a. Constitutional Deadlock
 - b. Brinkmanship
Aborted Coups in October 1992 and March 1993?
 - c. The Presidential Coup (September 21, 1993)
The Failed Countercoup
 - d. Adoption of the Yeltsin Constitution
December 12, 1993
4. The Yeltsin Constitution, 1993
 - a. President domination of executive branch
 - [1] Government (cabinet)
Chairman ("prime minister")
Presidential appointments with limited confirmation
Constrained legislative vote of no confidence
Presidential direction of cabinet
 - [2] Presidential Administration
 - [3] Russian Security Council
 - b. Weakened legislature: Federal Assembly
 - [1] State Duma
 - [2] Council of the Federation
 - c. Executive dominance in legislation

- [1] Difficult to override presidential vetoes
- [2] Presidential decrees
- d. Protection of presidential power from legislature
 - [1] Obstacles to amending the constitution
 - [2] Obstacles to impeachment
- 4. How Putin used the Yeltsin Constitution, 2000-
 - a. Controlling the State Duma
 - [1] Creating a presidential party
 - 1999: Unity (Medved or “Bear”) (23.3%)
 - Fatherland-All Russia (OVR)
 - 2002: Boris Gryzlov and “United Russia”
 - [2] Controlling elections
 - [a] The role of governors
 - [b] Controlling the broadcast media
 - Broadcast networks: ORT, RTR, NTV
 - Intimidation of the press
 - Control of polling organizations (VTsIOM)
 - [3] Controlling non-governmental organizations
 - [a] Harassment of political NGOs
 - [b] January 2006 Law on NGOs
 - b. Controlling the Regions
 - [1] Federal Districts and Presidential Representatives
 - (May 2000 Decree)
 - [2] Removal and appointment of governors
 - [a] “Federal intervention” (July 2000 Law)
 - [b] Presidential nomination of governors
 - (Dec 2004 law)
 - Confirmation by regional legislatures
 - Rejection: dissolution and new elections
 - Presidential dismissal of governors