

PS 142i: Int'l & Nat'l Security Policy
Summer Session I 2006
Tues & Thurs 9:00am – 12:00 noon
Room 1128A

Instructor: Robert L. Brown
Office: SSB 327
Office hours: Thurs 12-2pm
Email: rlbrown@ucsd.edu

National & International Security Policy Syllabus

Course description: This course introduces undergraduate students to theories of defense policies and international security. This course reviews some of the current international security problems that have faced the United States in the past and then examines how well these security policies cope with today's threats to US national security: regional deterrence, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and the prospect of major conflict with other major international powers. While there are no prerequisites for this course, the workload will be commensurate with the fact that it is an advanced undergraduate course on international relations given during a compressed summer schedule. By the end of the course, students should:

1. Understanding why states go to war and how they try to avoid war.
2. Understand the relationships among defense policy, security policy, and national interests.
3. Understanding the various strategies states use to increase their security.
4. Learning to apply policy analysis to solving US security problems

Requirements: This course requirements consist of writing two reading summaries (15%), a written assignment (15%), class discussion (30%), and a final exam (40%).

- Class participation: Students are expected to be prepared to participate in discussions on the readings assigned for class in each and every class meeting. Most readings will be provided to the students on a CD, though students may have to download others on their own. As you read the assigned materials for each session, think about the following questions:
 - What is the author's main argument? What are the competing arguments?
 - What evidence does the author present to support this argument?
 - Do you agree or disagree with the argument?
 - What other evidence support to the argument? Or support competing arguments?
 - What are the policy prescriptions that follow? Do these make sense?
- Reading summaries: Students will be expected to produce reading summaries approximately once during the course and provide copies to the rest of the class. Summaries should outline the questions described above, paying particular attention to (1) what outcome is being explained, (2) what causes the outcome, (3) what is the theory linking cause and outcome, (4) what is the evidence for this link, and (5) what are the competing arguments. (See examples below.) Students will sign up for particular classes and should meet with the instructor after the preceding class to identify the specific readings to summarize.
- Research and writing assignment: The written assignment will be given in class (#6) and will be due at the start of the class meeting on (#8). Students will be assigned to country teams to produce reports on specific aspects of that country's security policy.

- **Final exam:** The final exam will ask students to apply the material learned during the course in a comprehensive manner. This is a take-home exam due one day after the final class meeting.

Attendance. Class attendance will be important for your performance on the exams. Much of the material that we shall cover may either not be in the readings or not be in easily digestible form. Taking notes will help you structure the substance.

Academic Dishonesty. You are expected to do your own work. Students caught cheating on exams or plagiarizing their essays will receive a failing grade for the course and will be referred to the university administration for sanction.

Grade Appeals. You can expect to be graded on your academic performance. This includes clarity of thought, knowledge of the material, composition, spelling, and grammar. Students who believe to have received an incorrect grade or a grade based on non-academic criteria should submit a single typed page that identifies the problem and presents a reasoned argument that fits the criteria listed above.

Course outline and readings:

Class 1 (July 6): Introduction: Why study national security policy?

Topics: What was the Cold War? What were the issues then and what are they now? What is a national interest and a national strategy and how is it different than national security policy? Who sets national security policy?

Recommended readings:

- Wolfers, Arnold. 1952. "National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol. *Political Science Quarterly* 67 (4):481-502.
- Posen, Barry R. and Andrew L. Ross. 1996/97. Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy. *International Security* 21:3 (Winter 1996/1997), pp.5-53.
- Ikenberry, G. John. 2002. America's Imperial Ambition. *Foreign Affairs* 81:5 (Sep/Oct 2002), pp.44-60.
- Dueck, Colin. 2004. New Perspectives on American Grand Strategy. *International Security* 28:4 (Spring 2004), pp197-216.

Class 2 (July 11): IR Theory & The Cold War

Topic: Why do wars happen?

Required readings:

- Walt, Stephen M. 1998. International Relations: One World, Many Theories. *Foreign Policy* 110 (Spring 1998), pp29-46.
- Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Pp.3-20.
- Fearon, James D. 1995. Rationalist Explanations for War. *International Organization* 49 (3):379-414.

Recommended readings:

- Jack Snyder, "One World, Rival Theories," *Foreign Policy*, November/December 2004, pp. 53-62.
- Stephen Van Evera, "Offence, Defense and the Causes of War", International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4, Spring 1998 pp. 5-44.
- Blainey, Geoffrey. 1988. *The Causes of War*. 3rd ed. Macmillan Press: London.
- Cha, Victor. "Hate, Power and Identity in Japan-Korea Security: Towards a Synthetic Material-Ideational Analytical Framework," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 54.3 (November 2000): 309-24

- Walt, Stephen M. 2005. The Relationship Between Theory and Policy in International Relations. *Annual Review of Political Science* 8 (2005), pp 23-48.
- Freedman .1998 Int'l Security: Changing Targets. *Foreign Policy* 110.

Class 3 (July 13): Post-CW: revising deterrence; rising powers; anti-globalization/anti-West movements

Topics: Deterrence then versus deterrence now

Required readings:

- Huth, Paul K. 1999. Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates. *Annual Review of Political Science* 2:25-48.
- Colin S. Gray, "Deterrence in the 21st Century", *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 19, No. 3, July-September 2000, pp. 255-262.
- Leon Sloss, "Deterrence, Defenses, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control", *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 20, No. 5, October-December 2001, pp. 435-443.
- SKIM: US National Security Strategy 2006
- SKIM: Maples, Lt. Gen. Michael D. 2006. Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States *Statement for the record to US Senate Armed Service Committee* 28 February 2006 (19 pages).

Recommended readings:

- Military power
 - Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004
 - Carl H. Builder, *The Masks of War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).
 - Cohen, Eliot A. 2005. Stephen Biddle on Military Power. *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28:3 (Sep 2005), p413-424.
 - Daryl G. Press, "The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare" *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 5-44. <http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/polisci/faculty/bios/Pubs/Press_Myth.pdf>
 - Owen R. Cote, Jr., *Precision Strike from the Sea: New Missions for a New Navy*, Conference Report, December 8-9, 1997. <http://web.mit.edu/ssp/Publications/confseries/strike/strike_report.html>
 - Robert Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996; 55-136.
- Strategy & Deterrence
 - Schelling, Thomas. 1967. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven: Yale University Press. Pp. 1-34.
 - Trachtenberg, Marc. 2005. Preventive War.
 - Kugler, Richard L. 2002. Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept. *Strategic Forum* 196 (Dec 2002) (8 pages).
 - Morgan, Patrick M. 2003. *Deterrence Now*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 - Danilovic, Vesna. 2001. The Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45 (3):341-369.
 - William Perry, et al., 'An American Security Policy: Challenge, Opportunity and Commitment,' (July 2003); ("NSAG-7.23.03.pdf").
- Nuclear deterrence
 - Glaser, Charles L. and Steve Fetter. 2005. Counterforce Revisited. *International Security* 30:2 (Fall 2005), pp. 84-126.
 - Powell, Robert. 2003. Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense. *International Security* 27 (4):86-118.
- Globalization
 - Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye Jr. 2000. Globalization: What's New? What's Not? (And So What?) *Foreign Policy* 118 (Spring 2000), pp.104-119.
 - Dollar, David and Aart Kray. 2002. Spreading the Wealth. *Foreign Affairs* 81:1 (Jan/Feb 2002).
 - Samuel Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?' *Foreign Affairs*, (Summer 1993), pp. 22-49Sachs, Jeffrey. 1998. International Economics: Unlocking the Mysteries of Globalization. *Foreign Policy* 110 (Spring 1998), pp.97-111.

Class 4 July 18): International security cooperation: alternatives to deterrence and warfighting

Topics: Explaining cooperation between states

Required readings:

- Jervis, Robert. 1982. Security Regimes. *International Organization* 36 (2):173-194.
- Stein, Arthur A. 1982. Coordination and collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world. *International Organization* 36:2 (Spring 1982), pp299-324.
- Keohane, Robert O. 1998. International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work? *Foreign Policy* 110 (Spring 1998), pp.82-96.

Recommended readings:

- General
 - Jervis, Robert. 1978. Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. *World Politics* 30:2 (Jan 1978).
 - Kenneth Abbot and Duncan Snidal, "Why States Act through Formal Organizations", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 42, No. 1 February 1998, pp. 3-32.
 - Morrow, James D. 2000. Alliances: Why Write Them Down? *Annual Review of Political Science*:63-83.
- Examples
 - Cortright, David and George A. Lopez. 2005. Bombs, Carrots & Sticks: the use of incentives and sanctions. *Arms Control Today* March 2005, pp.19-25.
 - Beck, Michael, Cassidy Craft, Seema Gahlaut, and Scott Jones. 2002. Strengthening Multilateral Export Controls. Athens, GA: University of Georgia, Center for International Trade and Security.
 - Larsen, Jeffrey A. 2005. National Security and Neo-Arms Control in the Bush Administration. *Disarmament Diplomacy* 80 (Autumn 2005). (<http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd80/80jal.htm>; accessed 6 May 2006)
 - Mendelsohn, Jack. 2001. Is Arms Control Dead? *Issues in Science and Technology*. Spring 2001. (<http://www.issues.org/17.3/mendelsohn.htm>)

Class 5 (July 20): Asymmetric (State) Warfare & NBCWs (WMDs)

Required readings:

- NBCWs (WMDs)
 - US Dept. of Defense. 2001. "Chemical and Biological Defense Primer".
- Asymmetric warfare
 - Lind, William S., Keith Nightengale, John F. Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton, and Gary I. Wilson. 1989. The Changing Face of War: Into the fourth generation. *Marine Corps Gazette* October 1989:22-26. (http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/4th_gen_war_gazette.htm)
 - Hammes, Thomas X. 2005. Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation. In *Strategic Forum #214*. Washington, DC: National Defense University. (<http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF214/SF214.pdf>)
- NBCWs and asymmetric warfare
 - Quester, George H. 2000. Mismatched Deterrents: Preventing the use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. *International Studies Perspectives* (1):165-176.
 - Reichart, John F. 2001. Adversary Use of NBC Weapons: A Neglected Challenge: National Defense University *Strategic Forum* #187.
 - Korb, Lawrence J. 2003. A new national security strategy in an age of terrorists, tyrants, and weapons of mass destruction: three options presented as presidential speeches. *Council on Foreign Relations*. Pp.1-39 ("Memorandum to the President"): http://www.cfr.org/pdf/National_Security_CPI.pdf.

Recommended readings:

- NBCWs
 - OTA. 1979. The Effects of Nuclear War (Washington DC), Chapters 1 & 2.

- Shuey, Robert. 2001. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: The Current Situation and Trends. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
- Asymmetric warfare
 - Jervis, Robert. 1989. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution. Cornell Univ Press: Ithaca, NY. Pp. 1-45.
 - Blank, Stephen J. Rethinking Asymmetric Threats (Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College #103; September 2003).
 - Lambakis, Steven J. Reconsidering Asymmetric Warfare. *Joint Forces Quarterly* 36, pp. 102-108.
 - Payne, Keith B. (Study Director). 2001. Rationale and Requirements for U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms Control. Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy. (33 pgs)

Class 6 (July 25): Terrorism

Topics: The nature of terrorism and strategies for fighting terrorism

Required readings:

- Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2003. Behind the Curve: globalization and international terrorism. *International Security* 27 (3):30-58.
- David A. Lake, "Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century," *Dialog-IO* (Spring 2002): 15-28.
- Mousseasu, "Market Civilization and its Clash with Terror," *International Security* 27:3 (Winter 2002/03): 5-29.
- Trager, Robert F. and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva. 2005/06. Detering Terrorism. *International Security* 30:3 (Winter 2005/06), pps.87-123.

Recommended readings:

- Nature of terrorism
 - Atran, Scott. 2006. The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism *Washington Quarterly* 29:2 (Spring 2006), pp.127-147.
 - Thomas Homer-Dixon, "The Rise of Complex Terrorism," *Foreign Policy*, January/February 2002, pp.52-62
- Fighting terrorism
 - Stephen M. Walt, "Beyond bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. Foreign Policy", *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 3, Winter 2000/01, pp. 56-78.
 - Barry R. Posen, "The Struggle Against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics" *International Security* (Winter 2001/2002)
 - Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, "Combating Terrorism", *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 2003.

Class 7 (July 27): Nuclear Proliferation Part 1: 1945-2000

Required readings:

- Nuclear fuel cycle basics
 - nfc.htm (<http://www.world-nuclear.org/education/nfc.htm>)
 - IEE Factsheet on Nuclear Fuel Cycle (<http://www.iee.org/Policy/Areas/EnvEnergy/nucfuelcycl.pdf>)
- Nuclear proliferation: basics and history
 - Goldschmidt, Bertrand. 1977. A Historical Survey of Nonproliferation Policies. *International Security* 2 (1):69-87.
 - Lavoy, Peter R. 2004. Predicting Nuclear Proliferation: A Declassified Documentary Record *Strategic Insights* 3:1 (January 2004)
 - Bunn, George. 2003. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems. *Arms Control Today* 33 (10).

- Why do states proliferate?
 - SKIM: Jo, Dong-Joon, and Erik Gartzke. 2005. Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: a quantitative model.
 - Sagan, Scott 1997. Why do states build nuclear weapons? *International Security* 21:3: 54-86.

Recommended readings:

- Nuclear proliferation history/basics
 - Quester, George H. 1979. Nuclear Proliferation: linkages and solutions (review article). *International Organization* 33 (4):541-566.
 - Wohlstetter, Albert. 1977. Spreading the Bomb without Quite Breaking the Rules. *Foreign Policy* (25):88-96 and 145-179.
 - Thorne, Carleton E. 1997. Multilateral Nuclear Export Controls: Past, Present and Future. Paper read at International Seminar on the Role of Export Controls In Nuclear Non-proliferation, 7-8 October 1997, at Vienna, Austria. (“SeminarControl1.pdf”, pp.25-37.
- Incentives to proliferate
 - Singh, Sonali, and Christopher R. Way. 2004. The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48 (6):859-885.
 - Solingen, Etel. 1994. The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint. *International Security* 19 (2):126-169.

Class 8 (August 1): Nuclear Proliferation Part 2: 21st Century

Research and writing assignment due

Topic: Nonproliferation strategies

Required readings:

- CISAC-PSGS. 2005. Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Terrorism (March 2005). (Read through page 40 only.) (“Prvnt_Nuc_Prlf_&_Nuc_Trror_2005.pdf”)
- White House. 2002. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. (Dec 2002) (<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf>)
- Rademaker, Stephen G. 2006. Tackling the Hard Cases in Nuclear Proliferation (Remarks to the World Affairs Council, 27 March 2006); <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/63780.htm>.
- Zunes, Stephen. 2005. Undermining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: it didn’t start with the Bush administration. *Foreign Policy in Focus* (8 June 2005). (<http://www.fpif.org/papers/0506undermine.html>)

Recommended readings:

- Terrorism
 - Allison, Graham. 2004. Nuclear Terrorism. Henry Holt: NY. (pp87-103).
 - Linzer, Dafna. 2004. Nuclear capabilities may elude terrorists, experts say. *Washington Post*, 29 December 2004, A01. (http://docs.newsbank.com/openurl?ctx_ver=z39.88-2004&rft_id=info:sid/iw.newsbank.com:AWNB:WPIW&rft_val_format=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rft_dat=1074A5BE8445132A&svc_dat=InfoWeb:aggregated4&req_dat=0D1A845FAF8F8CA0)
- Networks
 - Braun, Chaim, and Christopher F. Chyba. 2004. Proliferation Rings: challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. *International Security* 29 (2):5-49.
 - Traub, James. 2004. The Netherworld of Nonproliferation. *The New York Times Magazine*, 13 June 2004, 49-53,70,77-78.

Class 9 (August 3): Other Security Threats

Required readings:

- Kaplan, Robert D. 1994. The Coming Anarchy. *The Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994, 44-76.

And two of the following:

- Paris, Roland. 2001. Human Insecurity: Paradigm shift or hot air. *International Security* 26 (2):87-

102.

- Dalby, Simon. 2002. Environmental Security: Ecology or International Relations. Paper read at International Studies Association Annual Meeting, March, 2002, at New Orleans, LA.
- Bielecki, J. 2002. Energy Security: is the wolf at the door? *The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance*. 42:2 (Summer 2002), pp235-250.
- Rice, Susan. 2006. The Threat of Global Poverty *National Interest* 83 (Spring 2006), pp76-82.
- Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "A Duty to Prevent," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2004
- Patrick, Stewart. 2006 "Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?" *Washington Quarterly* 29:2 (pp27-53).

Two Sample Reading Summaries

(1) Achen, Christopher H., and Duncan Snidal. 1989. Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies. *World Politics* 41 (2):143-169.

Research Question: What is the utility of comparative case studies in testing rational deterrence theory?

Methodology: Literature review and methodology evaluation.

Results: This article explores critiques of rational deterrence theory made by those employing comparative historical case studies. They argue rational deterrence theory is a theoretical concept, not a prediction, that the threat of violence deters action by another state, limited by the credibility of the threat and the resoluteness of the other state. Therefore, the empirical findings of "failures" of rational deterrence, such as by George & Smoke, illuminate additional factors in deterrence but doesn't disprove the theoretical concept.

Place in the literature: Introduction to rational deterrence theory and to the quant-qual debate.

Outline:

Theory of rational deterrence: Assumptions: rational, unitary state actors that share preferences but have different opportunities, which explains the variation in outcomes. (p150) Fundamental problem: deterrence is the use of threats to induce opponents to behave in desirable ways. (p151) Initial interests focused on Type I or basic deterrence (thermonuclear threats to superpowers' homelands) and later work focused on Type II or extended deterrence and conventional threats. If a deterrable initiator believes that it would be likely not be in the defender's interest to retaliate, or that the defender lacks the means or will to do so, the initiator will attack; deterrence will fail for sufficiently determined attackers and that not all conceivable opponents are deterrable. (p152) Critics of rational deterrence confuse the failure of deterrence with the failure of deterrence theory.

Case study analysts conclude that rational deterrence theory fails both descriptively and prescriptively. (p144) They argue: 1. Psychological approaches argue there are no real rational calculations. Either (a) decision makers may be able to perceive probabilities and cost-benefits accurately but for stress or fear are unable to combine into an expected utility function, or (b) decision makers face cognitive constraints on rational decisions (Jervis' misperception arguments). (p148-9) 2. Inaccurate predictions, such as George & Smoke and Lebow arguing that there are many historical examples in which the threat of retaliation was clear and credible but deterrence failed.

Analysis of individual deterrence situations doesn't distinguish between what is unique to a case and what is generalizable. (p146) The case study method at its best uses side-by-side comparisons of different deterrence crisis to produce contingent empirical generalizations and to draw attention to new variables. (p154)

(2) Danilovic, Vesna. 2001. The Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45 (3):341-369.

Research Question: What makes deterrent threats credible, an inherent interest in the issue or past demonstrations of resolve?

Dependent Variable: Successful deterrence.

Independent Variable: credibility

Methodology: Literature review and large-n statistical analysis of several related hypotheses.

Results: This study supports the argument that deterrence is credible when it is in a state's immediate interest but is less believable when deterrence is based upon past resolve.

- The preoccupation with costly signals and reputation in the nuclear age was predicated on a very specific idea: it was not rational for an adversary to believe that the deterrer's interests were worthy of retaliation.
- Two explanations for what creates credibility:
 - **Commitment theory:** Following Schelling (1960), commitments and events are considered to be horizontally "coupled", and the issue of past behavior and the consistency of strong resolve over time, indicating what we may call vertical or temporal interdependence of commitments.
 - **Theory of inherent credibility:** Kaufmann (1956:20) argued "there must be some relationship between the value of the objective sought and the costs involved in its attainment. A policy of deterrence which does not fulfill this requirement is likely to result only in deterring the deterrer." In extended deterrence, a state's willingness to become involved in a conflict depends upon the strength of its interests in the third party being threatened. States will "select themselves" into crises because they have strong interests in the result of that conflict.
- Morgan (1983:30) defines: "Immediate deterrence concerns the relationship between opposing states where at least one side is seriously considering an attack while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order to defend it. General deterrence relates to opponents who maintain armed forces to regulate their relationship even though neither is anywhere near mounting an attack."
- Overall, the results confirm that a state's decision to intervene in a crisis is largely a function of its inherent interests and regional interests are also a good predictor. (p360) The findings support only a restricted version of the alternative argument that considers credibility to be a function of an effective signaling of strong resolve. (p366)

Critique: Focus is on credibility problems given the irrationality of the act, not from the existence of private information or time inconsistency.