

David A. Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations: Authority, Sovereignty, and the New Structure of World Politics*. Draft Manuscript. Please do not cite or quote without author's permission.

Chapter 6

Subordination

Not only does hierarchy exist in world politics, as I have attempted to show in previous chapters, but it affects the choices and policies of subordinate states in important and fundamental ways. In existing theories of international relations, anarchy is treated as a universal condition that exerts powerful effects on state behavior. Anarchy requires, at a minimum, that states rely upon self-help and balance against rather than “bandwagon” with dominant states (most prominently, Walt 1987, Waltz 1979).¹ If, instead, states vary in their authority over one another, these general and supposedly universal propositions must be rendered contingent and the empirical record reinterpreted. Wholly sovereign states outside of any hierarchical relationships may still act according to the dictates of the Hobbesian state-of-nature purported to define international relations. But some states will subordinate themselves (or be subordinated) to others in exchange for protection and social order, freeing them to divert resources and effort from security to other valued purposes, to rely on their

¹¹ There is, of course, important debate whether balancing actually follows from anarchy alone (Lake and Powell 1999, 23-4). As noted in chapter X, constructivists also challenge the axiomatic link between anarchy and state practice (Wendt 1992, 1999), but continue to treat anarchy as a universal condition between all states.

dominant “protectors” for assistance rather than only their own capabilities, and to join with or “follow-the-lead” of their protectors rather than balance against them. What might appear to be “bandwagoning” or free riding (“buckpassing”) to some analysts, may in fact be subordinate states interacting in predictable ways with their dominant patrons. If relationships between states are not equally anarchic, but differ in hierarchy, state behavior will vary as well. In turn, examining state behavior but ignoring international hierarchy may produce profoundly misleading interpretations and explanations.

Many propositions about international relations follow from the condition of anarchy asserted by others and the conception of hierarchy advanced here. Most are not, as of yet, directly testable, for reasons explained below. This chapter examines two central hypotheses, however, that follow from the concept of relational authority and address core arguments about the effects of hierarchy on international politics. Using the measures of hierarchy developed in Chapter 5, I predict, and subsequently demonstrate, that security and economic hierarchy, first, reduce the level of defense effort in subordinate states and, second, increase the likelihood that dominant countries will aid subordinates in international conflicts. The first finding supports the proposition that subordinate states depend upon dominant states for protection, and thus reduce their own defense efforts. The second shows that dominant states do come to the aid of their

subordinates, and thus the reduced defense efforts of the latter are not unreasonable. Together, the evidence suggests that, all else constant, subordinate states are not strictly dependent upon self-help, depend upon their protectors for security, and are not continuously balancing against all who pose threats to their sovereignty.

These are preliminary tests of the theory. Additional propositions with observable implications and better research designs must eventually be devised. Nonetheless, the evidence presented in this chapter is inconsistent with extant theories of international relations and consistent with the approach to authority and international hierarchy outlined here. After presenting this evidence, the chapter develops more fully its implications for how we think about balance of power politics.

Throughout this chapter, issues of international order occupy a tantalizing if somewhat obscured position just off stage, if you will. If subordinate states are not limited to self-help and do not balance against dominant states, this also implies, contrary to much current theorizing, that there is a degree of functional differentiation and specialization in the international system, that states can be truly and deeply interdependent with one another, that cooperation is more prevalent than sometimes supposed, and that there may be a measure of centralized enforcement of international agreements and law. Before developing

these implications, however, it will be necessary to examine the effects of hierarchy on dominant states, the topic of Chapter 7. The issues of governance that are waiting “in the wings” in this chapter claim center stage in Chapter 8.

The Authority Contract

As explained in Chapter 2, central to the relational approach to authority developed in this volume is the exchange or contract between ruler and ruled. The ruler provides a social order or other public goods of value to the ruled while the ruled confer legitimacy on the ruler and accept those commands necessary to bring about that social order. In short, the ruled give up some measure of their autonomy – or, in the case of states, their sovereignty -- in exchange for valued services provided by the ruler. In short, states “sell” their sovereignty in exchange for order.

Social order is, of course, a multi-faceted product, and states may well desire and receive many different public goods from countries seeking to earn legitimacy for their dominance. In this chapter, I focus on the exchange of authority for protection or “security” from external threats for two primary reasons. First, protection from external coercion is a basic element of any social or international order and a requirement for prosperity in all organized political communities. As Hedley Bull (1977, 5) suggests, protection from violence and

“challenges that are constant and without limit” is an elementary condition of any effective order.

Second, as explained in Chapter 1, contemporary international relations theory and, especially, its realist variants presume that anarchy requires states to emphasize security above other goals. It is the supposedly immutable fact of international anarchy that renders international politics a state-of-nature, a Hobbesian war of all against all. To demonstrate that subordinate states accept the authority of dominant others in return for protection challenges directly this key tenant of extant theory. Of course, states do not give up their sovereignty lightly, and we might expect them to accept the authority of others only for something they value greatly, like security, perhaps making this a likely arena in which to find evidence of such exchanges. But finding it nonetheless poses a stark challenge to the prevailing view of international relations as an anarchic, self-help system.

This analogy of authority as a contract yields two unique and testable hypotheses about the effects of hierarchy on the behavior of states. These implications are the subject of the next two sections.

Hierarchy and Defense Effort

To deduce specific predictions about state behavior from the relational conception of authority explored above requires additional assumptions. I have

already assumed throughout that states are purposive, unitary actors.² I have also argued that states are capable and, indeed, do make tradeoffs between sovereignty and other valued goods; if sovereignty is inalienable, no exchange between dominant and subordinate is possible. Much of chapter 3 is devoted to defending this proposition.

In this section, I further assume that states receive utility from or desire security, sovereignty, and at least one other (and typically many more) valued good. A state's utility function thus embodies what Thomas Jefferson memorably identified in the Declaration of Independence as the rights of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."³ In practice, this assumption declares that states give up autonomy, security, or other desired objectives only for something equally if not more valuable.⁴

Combined with the notion of authority as a contract, this assumption implies that states will sacrifice some measure of sovereignty for security provided by a dominant state, and will divert some (or all, depending on the

² More precisely, I have assumed that states can be usefully treated as if they are purposive and unitary. On the key assumptions and methodological bets behind a strategic choice approach, see Lake and Powell (1999, 6-20).

³ The Declaration of Independence, of course, identifies these as "unalienable" rights, which of course contracts the prior assumption that sovereignty can be exchanged for other valued goods.

⁴ Some analysts assume that states seek security or power either as an end in themselves or as a prerequisite to other values. This is equivalent to assuming that states have a utility function with a single argument. This is clearly implausible. If states desired security alone, they would sacrifice all to obtain a measure more protection or a degree less risk. That states do not devote all of their resources and efforts to the single-minded pursuit of security indicates that they value other goods or objectives – liberty or happiness, broadly defined – as well.

marginal rate of substitute between these goods) of the resources that otherwise would have been devoted to defense to other purposes. It follows, therefore, that countries in hierarchical security relationships should, all else held constant, spend fewer of their own resources on security and rely more on the efforts of their dominant protector.⁵ This relationship, moreover, will be continuous: *the greater the hierarchy, the less effort the subordinate country will expend to provide for its own defense.*⁶

There is, at the level of anecdote, considerable evidence in favor of this hypothesis. Japan, a near protectorate of the United States after 1945, enjoyed legendarily low levels of defense effort. Even in the 1990s, Japanese politicians were reluctant to acknowledge that they were breaking the de facto cap on defense spending of one percent of GDP. By comparison, many West European states, also subordinate to the United States but typically to a lesser degree, were spending on average 1.8 percent of GDP on defense, and the United States itself

⁵ This hypothesis is similar to that in Altfeld (1984) and Morrow (1991, 1993). These works limit the range of variation in external ties to alliances, however, which are a relatively anarchic type of security relationship in which states give up comparatively little sovereignty for little security. Morrow (1991, 909) also adopts an unorthodox definition of autonomy as the ability to alter the status quo. In the approach here, states are simply giving up their ability to set their policies free from external control for greater security regardless of their preferences over the status quo.

⁶ The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between hierarchy and defense effort. Ideally, a theory should indicate not only the direction of a relationship, as here, but also the magnitude of a relationship. Unfortunately, we do not know how states value sovereignty relative to security or other goods (i.e., we do not know the marginal rate of substitution between these goods, typically reflected in the shape of their indifference curves). Testing against the null hypothesis of no effect, however commonly done in political science, is not a very demanding test. Nonetheless, it is not inappropriate in this instance given the widespread belief that there is no hierarchy between states or that it exerts no meaningful effect on behavior.

was spending 3.75 percent. In Central America and the Caribbean, which the United States has long dominated, states spend less than 25 percent of the global average on their militaries – the exception being during the 1980s when the conflicts in Nicaragua and surrounding states raised the regional average to 58 percent of the global level. In South America, despite numerous territorial disputes and provocative actions by long standing rivals (Mares 2001) and long histories of military rule, defense spending is still relatively low, averaging slightly over 50 percent of the global level in the 1960s and 1990s and between 30 and 40 percent of the global average in the 1970s and 1980s. States and regions subordinate to the United States appear to spend significantly less on defense than other regions and states.

To test this hypothesis more systematically, I undertake a pooled cross-sectional study of defense spending in all states for whom we have data for 1965, 1975, 1985 and 1995 (see Appendix for data sources). Defense effort is operationalized as military expenditures as a share of GDP and then regressed on the indicators of United States security and economic hierarchy described in Chapter 5, as well as an interaction term.⁷ Briefly, the measures of hierarchy for

⁷ Surprisingly, defense effort has attracted relatively little attention. For work by economists using this same definition, see Aufrant (1999), Smith (1995), and Hartley and Sandler (1999). Related literatures focus on burden-sharing in alliances; see Oneal and Whatley (1996). In an extension of the democracy and victory literature, political scientists have begun to look at defense effort and regime type. See Fordham and Walker (2005) and Goldsmith (2003, 2004). There is no “canonical” model of defense effort against which we can test the effect of hierarchy.

each country are, for security, the number of troops deployed by the United States, the number of alliances that are independent from the United States, and an aggregate measure that sums these two components, and for economics, an index of exchange rate “fixity,” trade dependence (bilateral trade dependence used in all regressions here), and again an aggregate measure that sums these two components. All variables are indexed with their highest values in 1995 set to one.

I employ a non-equivalent group design (NEGD) in which countries outside any hierarchic relationship serve as a control group and countries in hierarchic relationships with the United States constitute the experimental group; the latter, in turn, are considered to be “treated” with different levels of hierarchy.⁸ For reasons explained in Chapter 5, the hierarchy measures are only available for the United States, implying that at least some countries subordinate to other states within the international system are being classified as in the control group when, in fact, they are being “treated” from a different source. In all the tests reported below, this misclassification problem cuts against finding any significant effect of United States security or economic hierarchy.⁹ As also

⁸ On NEGD, see Trochim (2001, Chapter 8).

⁹ In essence, this is an omitted variables bias introduced by lack of data on other hierarchies. In theory, and the available evidence appears to support this inference, states are subordinate to only one great power, implying that measures of other hierarchies would be inversely related to measures of United States hierarchy. This suggests that if measures of other hierarchies were

reported in Chapter 5, the measures of United States hierarchy are calculated only at decade intervals between 1965 and 1995. All other variables are also measured at decade intervals (in some cases, with appropriate lags).

The key problem in any NEGD is the non-equivalence of the groups. We cannot assume that members are randomly assigned. Especially in this case, we know that states intentionally select themselves into one or another type of relationship with the United States. To properly identify the effect of United States hierarchy on defense effort, therefore, we need to examine the possible covariates associated with this selection decision. This chapter does not present a fully developed theory of the formation of hierarchy (see Lake 1999). Prior theory, and an eclectic set of auxiliary arguments, suggest the following covariates. Data and sources are discussed in more detail in the appendix.

Countries that are more threatened by others are more likely to subordinate themselves to the will of a dominant state in exchange for the protection offered by that power and, thus, are more likely to enter hierarchical relationships. The countries that are most threatened, in other words, are most likely to be willing to pay the high price that subordination entails. In the absence of a hierarchical relationship, we would therefore expect states in the experimental group to carry a higher than normal defense burden. To identify

available the coefficients on United States hierarchy would actually be larger (and most likely more significant) than those reported below.

the effect of hierarchy, therefore, we must control for foreign threats. External threats are measured in two ways.¹⁰ First, I create a dummy variable indicating whether the country was involved in a militarized interstate dispute (MID), as defined by the Correlates of War MID dataset, in the previous year. Involvement in a MID indicates the presence of issues between the country and others with a strong potential to escalate to violence.¹¹ Second, and somewhat more indirectly, I also count the number of allies other than the United States possessed by the country. This measure is conceptually different from the number of alliances that are independent from the United States, one of the component variables of security hierarchy. A large number of allies -- whether or not they are independent of the United States -- suggests a strong need for assistance, which would follow from a perception of external threat.¹²

Richer countries possess smaller opportunity costs in defense spending, and therefore may be less willing to trade autonomy for external protection and

¹⁰ A third measure of threat was developed as the highest defense effort of any contiguous state, which was presumed to be, for most countries, their most threatening neighbor. In models similar to those reported below, this variable was consistently signed correctly but statistically insignificant. *MID involvement* and *Other Allies* appear to be a better measures of external threats.

¹¹ A dummy variables indicating whether the country was engaged in a MID in one, two or three prior years produce very similar results. The results reported below are robust to different lag structures on MIDs.

¹² The correlation between the number of independent alliances and total alliances is a relatively high 0.69, potentially introducing problems of multicollinearity. Nonetheless, both variables are consistently significant in the regressions below. Dropping Number of Other Allies from model 3 does not change the sign or significance level of the index for independent alliances. The total number of alliances might also substitute for hierarchy, in which case we would expect a negative sign on this variable. In all of the regressions reported below, this variable is always positive and significant.

less likely to enter hierarchical relationships. If security is a normal good whose consumption increases with income, this implies that richer countries will both spend more on defense and enter fewer hierarchies. As a result, we would expect richer countries to select themselves into the control group and carry a higher defense burden. GDP per capita is included as a control.

To the extent that democracies are more likely to “flock together” (Siverson and Emmons 1991), they may also be more willing to enter into hierarchical relationships with the United States. If democracies are also more efficacious in their use of military force, they may bear a smaller defense burden, on average (Lake 1992, Reiter and Stam 2002). To separate the effects of hierarchy on defense effort from that of democracy, I include as another control the level of democracy, measured by the Polity2 scale (ranging from -10, least democratic, to 10, most democratic) from the Polity IV dataset.

The results are presented in Table 6.1.¹³ Security hierarchy and the interaction term between security and economic hierarchy is, as predicted,

¹³ The model is estimated with `xtgee`, a variant of the generalized estimating equation in STATA (version 8.0). `Xtgee` is preferred in this case because it permits unbalanced panels and robust standard errors. A lagged dependent variable and AR1 specification are used to correct for autocorrelation. Lagging the dependent variable in practice excludes all 1965 observations from the estimates, and permits only two time period dummies (for 1985 and 1995). There is evidence of an AR2 autocorrelation structure as well; lagging the dependent variable two periods and using an AR2 correlation structure does not affect the size of the estimates in any fundamental way, but it does greatly reduce the number of observations. Iraq and Saudi Arabia are excluded from all regressions because they are influential outliers, especially on the dimension of economic hierarchy (both are highly trade dependent on the United States with abnormally high levels of defense expenditure during most of the period examined here).

consistently negative and statistically significant. Economic hierarchy is never statistically significant on its own, but is in interaction with security hierarchy. This suggests that countries that are subordinate to the United States only on the economic dimension do not enjoy lower defense expenditures, perhaps because economic subordination is being traded for other desirable goods or that monetary and trade dependence do not create a sufficiently credible commitment by the United States for subordinates to lower their defense efforts on these grounds alone.

More importantly for the hypothesis under examination here, however, those countries that are subordinate on the security dimension and those that are subordinate on both dimensions do spend significantly smaller portions of their national income on defense. Indeed, the substantive impact of security and joint security and economic hierarchy is substantial. Within the sample of countries used in this estimate, the average country spends approximately 2.28 percent of its GDP on defense each year (s.d. = 3.86 percent; maximum value = 39.08 percent). A one unit increase in security hierarchy alone, equivalent to moving from no hierarchy to the level of Germany in 1995, reduces defense effort by 0.92 percent of GDP, or by about 40 percent of the mean level (see Table 6.1, panel b). A maximal increase in security hierarchy, from zero to the highest level observed in the sample for West Germany in 1965, reduces defense expenditures by 2.09

percent of GDP. For states that are also economically subordinate to the United States, the effects are much larger. In economically subordinate countries, the same one unit increase in security hierarchy reduces defense spending by 3.57 percent of GDP, more than the average level of defense effort in the sample as a whole and only slightly less than one standard deviation, and a maximal increase in hierarchy reduces military expenditures by 6.86 percent of GDP, somewhat less than two standard deviations.

Table 6.1 About Here

For comparison, the model is also estimated for security hierarchy alone (model 2) and with the two components of security hierarchy entered separately (model 3). Both the aggregate index and the component indices are, as predicted, negative and significant. Economic hierarchy alone in its aggregate and component indicators is never significant.

In all the models, the covariates carry the anticipated sign and are generally statistically significant, although democracy is significant only when the economic hierarchy measure is excluded.¹⁴ The period dummies (and a time variable, not shown) indicate a secular decline in defense effort since 1975.

To check for robustness, I also include controls for two additional factors. Civil War (model 4) is a dummy variable equal to one if the country was in an

¹⁴ This suggests that Fordham and Walker's (2005) finding that democracies do spend significant less may be a product of omitted variables bias.

on-going civil war in the year of observation (as defined by the Correlates of War dataset on internal conflicts). Civil war is, of course, likely to increase a state's military expenditures, but there is no particular reason to expect it to be related to the presence or absence of security or economic hierarchy – a fact confirmed by the similar coefficients on all the hierarchy variables in models 1 and 4.

Given the availability of data on hierarchy only for the United States, the test here is biased against finding a significant effect of hierarchy on defense effort. It is likely that a number of countries in the control group coded as wholly autonomous are, indeed, subordinate to some other state. If such states enjoy lower levels of defense effort, as predicted, it will be harder to identify accurately the effect of United States hierarchy. The unmeasured subordination of these other countries creates, in essence, an omitted variables bias that is expected to reduce the magnitude of the estimated effects of United States hierarchy. The most likely alternative set of hierarchical relationships in the period examined here is the Soviet Union's informal empire over much of Eastern Europe (Lake 1996, Lake 2001, Wendt and Friedheim 1995). Although this is undoubtedly an inadequate measure that fails to capture variations in hierarchy across the East European states, we can nonetheless check the robustness of the estimates reported in Table 6.1 by including as an indicator of Soviet hierarchy a simple control for membership in the Warsaw Pact. This dummy variable is negative

and significant, as expected, but does not affect the estimates of the measures of security and economic hierarchy for the United States, giving us some confidence in the general magnitude of the relationships found in the base model (model 1).

A final test examines the relationships between hierarchy, defense effort and alternative indicators of coercive capabilities. As noted in Chapter 5, coercive capabilities are closely related but analytically distinct from the construct of security or economic hierarchy. Coercive capabilities are traditionally measured by material resources, operationalized in Chapter 5 and here by population, number of military personnel, GDP (measured in 1996 dollars), major power status, and the state's overall CINC score (see data appendix). Controlling for hierarchy, all these indicators except major power status are negatively and significantly related to defense effort.¹⁵ Contingent on their levels of hierarchy, larger and more powerful states also appear likely to expend fewer resources on defense.

More importantly for the purposes of this study, however, controlling for coercive capabilities only slightly diminishes but does not eliminate the effect of

¹⁵ Despite the multicollinearity between security hierarchy and real GDP and CINC, which would normally be expected to inflate the coefficients on the latter variables when hierarchy is omitted, only population is statistically significant when included in a model similar to baseline models of Table 6.1 but excluding the several hierarchy indicators. This strongly suggests that the baseline model is not an appropriate model of the relationship between coercive capabilities and defense effort. If we were concerned with the substantive effects of coercive capabilities on defense effort, we would want to specify a different empirical model than the one used here. But any alternative model would still suffer from an omitted variables bias if it failed to include measures of security and economic hierarchy.

security and economic hierarchy on defense effort. As seen in Chapter 5 (Table 5.X), there is a small but positive correlation between GDP and CINC scores, on the one hand, and security hierarchy, on the other. I repeat here that this positive relationship defies all realist expectations, which would expect that states subordinate to the United States, if any, would be small and relatively inconsequential players on the world stage; instead, it is some of the larger and more important states that are subordinate. Controlling for coercive capabilities reduces the magnitude of the coefficients on security hierarchy and, therefore, causes them to fall below standard levels of statistical significance in two cases (Models 8 and 10). Nonetheless, the combined effect of security and economic hierarchy captured in the interaction term is always negative and significant, and marginally larger than in the baseline models reported in Table 6.1. Even controlling for coercive capabilities, the combined effect of security and economic hierarchy is strong and substantively important.

These results strongly support the hypothesis that security and economic hierarchy lead to lower levels of defense effort. Countries subordinate to the United States in security and economic affairs enjoy lower defense expenditures as a proportion of national income. This implies that states do not rely upon self-help or balance against their dominant protectors. Rather, they trade subordination for protection, or at least take advantage of their subordination to

lower their military burdens and place responsibility for their defense on the dominant state.

Hierarchy and Conflict Diffusion

It also follows from the relational conception of authority and the assumptions above that dominant states will be more likely to intervene to protect subordinate than non-subordinate states should they become involved in serious conflicts. If subordinates are exchanging sovereignty for protection, dominant states must actually provide the promised defense or else the former will withdraw their consent. Both dominant and subordinate states must fulfill their parts in the exchange for any authority relationship to endure.

The theory here does not predict any particular pattern of conflict involvement by subordinate states. Much of the existing literature on this topic, usually grouped under the headings of extended deterrence, horizontal escalation, or conflict diffusion, predicts and tests whether a great power's promise to defend its client deters challenges or further escalation (Huth 1988, Signorino and Tarar 2004, Werner 2000). Although sophisticated analytically and empirically, this literature by-and-large focuses on the challenger and the great power defender and ignores the policies and choices of target state. In the otherwise sophisticated model developed by Suzanne Werner (2000), for instance, the target state is not itself an actor in the game, but is assumed to

merely respond to all attacks with certainty (see Signorino and Tarar 2004, for a similar "state-of-the-art" model).¹⁶ This is obviously incomplete.

Allowing the target to be a strategic actor in its own right adds a level of complexity to the problem of extended deterrence that may overturn some of its primary predictions. A promise by a great power to protect a subordinate state may deter challenges, as current models expect, but it may also prompt the target state to engage in more "risky" behavior by provoking potential challengers or taking a more intransigent stance in negotiations. This is the classic problem of "moral hazard."¹⁷ The net effect of a promise to protect a subordinate is thus ambiguous, most likely deterring some challenges but also leading the subordinate to act more aggressively towards others. In turn, the dominant country also exercises increasing control over the subordinate's foreign policy as hierarchy increases. Indeed, it may be precisely to limit the risks of opportunistic behavior by partners, such as that stimulated by guarantees of protection, that prompts dominant countries to invest in more hierarchical relationships (Lake

¹⁶ Morrow (1994) takes a step in the right direction by including the target as an actor in the game, but limits the target's choices to resisting or not. To capture the moral hazard problem below, the target should be allowed to make counteroffers to the challenger's demands, creating a game of alternating offers.

¹⁷ Kreps (1990, 577) defines the problem of moral hazard as a situation in which "one party to a transaction may undertake certain actions that (a) affect the other party's valuation of the transaction but that (b) the second party cannot monitor/enforce perfectly. A classic example here is fire insurance, where the insuree may or may not exhibit sufficient care while storing flammable materials. The "solution: to a problem of moral hazard is the use of incentives – structuring the transaction so that the party who undertakes the actions will, in his own best interests, take actions that the second party would (relatively" prefer. For example, fire insurance is often only partial insurance so that the insuree has a financial interest in preventing a fire."

1999). It is possible that, at lower levels of hierarchy, the promise to protect may not be enough to deter some challengers but may stimulate riskier behavior by subordinates, actually increasing the risk of conflict, while at higher levels of hierarchy the promise to protect may be sufficiently credible to deter challengers and the dominant state's control over subordinates may be sufficiently great to limit opportunism, thereby decreasing the risk of conflict. Without a fully developed model, and theoretical expectations about where and how these thresholds might possibly operate, the net effect of hierarchy on conflict behavior is ambiguous. Thus, at this point, there is no clear expectation on the relative frequency by which subordinate states will become engaged in crises.¹⁸

The theory does clearly imply, however, that given a conflict, a dominant country will be more likely to come to the aid of subordinate than non-subordinate states, and that this effect will be increasing in the level of hierarchy. The dominant country has some obligation to come to the assistance of states over which it exercises authority, and may or may not have an obligation to others. This obligation is not "iron clad," however, as one means of limiting

¹⁸ Following Werner (2000), it might seem that the sample of observed crises would be biased towards states in less subordinate relationships. The greater the hierarchy, the greater the credibility of the commitment to defend the state and, thus, the more effective deterrence should be. But, this same credible commitment may cause the target to act more opportunistically as well by holding out for a better deal from the challenger. For this reason, I treat the breakdown of negotiations into crisis as essentially a random event (see Gartzke 1999). If there is a systematic bias toward less subordinate countries, this will make it less likely to find statistically significant results in the tests below.

opportunistic behavior by subordinates is not to make absolutely binding commitments to their defense, thereby hoping that the uncertainty surrounding the promise will deter opportunism by the subordinates more than it fails to deter possible challengers. Not all promises will be fulfilled, but some number of them must be honored for the subordinates to benefit on average from the dominant state's protection. Thus, I hypothesize that *the United States is more likely to join conflicts in which one of its subordinate is involved than crises in which no subordinate is involved*, where joining means that the United State itself becomes a crisis participant by bringing its diplomatic support or own military force to bear on the events. This relationship, moreover, is continuous: *the more hierarchical the relationship between the United States and the subordinate state, the more likely it is to join an on-going conflict*.

We are fortunate to have two different datasets on international disputes or crises, referred to here generically as conflicts. In the tests below, I use both the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) dataset(version 3.02), compiled by the Correlates of War project, and the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset (version 5.0), compiled by Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld.¹⁹ Since such incidents are relatively rare events, I include all eligible conflicts between 1960

¹⁹ For the MID dataset, see <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/> and Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer (2004). For the ICB dataset, see <http://www.icbnet.org/>. and Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997); I am indebted to Kyle Beardsley for his assistance on the ICB data.

and 1999, but as above observe the hierarchy variables only for the mid-point of each decade. For all conflicts between 1960 and 1969, for instance, hierarchy is measured only in 1965 and assumed to apply to all conflicts during the decade. This procedure may mask cases in which the level of hierarchy changed early or late in each decade, with the resulting measurement error making it less likely to find statistically significant effects of hierarchy on conflict behavior. This seems preferable to limiting the sample of conflicts to only those that occurred at or near the mid-point of each decade. In the statistical models below, I include dummy variables to capture any unique effects of these periods.

The dependent variable is whether the United States “joined” an on-going conflict. In both datasets, I exclude from analysis all conflicts in which the United States is coded as an original participant (MID) or an “actor” in the crisis (ICB). If the United States is an originating actor, it cannot be considered to “join” in any meaningful sense. This may mis-identify cases, of course, where the United States enters a conflict immediately or even preemptively to assist a subordinate, but I err on the side of exclusion.

The MID dataset includes 1,057 disputes between 1960 and 1999 in which the United States is not an originating party. A state “joins” an on-going dispute when it “initiates a militarized action or is the target of a militarized action by one or more states already involved.” By requiring some military action, this

creates a relatively high threshold for “joining.” Of the 1,057 relevant disputes, the United States joined only 27 (approximately 2.5 percent). Although the United States is frequently involved in militarized disputes, according to the full dataset, it is most typically an originating state and not a joiner. Nonetheless, the hypothesis being tested here is not about overall involvement, but about aiding subordinates. The MID dataset specifies clearly which side in the dispute the United States joined.

The ICB dataset identifies a smaller number of international crises. Between 1960 and 1999, the dataset includes a total of 218 crises in which the United States is not an actor. In turn, it codes for a range of possible levels of United States involvement (USINV), from no activity to low level political activity (including statements of approval or disapproval by government officials, economic involvement such as the withholding of foreign aid from a participant, or propaganda involvement), to covert or semi-military activity (aid or military advisors without actually participating in the fighting), to direct military activity. Due to the relatively few cases of direct United States military involvement, I collapse the last two categories, creating a trichotomous variable of no involvement (USINV = 1), diplomatic or economic involvement (USINV = 2), and military involvement (USINV = 3 and 4). The ICB dataset does not indicate which side of the conflict the United States joined. In some cases, this

can be inferred from the case histories, but given the range of behaviors coded and the “undirected” nature of much diplomatic or low-level military activity, I focus here simply on whether the United States was involved in the crisis or not and at what level.

Hierarchy is as explained in Chapter 5 and measured above. In the tests using the MID dataset, I measure hierarchy for the originating state with the highest level of security and economic hierarchy (in cases where one state was the most subordinate by the security measures and a second was the most subordinate on the economic measures, I choose that state with the largest relevant interaction term). For those disputes which the United States did not join, I use the highest level of hierarchy of any originating state. In disputes that the United States did join, I code for the highest level of security and economic hierarchy of any originating state on the side it eventually entered. It should be noted that this construction biases the test against finding any significant effect for security and economic hierarchy on conflict joining. In 677 of the 1,059 cases (nearly 64 percent), the United States had some positive level of hierarchy (usually economic) with originators on *both* sides of the dispute. By coding for the highest level of hierarchy for any originator in those cases where the United States did not join, it raises the hurdle over which levels of hierarchy must pass in those instances where it did join. In only one case (of 27) in which the United

States joined did it intervene on behalf of the originating country (Haiti) with a lower overall level of hierarchy than its opponent (the Dominican Republic), but in this instance the former's level of security hierarchy was greater than the latter's but was nonetheless offset by an even higher level of economic hierarchy. In the test using the MID data below, I include a dummy variable indicating whether the United States possessed some measure of security or economic hierarchy with states on both sides of the conflict. In the tests based on the ICB dataset, since the "sides" in the crises are often ambiguous, I code hierarchy by the highest level of security and economic hierarchy for any actor in the crisis.

I report results for the aggregate security index outlined in Chapter 5 and used above in the tests on defense effort. Deviating from the above, I report in the tests below results for a simple index of economic hierarchy based only on bilateral trade dependence. Surprisingly, monetary hierarchy has no effect at all on whether the United States joins a conflict, and when included in an aggregate index of economic hierarchy masks a strong effect by trade dependence (in the MID data). For reasons that are not entirely clear, it appears that trade rather than monetary ties drive the propensity of the United States to intervene on behalf of its subordinates. Unlike the tests for defense effort, there is no significant interaction effect between security and economic hierarchy.

As above, I employ a NEGD in which states select themselves into a control group, whose members are not subordinate to the United States, and a treatment group composed of states that are subordinate to the United States. In this test, as the discussion of the strategic incentives of subordinates above suggests, it is less clear in theory which factors, if any, both drive states to subordinate themselves to the United States and prompt the United States to intervene in a conflict. The existing empirical literature finds that alliance ties, geographic proximity, foreign trade, and the immediate balance of forces influence whether or not states join on-going conflicts (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979, Gartzke and Gleditsch 2003, Huth 1998, Signorino and Tarar 2004, Siverson and King 1980, Siverson and Starr 1991).²⁰ Alliances and foreign trade are already incorporated into the security and economic hierarchy indices, and there is no reason to expect that the local balance of power will co-vary with hierarchy.²¹

Conversely, intuition suggests that states in longer or more violent crises will be more likely to select themselves into the treatment group (i.e., subordinate themselves to the United States) and that the United States would be

²⁰ Signorino and Tarar (2004) also find that military arms sales is positively associated with joining. Weapons sales are possibly an additional measure of security hierarchy and are not included here as covariates for that reason.

²¹ Given the pattern of alliances since 1945, the presence of an alliance with the United States will be a perfect predictor of the absence of any alliances independent from the United States (see Chapter 5). Although the constructs might differ slightly, the two measures are observationally identical.

more likely to join especially long and violent disputes. Thus, I control for the duration of the conflict and the highest level of violence experienced during the crisis. Similarly, the greater the geopolitical salience of a region, the more likely the United States is to desire hierarchical relationships with states in the area and to intervene should a conflict arise. The number of actors involved will also reflect its relative importance, and thus I control for the total number of states on both sides of the conflict.

The results are presented in Table 6.3.²² For the test with the MID dataset, I constructed a simple dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the United States joined the dispute. Since there are relatively few cases of the United States joining any dispute (27 of 1057), rare events logit (Relogit) is the appropriate model (King and Zeng 2001). For the test with the ICB data, I constructed a trichotomous variable (described above). With the United States joining a larger fraction of these crises (131 of 218), multinomial logit is thus appropriate here. As predicted, security hierarchy is positively and significantly related to the probability of the United States joining a conflict in both tests.

Economic hierarchy is related to conflict joining in only the MID dataset. Unlike

²² The model reported here is robust to the variety of component measures of security and economic hierarchy as well as additional controls (from the ICB dataset) for the gravity of the value threatened (GRAVCR), number of actors involved in the crisis (NOACTR and CRACTR), great power involvement (GPINV), ethnicity related issues (ETHNIC and ETHCONF), enduring rivalries (ER), S-score differences between the crisis participants, CINC-score differences between the crisis participants, and (minimum and mean) distance between the crisis participants. Results not reported here.

in the tests on defense effort above, there is no significant interaction effect between security and economic hierarchy here. The insignificant results for economic hierarchy in the crisis dataset most likely follow from the large number and distribution of countries that are economically dependent on the United States. Since the MID dataset allows us to identify which side the United States joined, it is possible to construct a dummy variable as explained above for “mixed interests” in a dispute, which is coded as one for any case in which the United States possessed any positive degree of hierarchy with states on both sides of the conflict. In practice, these mixed interests were most often produced by economic not security hierarchy. As the results show, the United States is significantly less likely to intervene when it has subordinates on both sides of a dispute. Were a similar control possible for the ICB dataset, I suspect the economic hierarchy variable would perform as expected. The covariates are correctly signed and significant as well, except for the duration of the conflict, which is insignificant, and the level of violence, which is inconsistent in sign but positive and significant only for indirect and direct military involvement by the United States in the ICB test.

Table 6.3 About Here

The substantive magnitude of the variables in logit models can never be inferred directly from the coefficients. Panels B1-3 in Table 6.3 report the

predicted probability of the United States joining a conflict as security and economic hierarchy increase from zero (no hierarchy) to the 75th percentile and their maximum values while holding all other variables at their mean values. I also report the percentage change in the relative risk of the United States joining a conflict. These figures will be familiar to most readers from medical studies which typically report results in the form of smoking increases the risk of lung cancer by some specified percent, bike helmets reduce the risk of serious injury in an accident by some percent, and so on. The percentage change figures in the final column of panels b1-3 should be interpreted in the same way.

In the MID dataset, the baseline probability of the United States joining a dispute in which it has no subordinates is very low at 0.4 percent. This reflects the very large number of disputes, and the very small number of instances the United States joined. Increasing the level of security hierarchy to its 75th percentile increases the probability of joining by approximately 1.3 percent (first difference) and increasing the level to its maximum value raises the probability of joining by 4.8 percent (first difference). Increasing the index of security hierarchy from its minimum to its 75th percentile increases the risk that the United States will join by 226 percent, and increasing the index to its maximum observed level increases the risk by 765 percent. The effects of increasing security hierarchy on joining are thus large and significant. Conversely, at low levels of

economic hierarchy, the effect is small: increasing the index of bilateral trade dependence from its minimum to 75th percentile increases the probability of joining by only 0.3 percent and the relative risk by 54 percent. At higher levels, however, the impact is much larger. At the maximum level of economic hierarchy, the probability that the United States will join a dispute rises by 43.3 percent and the relative risk by an astounding 5,811 percent.

The ICB dataset indicates that security and economic hierarchy have a smaller and less robust effect on crisis joining by the United States. The effects of increased security and economic hierarchy on diplomatic and economic activity is typically small and insignificant. The baseline probability of the United States engaging in diplomatic or economic activity in a crisis with no subordinates is nearly 47 percent. Increasing the measure of security hierarchy to its 75th percentile increases this probability by only 0.3 percentage points (increasing security hierarchy to its maximum indicates a larger effect, but the estimate is not statistically significant at conventional levels). This same change increases the relative risk of the United States joining by a comparatively small 0.8 percent. As expected, the effects of security hierarchy on indirect and direct military participation are stronger and more robust, but the effects of economic hierarchy remain weak and insignificant. The baseline probability of the United States using indirect or direct military force in a crisis with no subordinates is

approximately 15.6 percent. Increasing the measure of security hierarchy to its 75th percentile increases this probability by 1.9 percent and the relative risk by 1.23 percent, and increasing security hierarchy to its maximum raises the probability of military involvement almost 16.4 percent – more than the baseline probability – and increases the relative risk by 108 percent.

These two tests clearly indicate that the United States is significantly more likely to come to the aid of its subordinates than it is to aid other states, and that this effect is increasing in the level of hierarchy. The results also indicate that the effects of hierarchy are stronger and more significant determinants of military involvement than economic or diplomatic activity: the MID dataset includes only cases of military action and in the ICB dataset the effects of security hierarchy are larger for indirect and direct military action than for lower levels of involvement. The findings imply that the United States is significantly more likely to come to the aid of subordinate than non-subordinate countries. States that condition their levels of defense effort on their subordination to the United States have some justification for expecting their protector to, in fact, fulfill its commitment to help defend them from foreign threats.

Beyond the Balance of Power

The results from both tests strongly support the two hypotheses. Subordinate countries spend less effort on defense than non-subordinate states

and are more likely to receive assistance if they enter into a conflict. These results equally strongly contradict established theories, foremost of which is balance of power theory.

“If there is any distinctively political theory of international politics,” Kenneth Waltz (1979, 117) writes, “balance of power theory is it.” Central to the theory is the assumed condition of international anarchy. As Waltz (1979, 121) states most forcefully, “balance of power politics prevail whenever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive.”

Balance of power theory comes in many variants, of which Waltz’s systemic version is merely the most spare (for alternative conceptions, see Haas 1953). Key to all variants, however, is the hypothesis that, in anarchy, all states must attend to their own security (i.e., engage in self-help) and will increase their own defense efforts (internal balancing) or combine into coalitions (external balancing) to counter the most powerful or, allowing for varying intentions, the most threatening states within the system. For Waltz (1979, 121), who offers a structural theory of general incentives, this implies that the system as a whole will tend toward roughly equal balances, although there may be substantial variation in individual state behavior. For others, the theory predicts more specific patterns of alliances, at least over the long run (Walt 1987). Waltz (1979,

125) claims empirical support from for balance of power theory from particularly “hard” cases, such as the United States and Soviet Union in World War II whose ideological antagonism should otherwise have precluded security cooperation.

Critics of balance of power theory charge that it’s predictions fit the empirical record poorly. In particular, they identify a variety of alternative strategies that states have adopted historically in response to rising power or threats, including (Christensen and Snyder 1990, Rosecrance and Lo 1996, Schroeder 1994, Schweller 1994, Schweller 1997):

- Hiding, avoiding commitments or retreating into isolation;
- Bandwagoning, joining with the stronger power;
- Transcending, building new institutions to escape from anarchy or, at least, to resolve the issues under dispute;
- Co-opting, persuading or buying off a challenger to return to the status quo ante; and
- Buckpassing or free riding, doing nothing in the hopes that others will balance against the challenger.

Overall, critics argue, bandwagoning (Schroeder 1994, Schweller 1994) and buckpassing (Christensen and Snyder 1990, Rosecrance and Lo 1996) are chosen more frequently than balance of power theory might expect. In revisionist accounts, even the Congress of Vienna and the resulting Concert of Europe

system, long understood as reconstituting and explicitly designing a balance of power system, have been reinterpreted as characterized more by free riding and bandwagoning than by balancing (Schroeder 1992). Especially problematic for critics is the post-Cold War period in which other states, contrary to expectations, have failed to balance against the United States, by far the single strongest state in modern history.²³

The results above have important implications for both sides of this debate. The evidence appears to contradict several expectations of balance of power theory. Balance of power theory is not yet formulated in a way that yields clear, falsifiable hypotheses. Do states balance all of the time? Only under some conditions – if so, which? This longstanding problem cannot be rectified here without taking us far afield. For this reason, I do not present a test of balance of power theory per se nor of the effect of hierarchy on balancing behavior. Nonetheless, the results here cut against what must be core expectations of the theory.

First, if states are concerned with security and survival, as Waltz (1979, 126) suggests, they should balance against those powers most likely to threaten their sovereignty, especially those that exercise authority over them and thereby

²³ On the expectation of the reemergence of a balance of power, see Mearsheimer (1990, 2001), Layne (1993), Waltz (1993, 2002). For alternative views, see Ikenberry (2002), Mastanduno (2002), Risse (2002), and Walt (2002).

diminish their sovereignty in whole or part. Yet, rather than exerting greater effort to assert their independence and balance against their dominant patron, those countries subordinate to the United States reduce their defense efforts. Local threats may still lead states to spend more on defense, as suggested by the consistently positive and usually significant coefficients on MID involvement and the number of other allies in the various models reported in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. But subordinate states clearly do not attempt to balance against the authority exerted by their dominant state. This fits with the general absence of balancing against the hegemony of the United States during the post-Cold War period.

Second, the states least likely to balance should be smaller, less powerful states who can more easily free ride on the efforts of others, hoping that they can benefit from the general defense provided by those more willing and able to stand up to regional challengers or aspirants to hegemony (Murdoch and Sandler 1982, Olson and Zeckhauser 1965). This suggests that balance of power politics is a great power game played most intensively and vigorously by the larger and more powerful states who can make a difference in the global scales. Yet, the results reported in Table 6.2 indicate clearly that, once we control for levels of

hierarchy, larger states that are more capable of wielding coercion actually exert less rather than more defense effort.²⁴

More generally, the results do not show that balance of power theory is necessarily wrong – though this may still be the case. Rather, they make plain that its propositions are, at best, contingent on the absence or presence of hierarchy in relations between states. Since anarchy is not a universal trait shared equally by all states, not all countries should be equally concerned with balancing against stronger powers or threats. For wholly sovereign states, balance of power theory may apply. For subordinate states, however, the strictures of balancing are relaxed for all and increasingly so as countries increase in the degree of hierarchy exerted over them. Subordinate states exert less defense effort on their own, are not solely dependent upon self-help in crises, and rely on their dominant state protectors for at least a measure of security even in hostile environments. Balance of power politics should be strongest and most evident not among the great powers, as suggested by current theory, but only among states that are not subordinate to some dominant state. Any test of balance of power theory must take the contingent nature of its propositions into account. None do so now.

²⁴ In the absence of the hierarchy variables, all of the measures of coercive capacity in Table 6.2 are negative but statistically insignificant at standard levels.

In turn, the results of these two tests also have significant implications for the criticisms leveled at balance of power theory, and especially the finding that states often engage in a variety of strategies other than balancing. Just as the balance of power theory is underspecified, and therefore not falsifiable, it has not been operationalized carefully enough for systematic tests either. There are no agreed definitions or broadly accepted measures of the key variables, including the very notion of a balance. Most importantly, there is no agreement on what behaviors constitute balancing, bandwagoning, buckpassing, or any other strategy. As a result, we cannot “count up” the instances of balancing or bandwagoning to determine whether states engage in one or the other more frequently than theory would lead us to expect (if, in fact, it made clear predictions). Just as I cannot solve the indeterminacy of balance of power theory in this short space, I cannot solve the measurement problems in the theory either. Nonetheless, focusing on the effects of hierarchy on state behavior suggests the need to reformulate and revise what constitutes some of the core alternatives to balancing behavior.

First, much of what is often described in the historical surveys as buckpassing or free riding may actually be subordinate states relying on the protection of their dominant powers – “cashing in” on the exchange that lies at the heart of authority relationships, if you will (Christensen and Snyder 1990,

Schroeder 1994). Rather than trying to avoid their “fair share” of the costs of collective defense against imposing powers or threats, the tests above suggest that subordinate states may actually be reaping the benefits for which they have surrendered part of their sovereignty. Rather than getting off more cheaply as the concept of free riding suggests, subordinate states are paying a higher cost than their defense efforts alone might suggest.

Second, bandwagoning may arise not only from countries hoping to reap the spoils of what comes to appear as an inevitable victory, as Schweller (1994) suggests, but also from subordinate states being called upon to legitimate a dominant power in its efforts to provide a broad social order by declaring their tactical support. Subordinate states rally to their dominant protector not necessarily to share in the spoils -- although they may hope for that as well, especially if they have provided real material support -- but to express their consent to its efforts to protect them and others. In short, subordinates may not bandwagon in any meaningful sense but rather may “follow-the-leader.”

Following-the-leader can be seen most clearly, perhaps, in the pattern of support for the United States in World War I and the post-Cold War conflicts. Although we lack systematic data on security or economic hierarchy in the pre-World War I era, there is little doubt that the United States was a regional hegemon as I have defined it (see Chapter 4) with at least a measure of authority

over most countries in its hemisphere. Prior to the United States' entering the until then largely European war on April 6, 1917, no Central or South American country had itself declared war or broken relations with Germany or Austria-Hungary. In the succeeding months, however, 12 Latin American states joined the hostilities, not as combatants, but by severing their relations and, in some cases, officially declaring war against the central powers.²⁵ There is no evidence that these states expected to reap a share of the spoils of war, limited as they were at Versailles. Rather, they entered to show their support for and the legitimacy of the United States' entry into the war.

More systematically, in Table 6.4, security and economic hierarchy as measured above are used to predict which states would join the multinational coalition in the first Iraq war in 1991 and the "coalition of the willing" in the second Iraq war of 2003. In each model, the dependent variable is simply whether the country joined the coalition.²⁶ I used the measures of hierarchy in

²⁵ These were, by date, Cuba (4/7/1917), Panama (4/7/1917), Brazil (4/11/1917), Bolivia (4/11/1917), Costa Rica (9/21/1917), Peru (10/6/1917), Uruguay (10/7/1917), Ecuador (12/8/1917), Guatemala (4/23/1918), Nicaragua (5/18/1918), Haiti (7/12/1918), and Honduras (7/19/1918). Only two non-Western hemisphere countries joined the war after the United States, Greece and Thailand (Siam). Source: www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1112.html, accessed on May 9, 2005.

²⁶ In the 1991 coalition, I count all states that provided either material or major financial support; see Lake 1999, Tables X and X. For the 2003 coalition, I count the countries listed in the White House Press release on Operation Iraqi Freedom of March 27, 2003 (available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/print/20030327-10.html>, accessed April 6, 2003). Several of the states listed as members of the coalition are, unfortunately, micro-states excluded from the standard datasets and therefore missing data on other variables. I suspect the results below would be stronger if we had adequate data for Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau,

1985 for the 1991 war and 1995 for the 2003 war to create “out-of-sample” forecasts; in other words, pre-existing hierarchy is used to predict what the coalition would look like six and eight years later. For the 1991 war, given the threat to regional security by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, I control for whether the participating country was located in the Middle East, although the results are highly robust whether this variable is included or not. For the 2003 war, a central dynamic was not only the prior United States hierarchies but also states that were competing, in a sense, to be brought under America’s hegemonic umbrella. Many states in what Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld inelegantly termed “New Europe” were willing to join the coalition as a signal of their pro-American stance, and perhaps to curry favor with the United States. These are “prospective” subordinates, several of whom explicitly linked their participation in the coalition to securing new American bases and deployments on their territories. The model is presented both with and without dummy variables for prior Warsaw Pact members and post-Soviet states.²⁷

In both cases, security hierarchy is a strong and robust predictor of who joins the United States-led coalition. Economic hierarchy does not appear to exert

Tonga, etc. Given their new found importance in international politics, this is a plea to the Correlates of War, Polity, and other data projects to add these countries to their datasets.

²⁷ It is not entirely clear what the relevant covariates are for these two models. The security hierarchy variable is, nonetheless, highly robust to the inclusion of a battery of control variables, including GDP per capita, democracy, and geographic proximity.

a significant impact on joining nor is there any significant interaction effect between security and economic hierarchy. In the first Iraq War, non-subordinate states had a baseline probability of joining the coalition of 11.9 percent (setting all the hierarchy variables to their minimums and Middle East to its mean), increasing to 49.1 when security hierarchy is at its 75th percentile (probability that estimate is different from baseline, $p < .01$). In the second Iraq War, non-subordinate states (in model 3) had a baseline probability of joining the coalition of 12.4 percent (setting all the hierarchy variables to their minimums and Warsaw Pact and Post-Soviet variables to their means), rising to 58.2 when security hierarchy is at its 75th percentile ($p < .01$). In addition, Warsaw Pact and former Soviet states were also significantly more likely to join the coalition than others. Clearly, states subordinate to the United States in security – or those in “New” Europe seeking American protection -- participated in the coalitions at much higher rates than would otherwise be expected. Given the authority relationships at play here, this gives new meaning to the phrase “coalition of the willing.”

At the same time, no one would suggest that the members of the Iraq War coalitions were seeking to “bandwagon for profit.” If the interpretation offered here is correct, they may have been hoping to bolster American legitimacy and facilitate the hegemon’s creation of a social order that would benefit them over

the longer run, but few spoils were ever handed out to any of these subordinate countries in the shorter run. At least some portion of the time, what might otherwise appear to be bandwagoning is actually subordinates following their leaders.

Introducing hierarchy into the analysis suggests the need to rethink and, at a minimum, to be more precise about what is meant by buckpassing and bandwagoning. Although they may remain viable strategies pursued by some states at some times, much of what is now understood as buckpassing or bandwagoning may actually be subordinate states claiming the benefits for which they have yielded sovereignty or performing the necessary obeisance to their dominant states.

Conclusion

Hierarchy between states challenges received understandings of international relations. It remains a truism that the system as a whole is anarchic. Despite the very substantial number of hierarchies in all regions of the globe, as explored in Chapter 5, the United States today is still very far from ruling all the world. But hierarchy between states still tempers the widely accepted consequences of systemic anarchy for world politics. Subordinate states are not solely dependent upon self-help, but depend upon protection from others in exchange for legitimacy and obedience. Subordinate states do not balance against

dominant others, but often appear to follow-the-leader by lending at least their “moral” if not material support to their protector in international conflicts.

International relations is not a Hobbesian state-of-nature, but rather a mixed society with pockets of relative anarchy characterized by the war of all-against-all, and pockets of relatively hierarchy in which a measure of authority, centralized enforcement, and comparative order prevail. Just as the Wild West with its self-help system of frontier justice existed simultaneously with settled areas enjoying authoritatively established law and order, so too can pockets of more or less anarchic or hierarchic relationships co-exist within the international system. To explain the choices of states and, even more important, to make sound policy, however, it is important to know which pocket you are in and with whom you are interacting.

Table 6.1. Defense Effort and Security and Economic Hierarchy, 1965-1995

A. Pooled Cross Sectional Regression (xtgee), with robust standard errors and correction for first-order autoregression (AR1).

Dependent Variable: Defense Effort (Military Expenditures/GDP)	Coefficient/Robust Standard Error/Probability <				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Security Hierarchy (number of foreign troops and independent alliances, normalized to 1995)	-0.0090 0.0040 0.022	-0.0129 0.0051 0.011		-0.0090 0.0041 0.031	-0.0093 0.0040 0.021
Security Hierarchy (number of foreign troops, normalized to 1995)			-0.0033 0.0013 0.009		
Security Hierarchy (number of independent alliances, normalized to 1995)			-0.0092 0.0042 0.029		
Economic Hierarchy (exchange rate regime and bilateral trade dependence, normalized to 1995)	0.0057 0.0046 0.218			0.0064 0.0046 0.162	0.0055 0.0046 0.239
Security and Economic Hierarchy Interaction	-0.0265 0.0105 0.012			-0.0264 0.0106 0.013	-0.0259 0.0104 0.013
Defense Effort, lagged one period	0.6373 0.0624 0.000	0.6626 0.0958 0.000	0.6606 0.0961 0.000	0.6290 0.0606 0.000	0.6392 0.0624 0.000
MID Involvement, lagged one year	0.0066 0.0021	0.0080 0.0022	0.0078 0.0021	0.0056 0.0020	0.0066 0.0021

	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.006	0.002
Number of Other Allies	0.0002	0.0002	0.0003	0.0002	0.0002
	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001
	0.013	0.038	0.052	0.010	0.013
Real GDP per capita (in XXX of 1996 dollars)	8.08e-07	7.86e-07	7.97e-07	8.92e-07	8.12e-07
	1.89e-07	2.65e-07	2.66e-07	2.02e-07	1.89e-07
	0.000	0.003	0.003	0.000	0.000
Democracy (Polity2 scale, -10 to 10)	-0.0003	-0.0004	-0.0004	-0.0003	-0.0003
	0.0002	0.0002	0.0002	0.0002	0.0002
	0.167	0.025	0.059	0.134	0.159
Civil War (dummy)				0.0089	
				0.0039	
				0.022	
Warsaw Pact member (dummy)					-0.0040
					0.0017
					0.021
1985 (period dummy)	-0.0134	-0.0123	-0.0126	-0.0140	-0.0134
	0.0043	0.0039	0.0041	0.0043	0.0043
	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.002
1995 (period dummy)	-0.0124	-0.0150	-0.0154	-0.0126	-0.0123
	0.0043	0.0038	0.0039	0.0042	0.0043
	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.003	0.004
Constant	0.0077	0.0091	0.0094	0.0067	0.0077
	0.0030	0.0030	0.0031	0.0031	0.0030
	0.010	0.003	0.003	0.031	0.010
Number of Observations	272	346	346	272	272

Number of Groups	93	121	121	93	93
Wald chi2	294.23	169.88	341.73	448.23	963.41

Excludes Iraq and Saudi Arabia as influential outliers.

B. Substantive Effects of Hierarchy on Defense Effort, Based on Model 1(Sample Mean = 2.38)

Change in Hierarchy	Change in Military Expenditures as a Percent of GDP
In one unit of Security Hierarchy	-0.92
From no Security Hierarchy to maximum observed value	-2.09
In one unit of both Security and Economic Hierarchy	-2.99
From no Economic or Security Hierarchy to maximum observed values of both	-6.02
At any positive value of Economic Hierarchy, in one unit of Security Hierarchy	-3.57
At any positive value of Economic Hierarchy, from no Security Hierarchy to maximum observed value	-6.86

Calculated via Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000).

Table 6.2. Hierarchy, Defense Effort, and Alternative Measures of International Power

Pooled Cross Sectional Regression (xtgee), with robust standard errors and correction for first-order autoregression (AR1).

Dependent Variable: Defense Effort (Military Expenditures/GDP)	Coefficient/Robust Standard Error/Probability <				
	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Security Hierarchy (number of foreign troops and independent alliances, normalized to 1995)	-0.0081 0.0036 0.027	-0.0071 0.0033 0.033	-0.0053 0.0036 0.136	-0.0082 0.0036 0.022	-0.0061 0.0034 0.077
Economic Hierarchy (exchange rate regime and bilateral trade dependence, normalized to 1995)	0.0072 0.0049 0.143	0.0066 0.0050 0.186	0.0063 0.0046 0.173	0.0057 0.0046 0.216	0.0066 0.0047 0.164
Security and Economic Hierarchy Interaction	-0.0280 0.0108 0.009	-0.0269 0.0112 0.016	-0.0277 0.0102 0.007	-0.0273 0.0105 0.010	-0.0269 0.0104 0.009
Defense Effort, lagged one period	0.6605 0.0539 0.000	0.6825 0.0519 0.000	0.6628 0.0583 0.000	0.6528 0.0563 0.000	0.6652 0.0532 0.000
MID Involvement, lagged one year	0.0075 0.0021 0.000	0.0079 0.0021 0.000	0.0077 0.0021 0.000	0.0076 0.0021 0.000	0.0078 0.0021 0.000
Number of Other Allies	0.0002 0.0001 0.030	0.0002 0.0001 0.033	0.0002 0.0001 0.047	0.0002 0.0001 0.010	0.0002 0.0001 0.058
Real GDP per capita (in XXX of 1996 dollars)	7.17e-07 1.94-07 0.000	7.28e-07 1.87e-07 0.000	8.436e-07 1.90e-07 0.000	8.43e-07 1.87e-07 0.000	7.68e-07 1.89e-07 0.000

Democracy (Polity2 scale, -10 to 10)	-0.0003 0.0002 0.199	-0.0003 0.0002 0.134	-0.0003 0.0002 0.131	-0.0003 0.0002 0.112	-0.0003 0.0002 0.141
Population (in ???)	-1.84e-11 6.53e-12 0.005				
Military Personnel		-6.19e-09 1.48e-09 0.000			
Gross Domestic Product (in XXX of 1996 dollars)			-5.61e-15 2.44e-15 0.022		
Major Power Status				-0.0106 0.0059 0.073	
CINC score					-0.1690 0.0519 0.001
1985 (period dummy)	-0.0134 0.0042 0.002	-0.0136 0.0043 0.001	-0.0130 0.0042 0.002	-0.01135 0.0043 0.002	-0.0135 0.0042 0.002
1995 (period dummy)	-0.0120 0.0042 0.004	-0.0124 0.0042 0.003	-0.0114 0.0042 0.006	-0.0121 0.0042 0.004	-0.0120 0.0042 0.004
Constant	0.0081 0.0031	0.0079 0.0031	0.0073 0.0030	0.0071 0.0029	0.0079 0.0031

	0.009	0.010	0.013	0.017	0.010
Number of Observations	272	271	272	272	272
Number of Groups	93	93	93	93	93
Wald chi2	362.71	515.57	339.92	380.85	416.57

Table 6.3. Security and Economic Hierarchy and the Probability of Joining a Conflict, 1960-1999.

a. Dependent variable is probability that the United States joins an on-going conflict.

Militarized Interstate Disputes; Rare Events Logit (0, no join; 1 join), clustered on country (cells present coefficient, standard error, probability)		International Crisis Behavior; multinomial logit (excluded category is no join) with robust standard errors, clustered on country (cells present coefficient, robust standard error, probability)		
			Diplomatic or Economic Activity only (usinv = 2)	Indirect or Direct Military Activity (usinv = 3/4)
Highest Level of United States Security Hierarchy for any Originating Country on Side Joined (number of foreign troops and number of independent alliances, normalized to 1995)	2.4113 1.0792 0.025	Highest Level of United States Security Hierarchy for any Crisis Country (number of foreign troops and number of independent alliances, normalized to 1995)	2.8464 1.0728 0.008	3.3841 1.1546 0.003
Highest Level of United States Economic Hierarchy for any Originating Country on Side Joined (index of bilateral trade dependence, normalized to 1995)	4.7617 1.2893 0.000	Highest Level of United States Economic Hierarchy for any Crisis Country (index of bilateral trade dependence, normalized to 1995)	-1.1204 1.4839 0.450	-0.7059 0.9650 0.464
United States security and/or economic hierarchy on both sides of conflict (dummy = 1 if positive value of either security or economic hierarchy on both	-1.5228 0.6206 0.014			

sides)				
Duration of International Conflict (MID variable = MAXDUR)	0.0005 0.0004 0.187	Duration of International Conflict (ICB variable = BREXIT)	0.0004 0.0008 0.577	0.0012 0.0009 0.182
Level of Violence in Conflict (MID variable = FATALPRE; precise number of fatalities)	-0.0634 0.0883 0.473	Level of Violence in Conflict (ICB variable = VIOL)	0.2156 0.1882 0.252	0.5491 0.2715 0.043
		Saliency of Area in Conflict (ICB variable = GEOSTR)	0.8374 0.4569 0.067	1.5757 0.4939 0.001
Number of Actors in Conflict (MID variables NUMA plus NUMB)	1.0000 0.2428 0.000	Number of Actors in Conflict (ICB variable = NOACTR)	0.3678 0.0895 0.000	0.4270 0.1025 0.000
1975 (dummy)	0.0492 1.7910 0.978	1975 (dummy)	-0.7642 0.5042 0.130	-0.4023 0.7089 0.570
1985 (dummy)	1.4287 0.8559 0.095	1985 (dummy)	-0.0071 0.5157 0.989	1.7152 0.6331 0.007
1995 (dummy)	0.1939 0.8330 0.816	1995 (dummy)	1.6273 0.6071 0.007	2.2546 0.7669 0.003
Constant	-7.4670 1.3515 0.000	Constant	-3.4436 0.9498 0.000	-7.4983 1.2364 0.000
Number of Observations	1054	Number of Observations	214	

	Pseudo R2	0.2205
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Note: Security and Economic hierarchy observed only at mid-point of each decade (e.g., 1965 for all crises 1960-1969).

B1. Predicted probability of joining an on-going MID (all variables at their means unless indicated)

Baseline probability of United States joining a dispute, no security or economic hierarchy = 0.00431 (p < .01)	Change in Probability that the United States will join an on-going MID (first difference)	Percentage Change in the Relative Risk that the United States will join an on-going MID
Movement from no security hierarchy to 75 th percentile	0.01270 (p < .03)	226
Movement from no security hierarchy to maximum	0.04842 (p < .04)	765
Movement from no economic hierarchy to 75 th percentile	0.00355 (p < .01)	54
Movement from no economic hierarchy to maximum	0.43316 (p < .01)	5,811

Calculated via relogitq, in Relogit (King and Zeng 2001).

B2. Predicted probability of joining an on-going crisis via diplomacy/economic activity (usinv = 2) (all variables at their means unless indicated)

Baseline probability of United States joining a crisis, no security or economic hierarchy = 0.46977 (p < .01)	Change in Probability that the United States will join an on-going crisis (first difference)	Percentage Change in the Relative Risk that the United States will join an on-going crisis
Movement from no security hierarchy to 75 th percentile	0.003 (p < .04)	0.8
Movement from no security hierarchy to maximum	0.15871 (p > .10)	40

Movement from no economic hierarchy to 75 th percentile	-0.02494 (p > .10)	-4.7
Movement from no economic hierarchy to maximum	-0.14220 (p > .10)	-27

Calculated via Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000).

B3. Predicted probability of joining an on-going crisis via indirect or direct military activity (usinv = 3/4) (all variables at their means unless indicated)

Baseline probability of United States joining a crisis, no security or economic hierarchy = 0.15655	Change in Probability that the United States will join an on-going crisis (first difference)	Percentage Change in the Relative Risk that the United States will join an on-going crisis
Movement from no security hierarchy to 75 th percentile	0.00190 (p < .01)	1.23
Movement from no security hierarchy to maximum	0.16136 (p < .01)	108
Movement from no economic hierarchy to 75 th percentile	0.00020 (p > .10)	0.005
Movement from no economic hierarchy to maximum	-0.02153 (p > .10)	-12

Calculated via Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000).

Table 6.4. Probability of Joining United States-led Coalition

Logit with robust standard errors

Dependent Variable: Probability that country will join coalition (no = 0, yes = 1)	Coefficient Robust standard errors Probability <		
	Model 1: Persian Gulf War 1991 (Independent Variables = 1985)	Model 2: Iraq War 2003 (Independent Variables = 1995)	Model 3: Iraq War 2003 (Independent Variables = 1995)
United States Security Hierarchy (number of foreign troops and independent alliances, normalized to 1995)	4.1693 1.2836 0.001	3.0992 1.1276 0.006	4.7765 1.4145 0.001
United States Economic Hierarchy (exchange rate regime and bilateral trade dependence, normalized to 1995)	0.3696 1.0454 0.793	0.4948 1.4634 0.735	1.7611 1.3966 0.207
Security and Economic Hierarchy Interaction	-2.2563 3.6069 0.532	-4.2304 3.6844 0.251	-6.5489 3.6705 0.074
Middle East (dummy)	1.8694 0.7067 0.008		
Warsaw Pact member (dummy)			3.7978 1.4876 0.011
State part of Former Soviet Union			1.7378 0.8354 0.038
Constant	-2.3659 0.5827	-1.4644 0.3441	-2.3792 0.4901

	0.000	0.000	0.000
Number of Observations	103	136	136
Pseudo R2	0.1675	0.0676	0.1890

Predicted probabilities discussed in text.

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