POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM MACHIAVELLI TO ROUSSEAU
I am attempting a loosely chronological consideration of some thinkers
between the period of 1500 and 1780, the period which marks the rise and
triumph of the modern political person and of the modern state. My
criteria of selection relate to the specific themes which I hope to try
and develop in the course. In particular (though not exclusively),
I am interested in the relation of authority-and community, the formation
of political myth, the rise and fall in the belief of the efficacy of human
action, and the gradual emergence of individuals thought capable of being
under their own (political) control.
This enterprise will involve us in dialogue with each of the people we
read. Needless to say, no-one should think that the presentation
of a thinker constitutes in any way a total or complete understanding.
Furthermore, the question of what an accurate partial understanding looks
like, I must leave to both your and my imagination. The course proceeds
in two dimensions. First, on a linear level, I am trying to tell
the story of the rise of modern Western ways of thinking about individuals
and politics and of the problems associated with that mode of thought.
Secondly, on a vertical dimension, we are trying to become as well acquainted
as possible with particular thinkers who have been important in this process.
This means that you will get much more out of the classes if you have done
the reading before the class. Such reading will serve to familiarize
you, as it were, with the characters of.the story that I am going to be
telling. And since time is limited, the better your initial acquaintance
the better you will come-to know them.-
Office hours:Wednesday,
10-12, by appt at 534 7081, drop in: at SSB 374; Email: <tstrong@weber.ucsd.edu>
Please purchase the following books; they are all in paperback at the Book Store:
Machiavelli, The
Prince (Hackett)
Shakespeare, Richard
III (Penguin)
Calvin, On God
and Political Duty
Hobbes, Leviathan
Locke, Second Treatise
on Government
Montesquieu, The
Persian Letters
Rousseau, Basic
Political Writings
Requirements
I have also placed the following texts on reserve and indicated useful chapters where appropriate, as suggested reading:
S.S. Wolin, Politics and Vision; L. Strauss and J. Cropsey, ed., History of Western Political Philosophy; G.L. Sabine, A History of Political Theory; J.L. Plamenatz, Man and Society, 2 volumes; J. G.A.Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment
January8: Introduction
Required: Nothing
Suggested: Wolin,
Chap. I; pp. 131-140; Pocock Chaps. I-III; Sabine, Chaps. 8-16
January 8,10,15: Machiavelli: Volition and Illusion
February 14,19: Montesquieu: Power and Justice
February 26, 28; March 5, 7: Rousseau and the Psychology of Fraternity: Illusion and Volition
Introduction
I. Theory (note
Greek origin: theoros)
A. related to sight; to seeing; "I see": a theoretical act
B. Makingthe owrld ones own
II. Politics
A. a question among many: Who am I and who are WE?
III. Political Theory
A. Questions and arguments about our relation to our collectivities.
B. always contested and contestable
I. the change in the Brutus figure from Dante to Shakespeare
II. "New philosophy calls all into question"
(Donne)
A. Reactions: reactionary; avoidance;
those who like it
III. Republicanism
A. no heredity: "The Age
of Bastards"
B. Achievement
C. Emphasis on skill and will
D. religion?
I. Who?
II. Intention of THE PRINCE
A. disappearance of tradition
B. how do we replace heredity with
ability?
III. Subject matter of THE PRINCE
A. types of states (chaps 1-2)
IV. What is the human condition for M?
A. two types of humans
1. responding
to the moment
2. instrumental
or economic
B. focuses on leader and led, not
on class
V. What gfoverns the relation of the two?
A. flux of human affairs
B. most desire constancy
C. using illusions (political judo)
VI. What is the range of what can be done?
A. relation of fortune and virtu
(discussion from handout)
B. autnomy of politics
VII. whenthe prince has done this what has been
done?
A. stato
VIII. morality in M
A. distinction of public and private
morality and their tensions
IX. limitations on the prince
A. habituation to an identity
B. death
X. Discourses:
A. to those who should be princes
B. importance of discord
C. the rule of law
D. militia and self-interest
E. dangers of Christianity
II. Calvin
A.
who
B.
new role for government
C.
new vision of law
D. human
consequences
1. predestination
VI. Politics as border maintenance
A. institutions
B. giving up the excutive power
of the law of nature
VII. Rebellion
A. the people judge
B. nature of consent
1. ## 155ff
2. society
as contingent
JAMES HARRINGTON
I. Major work is OCEANA, a kind of poorly discussed account of
England ove th previous 250 years
II. Two aspects:
A. Historical
1. The consequences of the
Enclosure Acts
a. "sheep ate men" (Sir Thomas More)
b. destruction of the noblity
B. Analysis
1. human events follow laws
2. there is a relation between
forms of government and distribution of property
3. "Equal Agrarian" is basis
of stable society
4. institutions
MONTESQUIEU
OUTLINE OF THE PERSIAN LETTERS : Note how most of the topics that we saw, say, in Locke, are here present. Note how much more complex they are made by the introduction of a psychology that corresponds to and maintains a political state of affairs.
I. PSYCHOLOGY:
1-10: ideal type of despot
2 security
3: ever a new command, ever a new submission
ideal despot
8: ideal subject (also Usbek)
9: politics as erotic (eunuch is his own friend)
ebb and flow of submission and domination
11-14: political revolutions
what is wrong with state of nature (Hobbes)
15-18: revolution: political idiocy
15 castration is a second birth
19-24: arbitrariness
20 suspicion always overcomes in a despot
21-22: fear
21 you are tools
23: how much must be done to keep one man happy: freedom as the quality
of a republic (Venice)
24 Paris as despotism (Pope and King)
25-32: arbitrariness and role playing
26 state of happy inability to transgress
28ff theater
30 appearance and reality -- how can one be Persian -- WHAT IS
NATURAL
32 astonishing thing about blindness is not knowing your own
city
28-32 identity
33-37 psychology of knowledge
33 attacks Christianity (harem is like France)
34 classically the despot has no friends: 34 compared to 37
35 Christianity is the wrong kind of illusion (see 113)
38-43: leadership
42 castration as dehumanization of subordinate
43 “if you ever beheld me” (the absent leader)
44-51 social bonds
48 social position and illusion -- the ages of the women
52-56: illusion
57-61: religion
65 the ideal harem is silent
62-71 human bonds
62 compare to 63 on women
67 only happy people are these incestuous ones
69 limits of philosophy
II. SUMMARY: The rational person in a non-rational society:
72-78, esp. 76-77
76: suicide/ society is mutual benefit (Pride is problem)
77 the solution is law not psychology
III. SOCIOLOGY: (society and despotism)
79-87 justice and authority
80 reason and government and punishment
83 justice
88-91 honor
limits of stoicism (the wives at least know what will make them
happy)
92-97 law
94 no need for state of nature
95 international politics
97 laws and nature and of nature
98-104 political society
102 monarchy is violent, always degenerating into a despotism
or a republic
despotism is without proportionality
103 invisibility of despot
105-112: arts and society
113-122: population
123-129 tenderness and social bonds
M on philosophers: geometry with no tenderness
130-137: literature as metaphor for life
132 irrelevance of philosophy
138-142: primacy of politics
138 what politics can do (turn things all around and ruin them
141: we feel the pain of others no matter how smart
142 antiquarian who wastes
143-146: leadership
147-161: dissolution of authority
147-155: dissolution of Usbek as subject
155 I am destroying myself
156-161: wives freedom: dissolution of Usbek as object
156-159 FOUR WIVES' LETTERS
161 I was deceiving you.
PERSIAN LETTERS: Cast of Characters
Usbek and Rica are in Europe
Rhedi: Ibben's nephew in Venice
FRIENDS: Ibben - Persian in Smyrna, Mirza in Ispahan (good man), Nessin in Ispahan; Rustan in Ispahan; Nargan - Persian envoy to Moscow
SLAVES: First black eunuch; Ibbi -eunuch with Usbek; Jaron - eunuch with Usbek; Narsit -old eunuch in Ispahan; Pharon - servant threatened with castration; Solim - young eunuch
WIVES: Roxane, Zachi, Zelis, Zephir
OTHERS: Jamshed - U's cousin; U's brother; Mahomet-Ali - servant of
the prophet and dervish; Hassein – dervish; Hadji Ibbi – pilgrim; Ben Joshua
- converted Jew; Nathaniel Levi - Jewish physician
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Who
II. THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS
A. law as a relationship, not a command (contra
Hobbes)
B. warning against despotism
C. justice requires laws andindependent judiciary
III. THE PERSIAN LETTERS
A. Two major themes
1. how people deceive themselves
and why
2. arbitrarianess of pwoer
only available to those on whom it is inflicted
B. uses of the epistolary novel:
1. anthropological
distance
2, distance
of the author
C. Uzbek
1. the limits of rationality
2. the absence of conversation
D. Why are people unhappy
1. Apheridon and Astarte
2. limitations on virtue
as basis of political society
3. Why do people submit
to despotism?
E. Institutional analysis
1. France is mad
2. jealous as despotism
as the desire that the other not exist except through me
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 12
ESSAY XII: OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT
As no party, in the present age, can well support itself, without a
philosophical or speculative system of principles, annexed to its political
or practical one; we accordingly find, that each of the factions, into
which this nation is divided, has reared up a fabric of the former kind,
in order to protect and cover that scheme of actions, which it pursues.
The people being commonly very rude builders, especially in this speculative
way, and more especially still, when actuated by party-zeal; it is natural
to imagine, that their workmanship must be a little unshapely, and discover
evident marks of that violence and hurry, in which it was raised. The one
party, by tracing up government to the DEITY, endeavour to render it so
sacred and inviolate, that it must be little less than sacrilege, however
tyrannical it may become, to touch or invade it, in the smallest article.
The other party, by founding government altogether on the consent of the
PEOPLE, suppose that there is a kind of original contract, by which the
subjects have tacitly reserved the power of resisting their sovereign,
whenever they find themselves aggrieved by that authority, with which they
have, for certain purposes, voluntarily entrusted him. These are the speculative
principles of the two parties; and these too are the practical consequences
deduced from them.
I shall venture to affirm, That both these systems of speculative
principles are just; though not in the sense, intended by the parties:
And, That both the schemes of practical consequences are prudent; though
not in the extremes, to which each party, in opposition to the other, has
commonly endeavoured to carry them.
That the DEITY is the ultimate author of all government, will
never be denied by any, who admit a general providence, and allow, that
all events in the universe are conducted by an uniform plan, and directed
to wise purposes. As it is impossible for the human race to subsist, at
least in any comfortable or secure state, without the protection of government;
this institution must certainly have been intended by that beneficent Being,
who means the good of all his creatures: And as it has universally, in
fact, taken place, in all countries, and all ages; we may conclude, with
still greater certainty, that it was intended by that omniscient Being,
who can never be deceived by any event or operation. But since he gave
rise to it, not by any particular or miraculous interposition, but by his
concealed and universal efficacy; a sovereign cannot, properly speaking,
be called his vice-gerent, in any other sense than every power or force,
being derived from him, may be said to act by his commission. Whatever
actually happens is comprehended in the general plan or intention of providence;
nor has the greatest and most lawful prince any more reason, upon that
account, to plead a peculiar sacredness or inviolable authority, than an
inferior magistrate, or even an usurper, or even a robber and a pyrate.
The same divine superintendant, who, for wise purposes, invested†a a TITUS
or a TRAJAN with authority, did also, for purposes, no doubt, equally wise,
though unknown, bestow power on a BORGIA or an ANGRIA. The same causes,
which gave rise to the sovereign power in every state, established likewise
every petty jurisdiction in it, and every limited authority. A constable,
therefore, no less than a king, acts by a divine commission, and possesses
an indefeasible right.
When we consider how nearly equal all men are in their bodily
force, and even in their mental powers and faculties, till cultivated by
education; we must necessarily allow, that nothing but their own consent
could, at first, associate them together, and subject them to any authority.
The people, if we trace government to its first origin in the woods and
desarts, are the source of all power and jurisdiction, and voluntarily,
for the sake of peace and order, abandoned their native liberty, and received
laws from their equal and companion. The conditions, upon which they were
willing to submit, were either expressed, or were so clear and obvious,
that it might well be esteemed superfluous to express them. If this, then,
be meant by the original contract, it cannot be denied, that all government
is, at first, founded on a contract, and that the most ancient rude combinations
of mankind were formed chiefly by that principle. In vain, are we asked
in what records this charter of our liberties is registered. It was not
written on parchment, nor yet on leaves or barks of trees. It preceded
the use of writing and all the other civilized arts of life. But we trace
it plainly in the nature of man, and in the equality,†b or something approaching
equality, which we find in all the individuals of that species. The force,
which now prevails, and which is founded on fleets and armies, is plainly
political, and derived from authority, the effect of established government.
A man's natural force consists only in the vigour of his limbs, and the
firmness of his courage; which could never subject multitudes to the command
of one. Nothing but their own consent, and their sense of the advantages
resulting from peace and order, could have had that influence.
†c Yet even this consent was long very imperfect, and could not
be the basis of a regular administration. The chieftain, who had probably
acquired his influence during the continuance of war, ruled more by persuasion
than command; and till he could employ force to reduce the refractory and
disobedient, the society could scarcely be said to have attained a state
of civil government. No compact or agreement, it is evident, was expressly
formed for general submission; an idea far beyond the comprehension of
savages: Each exertion of authority in the chieftain must have been particular,
and called forth by the present exigencies of the case: The sensible utility,
resulting from his interposition, made these exertions become daily more
frequent; and their frequency gradually produced an habitual, and, if you
please
to call it so, a voluntary, and therefore precarious, acquiescence in the
people.
But philosophers, who have embraced a party (if that be not a
contradiction in terms) are not contented with these concessions. They
assert, not only that government in its earliest infancy arose from consent
or rather the voluntary acquiescence of the people; but also, that, even
at present, when it has attained full maturity, it rests on no other foundation.
They affirm, that all men are still born equal, and owe allegiance to no
prince or government, unless bound by the obligation and sanction of a
promise. And as no man, without some equivalent, would forego the advantages
of his native liberty, and subject himself to the will of another; this
promise is always understood to be conditional, and imposes on him no obligation,
unless he meet with justice and protection from his sovereign. These advantages
the sovereign promises him in return; and if he fail in the execution,
he has broken, on his part, the articles of engagement, and has thereby
freed his subject from all obligations to allegiance. Such, according to
these philosophers, is the foundation of authority in every government;
and such the right of resistance, possessed by every subject.
But would these reasoners look abroad into the world, they would
meet with nothing that, in the least, corresponds to their ideas, or can
warrant so refined and philosophical a system. On the contrary, we find,
every where, princes, who claim their subjects as their property, and assert
their independent right of sovereignty, from conquest or succession. We
find also, every where, subjects, who acknowledge this right in their prince,
and suppose themselves born under obligations of obedience to a certain
sovereign, as much as under the ties of reverence and duty to certain parents.
These connexions are always conceived to be equally independent of our
consent, in PERSIA and CHINA; in FRANCE and SPAIN; and even in HOLLAND
and ENGLAND, wherever the doctrines above-mentioned have not been carefully
inculcated. Obedience or subjection becomes so familiar, that most men
never make any enquiry about its origin or cause, more than about the principle
of gravity, resistance, or the most universal laws of nature. Or if curiosity
ever move them; as soon as they learn, that they themselves and their ancestors
have, for several ages, or from time immemorial, been subject to such a
form of government or such a family; they immediately acquiesce, and acknowledge
their obligation to allegiance. Were you to preach, in most parts of the
world, that political connexions are founded altogether on voluntary consent
or a mutual promise, the magistrate would soon imprison you, as seditious,
for loosening the ties of obedience; if your friends did not before shut
you up as delirious, for advancing such absurdities. It is strange, that
an act of the mind, which every individual is supposed to have formed,
and after he came to the use of reason too, otherwise it could have no
authority; that this act, I say, should be so much unknown to all of them,
that, over the face of the whole earth, there scarcely remain any traces
or memory of it.
But the contract, on which government is founded, is said to
be the original contract; and consequently may be supposed too old to fall
under the knowledge of the present generation. If the agreement, by which
savage men first associated and conjoined their force, be here meant, this
is acknowledged to be real; but being so ancient, and being obliterated
by a thousand changes of government and princes, it cannot now be supposed
to retain any authority. If we would say any thing to the purpose, we must
assert, that every particular government, which is lawful, and which imposes
any duty of allegiance on the subject, was, at first, founded on consent
and a voluntary compact. But besides that this supposes the consent of
the fathers to bind the children, even to the most remote generations,
(which republican writers will never allow) besides this, I say, it is
not justified by history or experience, in any age or country of the world.
Almost all the governments, which exist at present, or of which
there remains any record in story, have been founded originally, either
on usurpation or conquest, or both, without any pretence of a fair consent,
or voluntary subjection of the people. When an artful and bold man is placed
at the head of an army or faction, it is often easy for him, by employing,
sometimes violence, sometimes false pretences, to establish his dominion
over a people a hundred times more numerous than his partizans. He allows
no such open communication, that his enemies can know, with certainty,
their number or force. He gives them no leisure to assemble together in
a body to oppose him. Even all those, who are the instruments of his usurpation,
may wish his fall; but their ignorance of each other's intention keeps
them in awe, and is the sole cause of his security. By such arts as these,
many governments have been established; and this is all the original contract,
which they have to boast of.
The face of the earth is continually changing, by the encrease
of small kingdoms into great empires, by the dissolution of great empires
into smaller kingdoms, by the planting of colonies, by the migration of
tribes. Is there any thing discoverable in all these events, but force
and violence? Where is the mutual agreement or voluntary association so
much talked of?
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 12 Para. 11/49 mp. 471 gp. 448
Even the smoothest way, by which a nation may receive a foreign
master, by marriage or a will, is not extremely honourable for the people;
but supposes them to be disposed of, like a dowry or a legacy, according
to the pleasure or interest of their rulers.
But where no force interposes, and election takes place; what
is this election so highly vaunted? It is either the combination of a few
great men, who decide for the whole, and will allow of no opposition: Or
it is the fury of a multitude, that follow a seditious ringleader, who
is not known, perhaps, to a dozen among them, and who owes his advancement
merely to his own impudence, or to the momentary caprice of his fellows.
Are these disorderly elections, which are rare too, of such mighty
authority, as to be the only lawful foundation of all government and allegiance?
In reality, there is not a more terrible event, than a total
dissolution of government, which gives liberty to the multitude, and makes
the determination or choice of a new establishment depend upon a number,
which nearly approaches to that of the body of the people: For it never
comes entirely to the whole body of them. Every wise man, then, wishes
to see, at the head of a powerful and obedient army, a general, who may
speedily seize the prize, and give to the people a master, which they are
so unfit to chuse for themselves. So little correspondent is fact and reality
to those philosophical notions.
Let not the establishment at the Revolution deceive us, or make
us so much in love with a philosophical origin to government, as to imagine
all others monstrous and irregular. Even that event was far from corresponding
to these refined ideas. It was only the succession, and that only in the
regal part of the government, which was then changed: And it was only the
majority of seven hundred, who determined that change for near ten millions.
I doubt not, indeed, but the bulk of those ten millions acquiesced willingly
in the determination: But was the matter left, in the least, to their choice?
Was it not justly supposed to be, from that moment, decided, and every
man punished, who refused to submit to the new sovereign? How otherwise
could the matter have ever been brought to any issue or conclusion?
The republic of ATHENS was, I believe, the most extensive democracy,
that we read of in history: Yet if we make the requisite allowances for
the women, the slaves, and the strangers, we shall find, that that establishment
was not, at first, made, nor any law ever voted, by a tenth part of those
who were bound to pay obedience to it: Not to mention the islands and foreign
dominions, which the ATHENIANS claimed as theirs by right of conquest.
And as it is well known, that popular assemblies in that city were always
full of licence and disorder, notwithstanding the institutions and laws
by which they were checked: How much more disorderly must they prove, where
they form not the established constitution, but meet tumultuously on the
dissolution of the ancient government, in order to give rise to a new one?
How chimerical must it be to talk of a choice in such circumstances?
†d The ACHAEANS enjoyed the freest and most perfect democracy
of all antiquity; yet they employed force to oblige some cities to enter
into their league, as we learn from POLYBIUS.†1
HARRY the IVth and HARRY the VIIth of ENGLAND, had really no
title to the throne but a parliamentary election; yet they never would
acknowledge it, lest they should thereby weaken their authority. Strange,
if the only real foundation of all authority be consent and promise!
It is in vain to say, that all governments are or should be,
at first, founded on popular consent, as much as the necessity of human
affairs will admit. This favours entirely my pretension. I maintain, that
human affairs will never admit of this consent; seldom of the appearance
of it. But that conquest or usurpation, that is, in plain terms, force,
by dissolving the ancient governments, is the origin of almost all the
new ones, which were ever established in the world. And that in the few
cases, where consent may seem to have taken place, it was commonly so irregular,
so confined, or so much intermixed either with fraud or violence, that
it cannot have any great authority.
†e My intention here is not to exclude the consent of the people
from being one just foundation of government where it has place. It is
surely the best and most sacred of any. I only pretend, that it has very
seldom had place in any degree, and never almost in its full extent. And
that therefore some other foundation of government must also be admitted.
Were all men possessed of so inflexible a regard to justice,
that, of themselves, they would totally abstain from the properties of
others; they had for ever remained in a state of absolute liberty, without
subjection to any magistrate or political society: But this is a state
of perfection, of which human nature is justly deemed incapable. Again;
were all men possessed of so perfect an understanding, as always to know
their own interests, no form of government had ever been submitted to,
but what was established on consent, and was fully canvassed by every member
of the society: But this state of perfection is likewise much superior
to human nature. Reason, history, and experience shew us, that all political
societies have had an origin much less accurate and regular; and were one
to choose a period of time, when the people's consent was the least regarded
in public transactions, it would be precisely on the establishment of a
new government. In a settled constitution, their inclinations are often
consulted; but during the fury of revolutions, conquests, and public convulsions,
military force or political craft usually decides the controversy.
When a new government is established, by whatever means, the
people are commonly dissatisfied with it, and pay obedience more from fear
and necessity, than from any idea of allegiance or of moral obligation.
The prince is watchful and jealous, and must carefully guard against every
beginning or appearance of insurrection. Time, by degrees, removes all
these difficulties, and accustoms the nation to regard, as their lawful
or native princes, that family, which, at first, they considered as usurpers
or foreign conquerors. In order to found this opinion, they have no recourse
to any notion of voluntary consent or promise, which, they know, never
was, in this case, either expected or demanded. The original establishment
was formed by violence, and submitted to from necessity. The subsequent
administration is also supported by power, and acquiesced in by the people,
not as a matter of choice, but of obligation. They imagine not, that their
consent gives their prince a title: But they willingly consent, because
they think, that, from long possession, he has acquired a title, independent
of their choice or inclination.
Should it be said, that, by living under the dominion of a prince,
which one might leave, every individual has given a tacit consent to his
authority, and promised him obedience; it may be answered, that such an
implied consent can only have place, where a man imagines, that the matter
depends on his choice. But where he thinks (as all mankind do who are born
under established governments) that by his birth he owes allegiance to
a certain prince or certain form of government; it would be absurd to infer
a consent or choice, which he expressly, in this case, renounces and disclaims.
Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artizan has a free
choice to leave his country, when he knows no foreign language or manners,
and lives from day to day, by the small wages which he acquires? We may
as well assert, that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to
the dominion of the master; though he was carried on board while asleep,
and must leap into the ocean, and perish, the moment he leaves her.
What if the prince forbid his subjects to quit his dominions;
as in TIBERIUS'S time, it was regarded as a crime in a ROMAN knight that
he had attempted to fly to the PARTHIANS, in order to escape the tyranny
of that emperor?†2 Or as the ancient MUSCOVITES prohibited all travelling
under pain of death? And did a prince observe, that many of his subjects
were seized with the frenzy of migrating to foreign countries, he would
doubtless, with great reason and justice, restrain them, in order to prevent
the depopulation of his own kingdom. Would he forfeit the allegiance of
all his subjects, by so wise and reasonable a law? Yet the freedom of their
choice is surely, in that case, ravished from them.
A company of men, who should leave their native country, in order
to people some uninhabited region, might dream of recovering their native
freedom; but they would soon find, that their prince still laid claim to
them, and called them his subjects, even in their new settlement. And in
this he would but act conformably to the common ideas of mankind.
The truest tacit consent of this kind, that is ever observed,
is when a foreigner settles in any country, and is beforehand acquainted
with the prince, and government, and laws, to which he must submit: Yet
is his allegiance, though more voluntary, much less expected or depended
on, than that of a natural born subject. On the contrary, his native prince
still asserts a claim to him. And if he punish not the renegade, when he
seizes him in war with his new prince's commission; this clemency is not
founded on the municipal law, which in all countries condemns the prisoner;
but on the consent of princes, who have agreed to this indulgence, in order
to prevent reprisals.
†f Did one generation of men go off the stage at once, and another
succeed, as is the case with silk-worms and butterflies, the new race,
if they had sense enough to choose their government, which surely is never
the case with men, might voluntarily, and by general consent, establish
their own form of civil polity, without any regard to the laws or precedents,
which prevailed among their ancestors. But as human society is in perpetual
flux, one man every hour going out of the world, another coming into it,
it is necessary, in order to preserve stability in government, that the
new brood should conform themselves to the established constitution, and
nearly follow the path which their fathers, treading in the footsteps of
theirs, had marked out to them. Some innovations must necessarily have
place in every human institution, and it is happy where the enlightened
genius of the age give these a direction to the side of reason, liberty,
and justice: but violent innovations no individual is entitled to make:
they are even dangerous to be attempted by the legislature: more ill than
good is ever to be expected from them: and if history affords examples
to the contrary, they are not to be drawn into precedent, and are only
to be regarded as proofs, that the science of politics affords few rules,
which will not admit of some exception, and which may not sometimes be
controuled by fortune and accident. The violent innovations in the reign
of HENRY VIII. proceeded from an imperious monarch, seconded by the appearance
of legislative authority: Those in the reign of CHARLES I. were derived
from faction and fanaticism; and both of them have proved happy in the
issue: But even the former were long the source of many disorders, and
still more dangers; and if the measures of allegiance were to be taken
from the latter, a total anarchy must have place in human society, and
a final period at once be put to every government.
Suppose, that an usurper, after having banished his lawful prince
and royal family, should establish his dominion for ten or a dozen years
in any country, and should preserve so exact a discipline in his troops,
and so regular a disposition in his garrisons, that no insurrection had
ever been raised, or even murmur heard, against his administration: Can
it be asserted, that the people, who in their hearts abhor his treason,
have tacitly consented to his authority, and promised him allegiance, merely
because, from necessity, they live under his dominion? Suppose again their
native prince restored, by means of an army, which he levies in foreign
countries: They receive him with joy and exultation, and shew plainly with
what reluctance they had submitted to any other yoke. I may now ask, upon
what foundation the prince's title stands? Not on popular consent surely:
For though the people willingly acquiesce in his authority, they never
imagine, that their consent made him sovereign. They consent; because they
apprehend him to be already, by birth, their lawful sovereign. And as to
that tacit consent, which may now be inferred from their living under his
dominion, this is no more than what they formerly gave to the tyrant and
usurper.
When we assert, that all lawful government arises from the consent
of the people, we certainly do them a great deal more honour than they
deserve, or even expect and desire from us. After the ROMAN dominions became
too unwieldly for the republic to govern them, the people, over the whole
known world, were extremely grateful to AUGUSTUS for that authority, which,
by violence, he had established over them; and they shewed an equal disposition
to submit to the successor, whom he left them, by his last will and testament.
It was afterwards their misfortune, that there never was, in one family,
any long regular succession; but that their line of princes was continually
broken, either by private assassinations or public rebellions. The praetorian
bands, on the failure of every family, set up one emperor; the legions
in the East a second; those in GERMANY, perhaps, a third: And the sword
alone could decide the controversy. The condition of the people, in that
mighty monarchy, was to be lamented, not because the choice of the emperor
was never left to them; for that was impracticable: But because they never
fell under any succession of masters, who might regularly follow each other.
As to the violence and wars and bloodshed, occasioned by every new settlement;
these were not blameable, because they were inevitable.
The house of LANCASTER ruled in this island about sixty years;†g
yet the partizans of the white rose seemed daily to multiply in ENGLAND.
The present establishment has taken place during a still longer period.
Have all views of right in another family been utterly extinguished; even
though scarce any man now alive had arrived at years of discretion, when
it was expelled, or could have consented to its dominion, or have promised
it allegiance? A sufficient indication surely of the general sentiment
of mankind on this head. For we blame not the partizans of the abdicated
family, merely on account of the long time, during which they have preserved
their imaginary loyalty. We blame them for adhering to a family, which,
we affirm, has been justly expelled, and which, from the moment the new
settlement took place, had forfeited all title to authority.
But would we have a more regular, at least a more philosophical,
refutation of this principle of an original contract or popular consent;
perhaps, the following observations may suffice.
All moral duties may be divided into two kinds. The first are
those, to which men are impelled by a natural instinct or immediate propensity,
which operates on them, independent of all ideas of obligation, and of
all views, either to public or private utility. Of this nature are, love
of children, gratitude to benefactors, pity to the unfortunate. When we
reflect on the advantage, which results to society from such humane instincts,
we pay them the just tribute of moral approbation and esteem: But the person,
actuated by them, feels their power and influence, antecedent to any such
reflection.
The second kind of moral duties are such as are not supported
by any original instinct of nature, but are performed entirely from a sense
of obligation, when we consider the necessities of human society, and the
impossibility of supporting it, if these duties were neglected. It is thus
justice or a regard to the property of others, fidelity or the observance
of promises, become obligatory, and acquire an authority over mankind.
For as it is evident, that every man loves himself better than any other
person, he is naturally impelled to extend his acquisitions as much as
possible; and nothing can restrain him in this propensity, but reflection
and experience, by which he learns the pernicious effects of that licence,
and the total dissolution of society which must ensue from it. His original
inclination, therefore, or instinct, is here checked and restrained by
a subsequent judgment or observation.
The case is precisely the same with the political or civil duty
of allegiance, as with the natural duties of justice and fidelity. Our
primary instincts lead us, either to indulge ourselves in unlimited freedom,
or to seek dominion over others: And it is reflection only, which engages
us to sacrifice such strong passions to the interests of peace and public
order. A small degree of experience and observation suffices to teach us,
that society cannot possibly be maintained without the authority of magistrates,
and that this authority must soon fall into contempt, where exact obedience
is not payed to it. The observation of these general and obvious interests
is the source of all allegiance, and of that moral obligation, which we
attribute to it.
What necessity, therefore, is there to found the duty of allegiance
or obedience to magistrates on that of fidelity or a regard to promises,
and to suppose, that it is the consent of each individual, which subjects
him to government; when it appears, that both allegiance and fidelity stand
precisely on the same foundation, and are both submitted to by mankind,
on account of the apparent interests and necessities of human society?
We are bound to obey our sovereign, it is said; because we have given a
tacit promise to that purpose. But why are we bound to observe our promise?
It must here be asserted, that the commerce and intercourse of mankind,
which are of such mighty advantage, can have no security where men pay
no regard to their engagements. In like manner, may it be said, that men
could not live at all in society, at least in a civilized society, without
laws and magistrates and judges, to prevent the encroachments of the strong
upon the weak, of the violent upon the just and equitable. The obligation
to allegiance being of like force and authority with the obligation to
fidelity, we gain nothing by resolving the one into the other. The general
interests or necessities of society are sufficient to establish both.
If the reason be asked of that obedience, which we are bound
to pay to government, I readily answer, because society could not otherwise
subsist: And this answer is clear and intelligible to all mankind. Your
answer is, because we should keep our word. But besides, that no body,
till trained in a philosophical system, can either comprehend or relish
this answer: Besides this, I say, you find yourself embarrassed, when it
is asked, why we are bound to keep our word? Nor can you give any answer,
but what would, immediately, without any circuit, have accounted for our
obligation to allegiance.
But to whom is allegiance due? And who is our lawful sovereign?
This question is often the most difficult of any, and liable to infinite
discussions. When people are so happy, that they can answer, Our present
sovereign, who inherits, in a direct line, from ancestors, that have governed
us for many ages; this answer admits of no reply; even though historians,
in tracing up to the remotest antiquity, the origin of that royal family,
may find, as commonly happens, that its first authority was derived from
usurpation and violence. It is confessed, that private justice, or the
abstinence from the properties of others, is a most cardinal virtue: Yet
reason tells us, that there is no property in durable objects, such as
lands or houses, when carefully examined in passing from hand to hand,
but must, in some period, have been founded on fraud and injustice. The
necessities of human society, neither in private nor public life, will
allow of such an accurate enquiry: And there is no virtue or moral duty,
but what may, with facility, be refined away, if we indulge a false philosophy,
in sifting and scrutinizing it, by every captious rule of logic, in every
light or position, in which it may be placed.
The questions with regard to private property have filled infinite
volumes of law and philosophy, if in both we add the commentators to the
original text; and in the end, we may safely pronounce, that many of the
rules, there established, are uncertain, ambiguous, and arbitrary. The
like opinion may be formed with regard to the succession and rights of
princes and forms of government.†h Several cases, no doubt, occur, especially
in the infancy of any constitution, which admit of no determination from
the laws of justice and equity: And our historian RAPIN†i pretends, that
the controversy between EDWARD the Third and PHILIP DE VALOIS was of this
nature, and could be decided only by an appeal to heaven, that is, by war
and violence.
Who shall tell me, whether GERMANICUS or DRUSUS ought to have
succeeded to TIBERIUS, had he died, while they were both alive, without
naming any of them for his successor? Ought the right of adoption to be
received as equivalent to that of blood, in a nation, where it had the
same effect in private families, and had already, in two instances, taken
place in the public? Ought GERMANICUS to be esteemed the elder son because
he was born before DRUSUS; or the younger, because he was adopted after
the birth of his brother? Ought the right of the elder to be regarded in
a nation, where he had no advantage in the succession of private families?
Ought the ROMAN empire at that time to be deemed hereditary, because of
two examples; or ought it, even so early, to be regarded as belonging to
the stronger or to the present possessor, as being founded on so recent
an usurpation?
COMMODUS mounted the throne after a pretty long succession of
excellent emperors, who had acquired their title, not by birth, or public
election, but by the fictitious rite of adoption. That bloody debauchee
being murdered by a conspiracy suddenly formed between his wench and her
gallant, who happened at that time to be Praetorian Praefect; these immediately
deliberated about choosing a master to human kind, to speak in the style
of those ages; and they cast their eyes on PERTINAX. Before the tyrant's
death was known, the Praefect went secretly to that senator, who, on the
appearance of the soldiers, imagined that his execution had been ordered
by COMMODUS. He was immediately saluted emperor by the officer and his
attendants; chearfully proclaimed by the populace; unwillingly submitted
to by the guards; formally recognized by the senate; and passively received
by the provinces and armies of the empire.
The discontent of the Praetorian bands broke out in a sudden
sedition, which occasioned the murder of that excellent prince: And the
world being now without a master and without government, the guards thought
proper to set the empire formally to sale. JULIAN, the purchaser, was proclaimed
by the soldiers, recognized by the senate, and submitted to by the people;
and must also have been submitted to by the provinces, had not the envy
of the legions begotten opposition and resistance. PESCENNIUS NIGER in
SYRIA elected himself emperor, gained the tumultuary consent of his army,
and was attended with the secret good-will of the senate and people of
ROME. ALBINUS in BRITAIN found an equal right to set up his claim; but
SEVERUS, who governed PANNONIA, prevailed in the end above both of them.
That able politician and warrior, finding his own birth and dignity too
much inferior to the imperial crown, professed, at first, an intention
only of revenging the death of PERTINAX. He marched as general into ITALY;
defeated JULIAN; and without our being able to fix any precise commencement
even of the soldiers' consent, he was from necessity acknowledged emperor
by the senate and people; and fully established in his violent authority
by subduing NIGER and ALBINUS.†3
Inter haec Gordianus CAESAR (says CAPITOLINUS, speaking of another
period) sublatus a militibus. Imperator est appellatus, quia non erat alius
in proesenti, It is to be remarked, that GORDIAN was a boy of fourteen
years of age.
Frequent instances of a like nature occur in the history of the
emperors; in that of ALEXANDER'S successors; and of many other countries:
Nor can any thing be more unhappy than a despotic government of this kind;
where the succession is disjointed and irregular, and must be determined,
on every vacancy, by force or election. In a free government, the matter
is often unavoidable, and is also much less dangerous. The interests of
liberty may there frequently lead the people, in their own defence, to
alter the succession of the crown. And the constitution, being compounded
of parts, may still maintain a sufficient stability, by resting on the
aristocratical or democratical members, though the monarchical be altered,
from time to time, in order to accommodate it to the former.
In an absolute government, when there is no legal prince, who
has a title to the throne, it may safely be determined to belong to the
first occupant. Instances of this kind are but too frequent, especially
in the eastern monarchies.†j When any race of princes expires, the will
or destination of the last sovereign will be regarded as a title. Thus
the edict of LEWIS the XIVth, who called the bastard princes to the succession
in case of the failure of all the legitimate princes, would, in such an
event, have some authority.†4†k Thus the will of CHARLES the Second disposed
of the whole SPANISH monarchy. The cession of the ancient proprietor, especially
when joined to conquest, is likewise deemed a good title. The general obligation,
which binds us to government, is the interest and necessities of society;
and this obligation is very strong. The determination of it to this or
that particular prince or form of government is frequently more uncertain
and dubious. Present possession has considerable authority in these cases,
and greater than in private property; because of the disorders which attend
all revolutions and changes of government.†l
We shall only observe, before we conclude, that, though an appeal
to general opinion may justly, in the speculative sciences of metaphysics,
natural philosophy, or astronomy, be deemed unfair and inconclusive, yet
in all questions with regard to morals, as well as criticism, there is
really no other standard, by which any controversy can ever be decided.
And nothing is a clearer proof, that a theory of this kind is erroneous,
than to find, that it leads to paradoxes, repugnant to the common sentiments
of mankind, and to the practice and opinion of all nations and all ages.
The doctrine, which founds all lawful government on an original contract,
or consent of the people, is plainly of this kind; nor has the most noted
of its partizans, in prosecution of it, scrupled to affirm, that absolute
monarchy is inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil
government at all;†5 and that the supreme power in a state cannot take
from any man, by taxes and impositions, any part of his property, without
his own consent or that of his representatives.†6 What authority any moral
reasoning can have, which leads into opinions so wide of the general practice
of mankind, in every place but this single kingdom, it is easy to determine.†m
The only passage I meet with in antiquity, where the obligation
of obedience to government is ascribed to a promise, is in PLATO'S Crito:
where SOCRATES refuses to escape from prison, because he had tacitly promised
to obey the laws. Thus he builds a tory consequence of passive obedience,
on a whig foundation of the original contract.
New discoveries are not to be expected in these matters. If scarce
any man, till very lately, ever imagined that government was founded on
compact, it is certain, that it cannot, in general, have any such foundation.
The crime of rebellion among the ancients was commonly expressed
by the terms {neoterizein}, novas res moliri.
Pick SIX of the following. Identify the source, the context in
the source, and the importance of the passage in an understanding of the
political theory of the author. (12 minutes each more or less)
1. It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed
these things, that nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to
invade, and destroy one another; … Let him consider with himself, when
taking a journey, he arms himself… and when going to sleep he locks his
doors… and this when he knows there be laws and public officers armed,
to revenge all injuries shall be done to him.
2. The liberty of the subject lieth therefore only in those things,
which in regulating their actions, the sovereign has praetermitted [passed
over, not dealt with]: such as is the liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise
contract with one another; to choose their own abode, their own diet, their
own trade of life , and institute [bring up] their children as them themselves
think fit; and the like.
3. Anyone who wants to set up a republic in a place where there
is a fair number of gentlemen [those who live in luxury off the income
arising from their estates, without working] can only do it if he begins
by killing them all.
4. I compare her [Fortune] to one of those torrential rivers
that, when they get angry, break their banks, knock down trees and buildings,
strip the soil from one place and deposit it somewhere else. Everyone
flees before them, everyone gives way in face of their onrush, nobody can
resist them at any point. But although they are so powerful, this
does not mean that men, when the waters recede, cannot make repairs and
build banks and barriers so that, if the waters rise again, either they
will be safely kept within the sluices or at least their onrush will not
be so unregulated and destructive.
5. Sweet prince, the untainted virtue of your years
Hath not yet dived into the world’s deceit:
Nor more can you distinguish of a man
Than of his outward show, which, God he knows,
Seldom or never jumpeth with the heart.
Those uncles which you want were dangerous;
Your grace attended to their sug’red words
But look not on the poison of their hearts:
God keep you from them, and from such false friends!
6. But if it is God’s will that while we are aspiring toward our true country, we be pilgrims on the earth, and if such adds are necessary to our pilgrimage, they who take them from man deprive him of his human nature. They plead that there should be so much perfection in the Church of God that its order would suffice to supply the place of all laws; but they foolishly imagine a perfection which can never be found in any community of men.
7. Thus the grass my horse has bit; the turfs my servant has cut; and the ore I have digg’d in any place where I have a right to them in common with others become my property without assignation or consent of any body.
8. Having received all actions of the Duke, then, I would not wish to criticize him; rather, he seems to me worthy to be held up as a model, as I have done, for all those who have risen to power through favor or luck and through the arms of others. For he could not have acted differently, given that he possessed a great spirit and had high ambitions. Only two things hindered his schemes: the shortness of Alexander’s pontificate and his own illness.
PAPER TOPICS
Write a paper of 4-6 pages (1198-1734 words) on ONE of the following. Please staple your paper in the top left-hand corner. Papers are due in class on March 5.
1. Some have claimed that Locke is really Hobbes in sheep’s clothing. Why might they do this? Give an analysis supporting or contesting such a claim.
2. Machiavelli famously wrote to a friend that if presented with the choice between the salvation of his soul and that of his city, he would choose the latter. How would (PICK TWO) Hobbes, Calvin, Locke respond to such a choice?
3. Compare and contrast the understanding of property in Hobbes and Locke.
4. What are the differences and similarities between Hobbes’ understanding of the sovereign and Machiavelli’s understanding of the prince?
5. Compare the style of writing in Montesquieu to that of one author we have read. What might be the political significance of any differences you find.
6. Compare the writing styles of Hobbes and Locke and indicate how their respective styles are linked to their political thought. Make sure you give examples.
7. Compare the state of nature as described by Rousseau (both before and after civil society – see the end of the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality) with either that in Hobbes or that in Locke: what difference do the differences make?
8. Evaluate the claims made by Hume against the idea of the social contract as a foundation of society.
9. Compare Machiavelli and Hobbes with respect to their ideas on political
foundings (on the establishment of a new state). What does founding
involve? What are the circumstances of kids of circumstances in which
founding may/does take place? What is its long term importance to
the state?
HUME – OF the Original Contract
May be found at
http://www.constitution.org/dh/origcont.htm
or
weber.ucsd.edu/~tstrong and follow links to PS 110B and find text
or emailing me and I will send it to you.
I. Jean Jacques Rousseau: the significance of his life and his
insistence we know about it.
II. The First Discourse
A. Conditions of composition
B. AIm: can Philosophy and citizenship be brought
together
1. no Socrates' today
C. themes
1. philosophy does no good
if it advances claims to knowledge
2. link betgween knowing
nother and civic virtue
3. no claim to authority
by the author (cf Hobbes problems)
III. The Second Discourse
A. conditions of composition
B. point to identify what happens when society becomes
structured by inequality
C. structure of book: the point
D.What are humans naturally
1. pity
2. self love
3. nothing
E. Second part: property as the instatiation of
inequality
1. developmental stages
2. the circle closes
3. accidental (ie non-necessary)quality
of society
4. the thought of the common:
"nature"
IV. The Social Contract
A. the beginning
1. chains and their legitmation
2. The General Will
a. the idea of the general or the common
b. the idea of the particular
3. Law and Sovereignity
B. Government and Sovereignity
1. the question of representation
C. Bk IV and the problem of the proportion of state