

2009 students on
the job market: Ben Gillen, Jaimie Lien, Juanjuan
Meng, Bryan Tomlin
VINCENT P.
CRAWFORD
On 1 January 2010 I began permanent appointments as
Drummond Professor of Political Economy, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, and Fellow of All Souls College.
I have transferred to emeritus status at UCSD, where I
will be in residence for part of each year, with dates to be posted here.
Contacts from 1
January 2010 through June 2010, and then again from October 2010 until further
notice (email will be monitored in all three places):
Preferred:
Manor Road
44-1865-271953 office direct
44-1865-271089 messages
44-1865-271094 fax
electronic mail: vincent.crawford “at” economics.ox.ac.uk
home
page: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/index.php/staff/vincent_crawford/
Alternative:
44-1865-279339 study direct
44-1865-279379 messages (lodge)
44-1865-279299 fax
electronic
mail: vincent.crawford “at” all-souls.ox.ac.uk
home page: http://www.all-souls.ox.ac.uk/people.php?personid=269
Contacts in July, August, and
September 2010 will be:
Department of Economics
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive
La Jolla, CA 92093-0508
(858) 534-3452
office direct
(858) 534-3383 messages
(858) 534-7040 fax
e-mail: v2crawford "at" dssmail.ucsd.edu
(but my old addresses should still work)
2003 Photo by Zoe Crawford at right (click to enlarge)
Please scroll down for course materials,
recent papers and presentations on behavioral labor economics and behavioral
and experimental game theory, press, and links.
Please scroll down or jump to curriculum
vitae, older downloadable papers,
or photos.
Courses in 2009 –
2010
(includes
"A Game of Fair Division," Review of Economic Studies 44 (June
1977), now a major
motion picture!)
Recent Papers and Presentations (download free Foxit Reader for pdf files;
read Preston McAfee
on why it's better (it is: a lot) and on the also-free PDF Forge Creator
to make your own pdf files)
Behavioral labor economics
Vincent P. Crawford and Juanjuan Meng, "New York City Cabdrivers’ Labor Supply
Revisited: Reference-Dependent Preferences with Rational-Expectations Targets
for Hours and Income", revised 16 July 2009
Original version of paper, 23 July 2008
Original version of Lecture
Slides, 23 July 2008

Behavioral and experimental game theory
Vox, Center for Economic Policy Research,
August 2008 interview by Romesh Vaitilingam on "Behavioural game theory:
how real people think in strategic interactions" (audio only)
Miguel A. Costa-Gomes, Vincent
P. Crawford, and Nagore Iriberri,
"Comparing Models of
Strategic Thinking in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil’s Coordination Games,"
Journal of the European Economic Association 7 (2009), 365-376;
presented in the session, "Limited Cognition, Strategic Thinking, and
Learning", Milan EEA-ESEM Meetings,
27 - 31 August 2008; previous version
Web appendix: "Limiting LQRE as a
Model of Limiting Outcomes in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil’s Coordination
Games"
Vincent P.
Crawford, Tamar
Kugler, Zvika Neeman, and Ady Pauzner, "Behaviorally Optimal Auction
Design: An Example and Some Observations," Journal of the European
Economic Association 7 (2009), 377=387; presented in the session,
"Limited Cognition, Strategic Thinking, and Learning", Milan EEA-ESEM Meetings, 27-31 August
2008; previous
version
Vincent Crawford,
"Modeling Behavior in Novel Strategic
Situations via Level-k Thinking" Lecture slides (there is no
paper yet), presented in the Marketing Seminar, Haas School of Business,
University of California, Berkeley, 3 April 2008; the Applied Micro Theory
Workshop, University of Pennsylvania, 28 April 2008; and at GAMES 2008, Third
World Congress of the Game Theory Society, 14 July 2008
Vincent Crawford, Uri
Gneezy, and Yuval
Rottenstreich, “The Power of
Focal Points is Limited: Even Minute Payoff Asymmetry May Yield Large
Coordination Failures,” American Economic Review 98 (2008), in
press; Web
Appendix (pdf)
(This paper is an extensive revision of Gneezy
and Rottenstreich, “The Power of Focal Points is Limited: Even Minute
Payoff Asymmetry yields Massive Coordination Failures,” 2005.)

Framing
the game in our "
with
the
Vincent P. Crawford, "Level-k Thinking" Lecture
slides (there
is no paper yet), presented at the 2007 North American Meeting of the Economic
Science Association, Tucson, October 18-21
Vincent P. Crawford, Preliminary version of "Let’s Talk It Over:
Coordination Via Preplay Communication With Level-k Thinking"and
Lecture Slides, presented at the 26th Arne Ryde
Symposium, “Communication in Games and Experiments,” 24-25 August 2007,
Lund, Sweden (poster)

Vincent P.
Crawford and Nagore Iriberri,
"Level-k Auctions: Can a
Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and
Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?," Econometrica 75
(November 2007), 1721–1770; Final version of Web Appendix with detailed calculations
and other supporting materials; Lecture
slides (ppt)
Previous
version, July 2006; Previous version,
November 2005 (this version extends our October 2005 specification of truthful
level-k types to allow L0 to condition on its own information in a more
sensible way, which changes the model's predictions for Avery and Kagel's
(1997) design; and corrects an error in our derivation of the implications of
random level-k types in Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey's (2002) design); First version, October 2005
Vincent P. Crawford and Nagore Iriberri, "Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naivete, and
Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games," American
Economic Review 97 (December 2007), 1731-1750; Web
Appendix (pdf); Data Appendix (zip); Lecture slides (ppt)
Presented as SESS Student
Previous version, February 2006; Previous version, January 2005; Previous version, September 2004; Preliminary version,
June 2004
Reference (without screen credit, and with no real appreciation of the importance
of level-k thinking...) on 2005 episode of the CBS series Numb3rs,
"Assassin," first aired 10/21/2005 (courtesy of William Nguyen Phan; YouTube Clip; Text;
Moriarti Comment)
Charlie: Hide and seek.
Don: What are you talking about, like the kids’ version?
Charlie: A mathematical approach to it, yes. See, the assassin must hide
in order to accomplish his goal, we must seek and find the assassin before he
achieves that goal.
Megan: Ah, behavioral game theory, yeah, we studied this at
Charlie: I doubt you studied it the way that Rubinstein, Tversky and
Heller studied two person constant sum hide and seek with unique mixed strategy
equilibria.
Megan: No, not quite that way.
Don: Just bear with him.
Thoughts on Hide and Seek games played on naturally occuring
"landscapes" from Edgar Allan Poe's The Purloined Letter (complete story)
General principles:
"…But
he perpetually errs by being too deep or too shallow, for the matter in hand;
and many a schoolboy is a better reasoner than he. I knew one about eight years
of age, whose success at guessing in the game of 'even and odd' attracted
universal admiration. This game is simple, and is played with marbles. One
player holds in his hand a number of these toys, and demands of another whether
that number is even or odd. If the guess is right, the guesser wins one; if
wrong, he loses one. The boy to whom I allude won all the marbles of the
school. Of course he had some principle of guessing; and this lay in mere
observation and admeasurement of the astuteness of his opponents. For example,
an arrant simpleton is his opponent, and, holding up his closed hand, asks,
'are they even or odd?' Our schoolboy replies, 'odd,' and loses; but upon the
second trial he wins, for he then says to himself, the simpleton had them even
upon the first trial, and his amount of cunning is just sufficient to make him
have them odd upon the second; I will therefore guess odd'; --he guesses odd,
and wins. Now, with a simpleton a degree above the first, he would have
reasoned thus: 'This fellow finds that in the first instance I guessed odd,
and, in the second, he will propose to himself upon the first impulse, a simple
variation from even to odd, as did the first simpleton; but then a second
thought will suggest that this is too simple a variation, and finally he will
decide upon putting it even as before. I will therefore guess even' guesses
even, and wins. Now this mode of reasoning in the schoolboy, whom his fellows
termed 'lucky,' --what, in its last analysis, is it?"
"It is merely," I said, "an identification of the reasoner's
intellect with that of his opponent."
(glossary:
"arrant simpleton" = L1 (conditional on shared history, which
makes one choice focal in a way that would attract L0); "simpleton
a degree above the first" = L2; boy with all the marbles = L2
or L3, depending on his assessment of how simple his opponent is)
Specific application:
"At
length my eyes, in going the circuit of the room, fell upon a trumpery filigree
card-rack of pasteboard, that hung dangling by a dirty blue ribbon, from a
little brass knob just beneath the middle of the mantelpiece. In this rack,
which had three or four compartments, were five or six visiting cards and a
solitary letter. This last was much soiled and crumpled. It was torn nearly in
two, across the middle --as if a design, in the first instance, to tear it
entirely up as worthless, had been altered, or stayed, in the second. It had a
large black seal, bearing the D-- cipher very conspicuously, and was addressed,
in a diminutive female hand, to D--, the minister, himself. It was thrust
carelessly, and even, as it seemed, contemptuously, into one of the upper
divisions of the rack.
"No
sooner had I glanced at this letter, than I concluded it to be that of which I
was in search. To be sure, it was, to all appearance, radically different from
the one of which the Prefect had read us so minute a description. Here the seal
was large and black, with the D-- cipher; there it was small and red, with the
ducal arms of the S-- family. Here, the address, to the Minister, was
diminutive and feminine; there the superscription, to a certain royal
personage, was markedly bold and decided; the size alone formed a point of
correspondence. But, then, the radicalness of these differences, which was
excessive; the dirt; the soiled and torn condition of the paper, so
inconsistent with the true methodical habits of D--, and so suggestive of a
design to delude the beholder into an idea of the worthlessness of the
document; these things, together with the hyperobtrusive situation of this
document, full in the view of every visitor, and thus exactly in accordance
with the conclusions to which I had previously arrived; these things, I say,
were strongly corroborative of suspicion, in one who came with the intention to
suspect."
Vincent P.
Crawford, "Look-ups as the
Windows of the Strategic Soul: Studying Cognition via Information Search in
Game Experiments" (based on joint work with Miguel A. Costa-Gomes and
Bruno Broseta), in Andrew Caplin and Andrew Schotter, editors, Perspectives
on the Future of Economics: Positive and Normative Foundations, Volume 1 in
the series Handbooks of Economic Methodologies, Oxford University Press,
2008; Lecture Slides presented at Methodologies
of Modern Economics Conference, Center for Experimental Social Science, New
York University, 28-29 July 2006; Lecture
Slides presented at the Conference on the Foundations of Positive and
Normative Economics, New York University, 25-26 April 2008. 
Miguel A.
Costa-Gomes and Vincent P. Crawford, "Studying
Cognition via Information Search in Two-Person Guessing Game Experiments,"
paper still in progress
Lecture
Slides, Berkeley Psychology and Economics Seminar, 6 March
2007, and the Barcelona JOCS Seminar, 26 March 2007; focusing on cognitive and
experimental issues; earlier version of Lecture
Slides, Chicago, 2007, AEA Meetings; focusing on cognitive and
experimental issues
Lecture Slides,
Workshop on Econometrics and Experimental Economics, Northwestern University,
28 April 2006; focusing on econometric issues
Lecture Slides, "Studying
Strategic Thinking by Monitoring Search for Hidden Payoff Information and
Interpreting the Data in the Light of Algorithms that Link Cognition, Search,
and Decisions," NSF Workshop on “Behavior, Computation, and
Networks in Human Subject Experimentation,” Del Mar, California, July 31-August
1, 2008
Lecture
Slides, Cemmap/ELSE Workshop on
"Experimental Analysis of Procedural Rationality in Games and
Decisions,"
Lecture Slides,
"Studying Strategic Thinking Experimentally by Monitoring Search for
Hidden Payoff Information," Behavioral, Social and Computer Sciences
Seminar, Calit2,
University of
Miguel A.
Costa-Gomes and Vincent P. Crawford, "Cognition
and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American
Economic Review 96 (December 2006), 1737-1768; Web
Appendix (zip) (A.
Instructions for Baseline and Robot/Trained Subjects Treatments; B. Description
of Pilots; C. Preliminary Statistical Tests; D. Figures Showing Subjects'
Aggregate Guess Distributions, Game by Game; E. Subjects' Guess and Look-up
Data; F. Specification Tests and Analysis of Clusters; G. Supplementary Tables;
H. Analysis of Search); Data
Appendix (zip); Lecture slides; part of Figure 1 from Nagel (1995 AER)
referred to in slides
Previous version, August
2006; previous version, December
2005; previous version, October
2004; first version, April 2004
Figures
showing aggregate frequency distributions of guesses game by game (with games
identified by the codes from Table 2):
Sara Robinson extensively discusses
this paper in her article, "How Real People Think in
Strategic Games," in the January/Februrary 2004 issue of SIAM News
Vincent P.
Crawford, "Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational
and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of
Intentions," American Economic Review 93 (March
2003), 133-149; Lecture
slides
Previous version (UCSD Discussion Paper
2001-16)

Quotes:
Let
me read you some of the actual chatter that we picked up that Spring and
Summer:
·
'Unbelievable news in coming weeks'
·
'Big event ... there will be a very, very, very, very big uproar'
·
'There will be attacks in the near future'
Troubling,
yes. But they don’t tell us when; they don’t tell us where; they don’t tell us
who; and they don’t tell us how." -- Condoleeza Rice, Opening Remarks to
the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
"Συνέντευξη
του
Διακεκριμένου
Καθηγητή του
Πανεπιστημίου
της Καλιφόρνια, Σαν
Ντιέγκο, Professor
Vincent P. Crawford: Στο
εργαστήριο
μαθαίνουμε πώς
λαμβάνονται οι
αποφάσεις,"
Εφημερίδα ΤA ΝΕΑ
15/03/2005, ειδικό
ένθετο MBA Ανοιχτό: ("Interview of Distinguished Professor at the University
of California, San Diego, Professor Vincent P. Crawford: In the Laboratory We
Learn How Decisions are Made", in the special inset "MBA
Open" of the Greek newspaper "The News," 15 March
2005 (interviewed by Constantina
Kottaridi))
Vincent P. Crawford, Lecture
Slides for "Outguessing and Deception in Novel Strategic Situations,"
SESS Distinguished Lecture, Singapore
Management University, November 2004; SMU Video webcast (asf,
379 megabytes; may load slowly); Lecture
Slides for version
presented at Northwestern University, October 2005
Vincent P. Crawford, "Introduction to
Experimental Game Theory" (Symposium), Journal of Economic Theory 104
(May 2002), 1-15; html
Miguel
Costa-Gomes, Vincent Crawford, and Bruno Broseta, "Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An
Experimental Study," Econometrica 69 (September 2001)),
1193-1235; Correction of minor typos in Table 2 of published version (p.1216)
Preliminary version
(UCSD Discussion Paper 98-22, includes appendices); extensively revised version plus Appendix A (UCSD
Discussion Paper 2000-02R), Appendices B, C, D,
and E; Lecture slides; MouseLab home page
Vincent P. Crawford, "Learning
Dynamics, Lock-in, and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Coordination Games,"
in Ugo Pagano and Antonio Nicita, editors, The Evolution of Economic
Diversity (papers from Workshop X, International School of Economic
Research, University of Siena), London and New York: Routledge, 2001, 133-163; Lecture slides
Readers (and potential Routledge authors) should note that Routledge
eliminated crucial parts of Figure 6.2(b), making it meaningless. There should
be a closed dot at (2,0) and an open dot at (0,0), as in the UCSD Discussion
Paper 97-19 version.
Vincent P. Crawford and Bruno Broseta, "What Price Coordination? The Efficiency-enhancing
Effect of Auctioning the Right to Play," American Economic Review
88 (March 1998), 198-225.
Vincent Crawford, "Theory
and Experiment in the Analysis of Strategic Interaction," in David Kreps
and Ken Wallis, editors, Advances
in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Seventh World Congress, Vol.
I, Econometric Society Monographs No. 27, Cambridge, U.K., and New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1997, 206-242; reprinted
with minor changes and additions in Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein, and
Matthew Rabin, editors, Advances in Behavioral Economics, Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2003, 344-373.
Vincent Crawford, "A Survey of Experiments on
Communication via Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Theory 78
(February 1998), 286-298.
Vincent P. Crawford, "Adaptive
Dynamics in Coordination Games," Econometrica 63 (January
1995), 103-143
Vincent P. Crawford, "An 'Evolutionary'
Interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Experimental Results on
Coordination," Games and Economic Behavior 3 (February 1991),
25-59
Vincent P. Crawford, "Explicit Communication and Bargaining Outcomes," American
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 80 (May 1990), 213-219
Vincent P. Crawford, "Equilibrium
without Independence," Journal of Economic Theory 50 (February
1990), 127-154
Vincent P. Crawford, "Learning and
Mixed-Strategy Equilibria in Evolutionary Games," Journal of
Theoretical Biology 140 (23 October 1989), 537-550
Matching Markets
Vincent P. Crawford, "The Flexible-Salary Match: A Proposal to Increase the
Salary Flexibility of the National Resident Matching Program," Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization 66 (2008), 149-160; working paper version.
Previous
version, February 2005; First version,
August 2004
Sara
Robinson's August 24, 2004 New York Times article about
the proposal,
"Tweaking the Math to Make Happier Medical
Marriages" and the graphic
published with the article
Patricia Morén's March 29, 2007 Diario Medico
(free online registration required) article about the proposal, "La flexibilidad salarial del residente mejora
su asignación a distintos centros"
Read more about the National
Resident Matching Program; about the residents' lawsuit
Vincent P. Crawford and Elsie Marie Knoer, "Job Matching with Heterogeneous Firms and Workers,"
Econometrica 49 (March 1981), 437-450
Alexander S. Kelso, Jr., and Vincent P. Crawford,
"Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and
Gross Substitutes," Econometrica 50 (November 1982), 1483-1504
Vincent P. Crawford, "Comparative
Statics in Matching Markets," Journal of Economic Theory 54
(August 1991), 389-400
Miscellany
Vincent P. Crawford and Ping-Sing Kuo, "A Dual Dutch
Auction in Taipei: The Choice of Numeraire and Auction Form in Multi-Object
Auctions with Bundling," Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization 52 (August 2003), 427-442; final version
(UCSD Discussion Paper 2000-10); Lecture
slides
"The Protestant Ethic and
the Spirit of Stuffiness" or "Who is Gerard Wanrooy and why did he (and his boss at Elsevier,
Joop Dirkmaat), overriding JEBO editor
Barkley Rosser's decision, refuse to publish one of these photographs in the
article or to post them as accompanying materials linked on JEBO's
website; and why did they try even to refuse us the right to publish a link in JEBO
to the photographs posted on this website?"
Informal talk on
"Strategies for
Getting Papers Published in Journals" (audio only, hard to hear), National Dong Hwa University,


Vincent P.
Crawford, "Review
of Games
of Strategy
by Avinash Dixit and Susan Skeath," Journal of Economic Literature
39 (September 2001), 904-905; html

Vincent Crawford, "John Nash and the
Analysis of Strategic Behavior," Economics Letters 75
(May 2002), 377-382; UCSD Discussion
Paper 2000-03; reprinted in Greek translation, with minor
changes, as "O John Nash και η
ανάλυση της
στρατηγικής
συμπεριφοράς,"
in Θεωρια
Παιγνιων:
Αφιερωμα στον John
Nash (Game Theory: A Festschrift in Honor of John Nash), Constantina Kottaridi
and Gregorios Siourounis, editors, Athens: Eurasia Publications, 2002
Vincent
P. Crawford, "Review
of Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge by
Michael Suk-Young Chwe," Journal of Economic Literature 40
(June 2002), 577-578; html
Past Courses (at UCSD unless otherwise noted; only most
recent year is shown for undergraduate courses)
Press
American
Academy of Arts and Sciences
Photos
from the 2003 Induction Ceremony

In memory of my father, Bennett Crain,
1930-2006
Great-great-great-great-uncle "Bill" (William
Harris Crawford, 1772-1834; click to
enlarge)
Vincent Crawford/ UCSD Department of Economics
/last modified 3 February 2010
Copyright ©
Vincent P. Crawford, 2010. All federal and state copyrights reserved for all
original material presented on this site, or in the courses it refers to,
through any medium, including lecture or print.