

Identifying Government Spending Shocks: It's All in the Timing

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Abstract

Do shocks to government spending raise or lower consumption and real wages? Standard VAR identification approaches show a rise in these variables, whereas the Ramey-Shapiro narrative identification approach finds a fall. I show that a key difference in the approaches is the timing. Both professional forecasts and the narrative approach shocks Granger-cause the VAR shocks, implying that the VAR shocks are missing the timing of the news. Simulations from a standard neoclassical model in which government spending is anticipated by several quarters demonstrate that VARs estimated with faulty timing can produce a rise in consumption even when it decreases in the model. Motivated by the importance of measuring anticipations, I construct two new variables that measure anticipations. The first is based on narrative evidence that is much richer than the Ramey-Shapiro military dates and covers 1939 to 2008. The second is from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, and covers the period 1969 to 2008. All news measures suggest that most components of consumption fall after a positive shock to government spending. The implied government spending multipliers range from 0.6 to 1.1.

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I. Introduction

How does the economy respond to a rise in government purchases? Do consumption and real wages rise or fall? The literature remains divided on this issue. VAR techniques in which identification is achieved by assuming that government spending is predetermined within the quarter typically find that a positive government spending shock raises not only GDP and hours, but also consumption and the real wage (or labor productivity) (e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fatás and Mihov (2001), Mountford and Uhlig (2002), Perotti (2005), Pappa (2005), Caldara and Kamps (2006), and Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés (2007)). In contrast, analyses using the Ramey-Shapiro (1998) “war dates” typically find that while government spending raises GDP and hours, it lowers consumption and the real wage (e.g. Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004), and Cavallo (2005)). Event studies such as Giavazzi and Pagano’s (1990) analysis of fiscal consolidations in several European countries, and Cullen and Fishback’s (2006) analysis of WWII spending on local retail sales generally show a negative effect of government spending on private consumption. Hall’s (1986) analysis using annual data back to 1920 finds a slightly negative effect of government purchases on consumption.

Whether government spending raises or lowers consumption and the real wage is crucial for our understanding of how government spending affects GDP and hours, as well as whether “stimulus packages” make sense. It is also important for distinguishing macroeconomic models. Consider first the neoclassical approach, as represented by papers such as Aiyagari, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) and Baxter and King (1993). A *permanent* increase in government spending financed by nondistortionary means creates a negative wealth effect for the representative household. The household optimally responds by decreasing its consumption and

increasing its labor supply. Output rises as a result. The increased labor supply lowers the real wage and raises the marginal product of capital in the short run. The rise in the marginal product of capital leads to more investment and capital accumulation, which eventually brings the real wage back to its starting value. In the new steady-state, consumption is lower and hours are higher. A *temporary* increase in government spending in the neoclassical model has less impact on output because of the smaller wealth effect. Depending on the persistence of the shock, investment can rise or fall. In the short run, hours should still rise and consumption should still fall.¹

The new Keynesian approach seeks to explain a rise in consumption, the real wage, and productivity found in most VAR analyses. For example Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) and Devereux, Head and Lapham (1996) propose models with oligopolistic (or monopolistic) competition and increasing returns in order to explain the rise in real wages and productivity. In the Devereux et al model, consumption may rise only if returns to specialization are sufficiently great. Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés (2006) show that only an “ultra-Keynesian” model with sticky prices, “rule-of-thumb” consumers, and off-the-labor-supply curve assumptions can explain how consumption and real wages can rise when government spending increases. Their paper makes clear how many special features the model must contain to explain the rise in consumption.

This paper reexamines the empirical evidence by comparing the two main empirical approaches to estimating the effects of government spending: the VAR approach and the Ramey-Shapiro narrative approach. After reviewing the set-up of both approaches and the basic results,

¹ Adding distortionary taxes or government spending that substitutes for private consumption or capital adds additional complications. See Baxter and King (1993) and Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004) for discussions of these complications. Barro (1981) tests predictions from a neoclassical model, but one in which hours do not vary.

I show that a key difference appears to be in the timing. In particular, I show that both the Ramey-Shapiro dates and professional forecasts Granger-cause the VAR shocks. Thus, big increases in military spending are anticipated several quarters before they actually occur. I show this is also true for several notable cases of non-defense government spending changes. I then simulate a simple neoclassical model to demonstrate that failing to account for the anticipation effect can explain all of the differences in the empirical results of the two approaches.

Although the Ramey-Shapiro military variable gets the timing right, it incorporates news in a very rudimentary way. Thus, in the final part of the paper, I construct two new measures of government spending shocks. The first builds on ideas by Romer and Romer (2007) and uses narrative evidence to construct a new, richer variable of defense shocks. Romer and Romer use information from the legislative record to document tax policy changes. I instead must rely on news sources because government documents are not always released in a timely manner and because government officials have at times purposefully underestimated the cost of military actions. Using *Business Week*, as well as several newspaper sources, I construct an estimate of changes in the expected present value of government spending. My analysis extends back to the first quarter of 1939, so I am able to analyze the period of the greatest increase in government spending in U.S. history. For the most part, I find effects that are qualitatively similar to those of the simple Ramey-Shapiro military variable. When World War II is included, the multiplier is estimated to be around unity; when it is excluded it is estimated to be 0.6 to 0.8, depending on how it is calculated.

Unfortunately, the new defense news shock variable has very low predictive power if both WWII and the Korean War are excluded. Thus, I construct another variable for the later period based on the Survey of Professional Forecasters. In particular, I use the difference

between actual government spending growth and the forecast of government growth made one quarter earlier as the shock. This variable is available from 1969 to 2008. VARs with this variable indicate that temporary rises in government spending do not stimulate the economy.

Recent research on the effects of tax changes on the economy complements the points made here. In an early contribution to this literature, Yang (2005) points out the differences between anticipated and unanticipated tax changes in a theoretical model. Leeper, Walker and Yang (2008) show the pitfalls of trying to use a standard VAR to identify shocks when there is foresight about taxes. Mertens and Ravn (2008) use the narrative-approach tax series constructed by Romer and Romer (2008) to distinguish anticipated from unanticipated tax changes empirically, and find very different effects. These papers provide additional evidence on the importance of anticipation effects.

II. Fluctuations in Government Spending

This section reviews the trends and fluctuations in the components of government spending. As we will see, defense spending accounts for almost all of the volatility of government spending.

Figure 1 shows the paths of real defense spending per capita and total real government spending per capita in the post-WWII era.² The lines represent the Ramey-Shapiro (1998) dates, including the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, augmented by 9/11. These dates will be reviewed in detail below. The major movements in defense spending all come following one of the four military dates. Korea is obviously the most

² Per capita variables are created using the entire population, including armed forces overseas.

important, but the other three are also quite noticeable. There are also two minor blips in the second half of the 1950s and the early 1960s.

Looking at the bottom graph in Figure 1, we see that total government spending shows a significant upward trend over time. Nevertheless, the defense buildups are still distinguishable after the four dates. The impact of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has a delayed effect on total government spending, because nondefense spending fell.

Some have argued that the Korean War was unusually large, and thus should be excluded from the analysis of the effects of government spending. To put the Korean War in context, Figure 2 shows the defense spending per capita back to 1939. The Korean War, which looked so large in a post-WWII graph, is dwarfed by the increases in government spending during WWII. The post-9/11 spending would not be noticeable if the line were not drawn.

Figure 3 returns to the post-WWII era and shows defense spending, nondefense federal spending, and state and local spending as a fraction of GDP (in nominal terms). The graph shows that relative to the size of the economy, each military buildup has become smaller over time. Federal nondefense spending is a minor part of government spending, hovering around two to three percent of GDP. In contrast, state and local spending has risen from around five percent of GDP in 1947 to over twelve percent of GDP now. Since state and local spending is driven in large part by cyclical fluctuations in state revenues, it is not clear that aggregate VARs are very good at capturing shocks to this type of spending. For example, California dramatically increased its spending on K-12 education when its tax revenues surged from the dot-com boom in the second half of the 1990s.

What kind of spending constitutes nondefense spending? Government data on spending by function shows that the category of education, public order (which includes police, courts and

prisons), and transportation expenditures has increased to 50 percent of total government spending. The standard VAR approach includes shocks to this type of spending in its analysis (e.g. Blanchard and Perotti (2002)). Such an inclusion is questionable for several reasons. First, the biggest part of this category, education, is driven in large part by demographic changes, which can have many other effects on the economy. Second, these types of expenditures would be expected to have a positive effect on productivity and hence would have a different effect than government spending that has no direct production function impacts. As Baxter and King (1993) make clear, the typically neoclassical predictions about the effects of government spending change completely when government spending is “productive.” Thus, including these categories in spending shocks is not the best way to test the neoclassical model versus the Keynesian model.³

In sum, defense spending is a major part of the variation in government spending around trend. Moreover, it has the advantage of being the type of government spending least likely to enter the production function or interact with private consumption. It is for this reason that many analyses of government spending focus on military spending when studying the macroeconomic effects of government spending, including early contributions by Barro (1981) and Hall (1986) as well as more recent contributions by Barro and Redlick (2009) and Hall (2009).

³ Some of the analyses, such as Eichenbaum and Fisher (2005) and Perotti (2007), have tried to address this issue by using only “government consumption” and excluding “government investment.” Unfortunately, this National Income and Product Account distinction does not help. As the footnotes to the NIPA tables state: “Government consumption expenditures are services (such as education and national defense) produced by government that are valued at their cost of production....Gross government investment consists of general government and government enterprise expenditures for fixed assets.” Thus, since teacher salaries are the bulk of education spending, they would be counted as “government consumption.”

III. Identifying Government Spending Shocks: VAR vs. Narrative Approaches

A. The VAR Approach

Blanchard and Perotti (2002) have perhaps the most careful and comprehensive approach to estimating fiscal shocks using VARs. To identify shocks, they first incorporate institutional information on taxes, transfers, and spending to set parameters, and then estimate the VAR. Their basic framework is as follows:

$$Y_t = A(L, q)Y_{t-1} + U_t$$

where Y_t consists of quarterly real per capita taxes, government spending, and GDP. Although the contemporaneous relationship between taxes and GDP turns out to be complicated, they find that government spending does not respond to GDP or taxes contemporaneously. Thus, their identification of government spending shocks is identical to a Choleski decomposition in which government spending is ordered before the other variables. When they augment the system to include consumption, they find that consumption rises in response to a positive government spending shock. Galí et al (2007) use this basic identification method in their study which focuses only on government spending shocks and not taxes. They estimate a VAR with additional variables of interest, such as real wages, and order government spending first. Perotti (2007) uses this identification method to study a system with seven variables.⁴

B. The Ramey-Shapiro Narrative Approach

In contrast, Ramey and Shapiro (1998) use a narrative approach to identify shocks to government spending. Because of their concern that many shocks identified from a VAR are simply anticipated changes in government spending, they focus only on episodes where *Business*

⁴ See the references listed in the introduction to see the various permutations on this basic set-up.

Week suddenly began to forecast large rises in defense spending induced by major political events that were unrelated to the state of the U.S. economy. The three episodes identified by Ramey and Shapiro were as follows:

Korean War

On June 25, 1950 the North Korean army launched a surprise invasion of South Korea, and on June 30, 1950 the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff unilaterally directed General MacArthur to commit ground, air, and naval forces. The July 1, 1950 issue of *Business Week* immediately predicted more money for defense. By August 1950, *Business Week* was predicting that defense spending would more than triple by fiscal year 1952.

The Vietnam War

Despite the military coup that overthrew Diem on November 1, 1963, *Business Week* was still talking about defense cuts for the next year (November 2, 1963, p. 38; July 11, 1964, p. 86). Even the Gulf of Tonkin incident on August 2, 1964 brought no forecasts of increases in defense spending. However, after the February 7, 1965 attack on the U.S. Army barracks, Johnson ordered air strikes against military targets in North Vietnam. The February 13, 1965, *Business Week* said that this action was “a fateful point of no return” in the war in Vietnam.

The Carter-Reagan Buildup

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 24, 1979 led to a significant turnaround in U.S. defense policy. The event was particularly worrisome because some believed it was a possible precursor to actions against Persian Gulf oil countries. The January 21, 1980 *Business*

Week (p.78) printed an article entitled “A New Cold War Economy” in which it forecasted a significant and prolonged increase in defense spending. Reagan was elected by a landslide in November 1980 and in February 1981 he proposed to increase defense spending substantially over the next five years.

These dates were based on data up through 1998. Owing to recent events, I now add the following date to these war dates:

9/11

On September 11, 2001, terrorists struck the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. On October 1, 2001, *Business Week* forecasted that the balance between private and public sectors would shift, and that spending restraints were going “out the window.” To recall the timing of key subsequent events, the U.S. invaded Afghanistan soon after 9/11. It invaded Iraq on March 20, 2003.

The military date variable takes a value of unity in 1950:3, 1965:1, 1980:1, and 2001:3, and zeroes elsewhere. This simple variable has a reasonable amount of predictive power for the growth of real defense spending. A regression of the growth of real defense spending on current and eight lags of the military date variable has an R-squared of 0.26.⁵

To identify government spending shocks, the military date variable is embedded in the standard VAR, but ordered before the other variables.⁶ Choleski decomposition shocks to the

⁵ The R-squared jumps to 0.57 if one scales the variable for the size of the buildup, as in Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004).

⁶ The original Ramey-Shapiro (1998) implementation did not use a VAR. They regressed each variable of interest on lags of itself and the current and lagged values of the military date variable. They then simulated the impact of changes in the value of the military date variable. The results were very similar to those obtained from embedding the military variable in a VAR.

military date variable rather than to the government spending variable are used to identify government shocks.

C. Comparison of Impulse Response Functions

Consider now a comparison of the effects of government spending increases based on the two identification methods. In both instances, I use a VAR similar to the one used recently by Perotti (2007) for purposes of comparison. The VAR consists of the log real per capita quantities of total government spending, GDP, total hours worked, nondurable plus services consumption, and private fixed investment, as well as the Barro-Redlick (2009) tax rate and the log of nominal compensation in private business divided by the deflator in private business.⁷ Chained nondurable and services consumption are aggregated using Whelan's (2000) method. I use total hours worked instead of private hours worked based on Cavallo's (2005) work showing that a significant portion of rises in government spending consists of increases in the government payroll. Total hours worked are based on unpublished BLS data and are available on my web site. Complete details are given in the data appendix. Also, note that I use a product wage rather than a consumption wage. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) show both theoretically and empirically why it is the product wage that should be used when trying to distinguish models of government spending. Defense spending tends to be concentrated in a few industries, such as manufactured goods. Ramey and Shapiro show that the relative price of manufactured goods rise significantly

⁷ The results are very similar if I instead use Alexander and Seater's (2009) update of the Seater (1983) and Stephenson (1998) average marginal tax rate. The Alexander-Seater tax rates are based on actual taxes paid, whereas the Barro-Sahasakul series uses statutory rates. The new Barro-Redlick series includes state income taxes, whereas the Alexander-Seater series only has federal income and social security tax rates.

during a defense buildup. Thus, product wages in the expanding industries can fall at the same time that the consumption wage is unchanged or rising.⁸

Both VARs are specified in levels, with a quadratic time trend and four lags included. In the VAR identification, the government spending shock is identified by a Choleski decomposition in which government spending is ordered first. In the war dates identification, the current value and four lags of a dummy variable with the military date are also included. The military date takes a value of unity in 1950:3, 1965:1, 1980:1, and 2001:3.⁹ I compare the effects of shocks that are normalized so that the log change of government spending is unity at its peak in both specifications.

Figures 4A and 4B show the impulse response functions. The standard error bands shown are only 68% bands. Although this is common practice in the government spending literature, it has no theoretical justification.¹⁰ I only use the narrow error bands because the wider ones make it difficult to see the comparison of mean responses across specifications. In the later analysis with my new variables, I also show 95% error bands.

The first column shows the results from the VAR identification and the second column shows the results from the war dates identification. Figure 4A shows the effects on government spending, GDP, and hours. The results are qualitatively consistent across the two identification schemes for these three variables. By construction, total government spending rises by the same amount, although the peak occurs several quarters earlier in the VAR identification. This is the first indication that a key difference between the two methods is timing. GDP rises in both

⁸ The main reason that Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) find that real wages increase is that they construct their real wage by dividing the wage in manufacturing by the implicit price deflator. Ramey and Shapiro show that the wage in manufacturing divided by the price index for manufacturing falls during a defense buildup.

⁹ Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) allow the value of the dummy variable to differ across episodes according to the amount that government spending increase. They obtain very similar results.

¹⁰ Some have appealed to Sims and Zha (1999) for using 68% bands. However, there is no formal justification for this particular choice. It should be noted that most papers in the monetary literature use 95% error bands.

cases, but its rise is much greater in the case of the war dates identification. Hours rise slightly in the VAR identification, but much more strongly in the war dates identification. A comparison of the output and hours response shows that productivity rises slightly in both specifications.

Figure 4B shows the cases in which the two identification schemes differ in their implications. The VAR identification scheme implies that government spending shocks raise consumption, lower investment for two years, and raise the real wage. In contrast, the war dates identification scheme implies that government spending shocks lower consumption, raise investment for a quarter before lowering it, and lower the real wage.

Overall, these two approaches give diametrically opposed answers with regard to some key variables. The next section presents empirical evidence and a theoretical argument that can explain the differences.

IV. The Importance of Timing

A concern with the VAR identification scheme is that some of what it classifies as “shocks” to government spending may well be anticipated. Indeed, my reading of the narrative record uncovered repeated examples of long delays between the decision to increase military spending and the actual increase. At the beginning of a big buildup of strategic weapons, the Pentagon first spends at least several months deciding what sorts of weapons it needs. The task of choosing prime contractors requires additional time. Once the prime contracts are awarded, the spending occurs slowly over time. Quarter-to-quarter variations are mostly due to production scheduling variations among prime contractors.

From the standpoint of the neoclassical model, what matters for the wealth effect are changes in the present discounted value of government purchases, not the particular timing of the

purchases. Thus, it is essential to identify when news becomes available about a major change in the present discounted value of government spending.

Blanchard and Perotti (2002) worried about the timing issue, and devoted Section VIII of their paper to analyzing it. To test for the problem of anticipated policy, they included future values of the estimated shocks to determine whether they affected the results. They found that the response of output was greater once they allowed for anticipation effects (see Figure VII). Unfortunately, they did not show how the responses of consumption or real wages were affected. Perotti (2005) approached the anticipation problem by testing whether OECD forecasts of government spending predicted his estimated government spending shocks. For the most part, he found that they did not predict the shocks.

In the next subsection, I show that the war dates as well as professional forecasts predict the VAR government spending shocks. I also show how in each war episode, the VAR shocks are positive several quarters after *Business Week* started forecasting increases in defense spending. In the second subsection, I present simulations from a simple theoretical model that shows how the difference in timing can explain most of the differences in results. In the final subsection, I show that delaying the timing of the Ramey-Shapiro dates produces the Keynesian results.

A. Empirical Evidence on Timing Lags

To compare the timing of war dates versus VAR-identified shocks, I estimate shocks using the VAR discussed above except with defense spending rather than total government spending as the key variable. I then plot those shocks around the war dates.

Figures 5A and 5B shows the path of log per capita real defense spending, the series of identified shocks, and some long-term forecasts. Consider first the Korean War in Figure 5A. The first vertical line shows the date when the Korea War started. The second vertical line indicates when the armistice was signed in July 1953. According to the VAR estimates, shown in the middle graph, there was a large positive shocks to defense in 1951:1. However, as *Business Week* made clear, the path of defense spending during these three quarters was anticipated as of August and September of 1950. The bottom graph shows *Business Week's* forecasts of defense spending. The June 1950 forecast, made before the Korean War started, predicted that defense spending would remain at about \$15 billion per year. Two months later in August 1950, *Business Week* correctly predicted the rise in defense spending through fiscal year 1952. By September 1950, it had correctly predicted the rise through fiscal year 1954. Thus, it is clear that the positive VAR shocks are several quarters too late. It is also interesting to note that while *Business Week* was predicting a future decline in defense spending as early as April 1953 when a truce seemed imminent, the VAR records a negative defense spending shock late in the first quarter of 1954. Thus, the VAR shocks are not accurately reflecting news about defense spending.

Forecasts were not as accurate for Vietnam. As of August 1965, several noted senators were forecasting much higher expenditures than the Johnson Administration was quoting. The forecasts kept rising steadily for some time. Thus, while it is true that there were a number of positive spending shocks in the first years of the Vietnam War, it is not clear that the VAR gets the timing right.

In Figure 5B, the VARs show many positive shocks during the Carter-Reagan build-up through 1985. The bottom panel shows, however, that as of January 1981, the OMB was very

accurately predicting spending in fiscal years 1981-1984. On the other hand, the October 1981 forecast over-predicted defense spending in fiscal years 1985 and 1986. However, all of the forecast error for 1985 and 1986 can be attributed to the fact that inflation fell much more quickly than expected. In real terms, the October 1981 predictions for the 1985 and 1986 fiscal years were very accurate. Yet the VARs produce large positive shocks for those years.

After 9/11 the VAR implies virtually no shocks until the second quarter of 2003. Yet the February 2002 OMB forecast for the next several years was raised significantly relative to the pre-9/11 April 2001 forecast. The February 2003 OMB forecast under-predicted spending, primarily because it assumed no invasion of Iraq, although many believed that it would happen.

As additional evidence of the ability of the private sector to forecast, Figure 6 shows the government spending growth forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, available from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Before the third quarter of 1981, forecasters were asked to predict nominal defense spending. I convert the forecasts to real defense spending using the forecasts of the GDP deflator. Starting in the third quarter of 1981, forecasters were asked to predict real federal spending. The forecasts shown in the graph for quarter t are the forecast made in t for the growth rate of spending between $t - 1$ and $t + 4$. It is clear that forecasters predicted significantly higher defense spending growth for the year ahead starting in the first quarter of 1980, which was just after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Similarly, forecasters predicted higher federal spending growth beginning in the fourth quarter of 2001, just after 9/11.¹¹ Note also that the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 did not lead to a jump up in forecasts in the second quarter of 2003. In fact, the initial invasion went so well that forecasters reduced their forecasts in the third quarter of 2003.

¹¹ The higher predictions do not show up in the third quarter of 2001 because the forecasters had already returned their surveys when 9/11 hit.

Overall, it appears that much of what the VAR might be labeling as “shocks” to defense spending may have been forecasted. To test this hypothesis formally, I perform Granger causality tests between various variables and the VAR-based government spending shocks. In addition to the military dates variable, I also use estimates from the Survey of Professional Forecasters for real federal government spending forecasts starting in the third quarter of 1981. I use both the implied forecast dating from quarter t-1 of the log change in real spending from quarter t-1 to quarter t and the implied forecast dating from quarter t-4 of the change from quarter t-4 to quarter t..

Table 1 shows the results. The evidence is very clear: the war dates Granger-cause the VAR shocks but the VAR shocks do not Granger-cause the war dates. Moreover, the VAR shocks, which are based on information up through the previous quarter, are Granger-caused by professional forecasts, even those made *four quarters earlier*. Thus, the VAR shocks are forecastable.

One should be clear that timing is not an issue only with defense spending. Consider the interstate highway program. In early 1956, *Business Week* was predicting that the “fight over highway building will be drawn out.” By May 5, 1956, *Business Week* thought that the highway construction bill was a sure bet. It fact it passed in June 1956. However, the multi-billion dollar program was intended to stretch out over 13 years. It is difficult to see how a VAR could accurately reflect this program. Another example is schools for the Baby Boom children. Obviously, the demand for schools is known several years in advance. Between 1949 and 1969, real per capita spending on public elementary and secondary education increased 300%.¹² Thus, a significant portion of non-defense spending is known months, if not years, in advance.

¹² The nominal figures on expenditures are from the *Digest of Education Statistics*. I used the GDP deflator to convert to real.

B. The Importance of Timing in a Theoretical Model

Macroeconomists have known for a long time that anticipated policy changes can have very different effects from an unanticipated change. For example, Taylor (1993, Chapter 5) shows the effects of a change in government spending, anticipated two years in advance, on such variables as GDP, prices, interest rates and exchange rates. He does not consider the effects on consumption or real wages, however. More recently, Yang (2005) shows that foresight about tax rate changes significantly changes the responses of key variables in theoretical simulations.

To see how important anticipation effects can be for government spending, consider a simple neoclassical growth model with government spending and nondistortionary taxes. The model is deliberately stylized in order to show how important these effects can be. The key equations of the social planner problem are as follows, where the parameters are calibrated to a quarterly frequency:

$Y_t = (Z_t N_t)^{0.67} K_t^{0.33}$	Production Function
$U = \log(C_t) + \varphi_t \cdot \log(1 - N_t)$	Utility of the representative household
$Y_t = C_t + I_t + G_t$	Resource constraint
$K_{t+1} = I_t + (1 - 0.023)K_t$	Capital Accumulation

Y is output, N is labor, K is capital, C is consumption, I is investment, and G is government purchases. Government purchases are financed with nondistortionary taxes. Households maximize the present discounted value of utility U with discount factor $\beta = 0.99$.

The driving processes are calibrated as follows:

$$\ln Z_t = .95 \cdot \ln Z_{t-1} + ez_t, \quad \sigma_{ez} = 0.01$$

$$\ln \varphi_t = .95 \cdot \ln \varphi_{t-1} + e\varphi_t, \quad \sigma_{e\varphi} = 0.008$$

$$\ln NEWS_t = \text{constant} + 1.4 \ln NEWS_{t-1} - 0.18 \ln NEWS_{t-2} - 0.25 \ln NEWS_{t-3} + eg_t, \quad \sigma_{eg} = 0.028$$

$$\ln G_t = \ln NEWS_{t-2}$$

The calibration for the technology shock is standard. The calibrations for the marginal rate of substitution shock and the government spending shock are based on my estimates from data. *NEWS* is the forecast of government spending whereas *G* is actual government spending. This specification allows agents to know the shock to actual government spending two quarters in advance. The model is solved with Dynare. All variables reported below are in logs.

Figure 6 shows the theoretical impulse response functions from this model. News becomes available in quarter 0, but government spending does not start to increase until quarter two. In contrast, output, hours, consumption, investment and real wages all jump in quarter 0 when the news arrives. Output and hours rise immediately, while consumption and real wages fall immediately. Interestingly, investment rises for several quarters before it falls. Investment rises because the increase in government spending is expected to be prolonged, so firms want to build up their capital stocks.

Looking at these graphs, one wonders what happens in a VAR if one identifies the government spending shock from when government spending actually changes. To study this effect, I simulate data from this stylized model. In order to increase the number of shocks to four

so that I can include at least three variables in the VARs, I also assume that there is measurement error in the logarithm of output, and that it follows an AR(1) with autocorrelation coefficient of 0.95 and standard errors of 0.005. I then run two types of trivariate VARs on the simulated data. In the first set of VARs, I use government spending, output, and the variable of interest, and identify the shock as the shock to government spending, which is ordered first. In the second set of VARs, I use the news, output, and the variable of interest, and identify the shock as the shock to the news variable which is ordered first. In all cases, I use four lags of the variables.

Figures 7A and 7B show the results.¹³ The VARs that identify shocks from actual government spending, are shown in the left column and the VARs that identify shocks from the news about government spending are shown in the right column. The patterns across the two columns are strikingly similar to the patterns across the VARs on real data using the two methods shown in Figures 4A and 4B. In particular, the shocks to government show a much smaller response of GDP than the shocks to news, just as the standard VAR identification method finds a smaller response than the Ramey-Shapiro military dates. The same is true of hours. In Figure 7B, we see that the shocks to actual government spending lead to a rise in consumption, whereas the shocks to news lead to a fall in consumption. In both cases, real wages fall, although the pattern is different. The problem with the VAR that identifies shocks from actual government spending is that it often catches the variables *after* they have already had an initial response to the news. The contemporaneous correlation of the estimated shocks using actual government spending in the VAR with the true shocks is -0.01. The correlation of the identified shock and the true shock *two quarters ago* is 0.4, but the timing is off. Thus, the faulty

¹³ The government spending and output responses shown are from the trivariate VAR that also contains consumption.

timing VAR picks up nothing of the true shocks. In contrast, the correlation between the estimated shocks using the news and the true shocks is 0.97.

As stated above, this model is very stylized in order to make the point in the simplest possible model. One could modify the theoretical model to incorporate elements such as habit persistence in consumption and/or adjustment cost in investment. In this case, the true responses would be more dragged out and missing the timing by two quarters would have a somewhat smaller effect. However, introducing more realistic lags would likely have changed the impulse responses just as they did in the previous example.

C. Would Delaying the Ramey-Shapiro Dates Lead to Keynesian Results?

If the theoretical argument of the last section applies to the current situation, then delaying the timing of the Ramey-Shapiro dates should result in VAR-type Keynesian results.¹⁴ To investigate this possibility, I shifted the four military dates to correspond with the first big positive shock from the VAR analysis. Thus, instead of using the original dates of 1950:3, 1965:1, 1980:1, and 2001:3, I used 1951:1, 1965:3, 1981:4, and 2003:2.

Figure 8 shows the results using the baseline VAR of the previous sections. As predicted by the theory, the delayed Ramey-Shapiro dates applied to actual data now lead to rises in consumption and the real wage, similarly to the shocks from the standard VARs. Thus, the heart of the difference between the two results appears to be the VAR's delay in identifying the shocks.

Alternatively, one could try to estimate the VAR and allow future identified shocks to have an effect. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) did this for output, but never looked at the effects on consumption or wages. Based on an earlier draft of my paper, Tenhofen and Wolff (2007)

¹⁴ This idea was suggested to me by Susanto Basu.

analyze such a VAR for consumption and find that when the VAR timing changes, positive shocks to defense spending lead consumption to fall.

Thus, all of the empirical and theoretical evidence points to timing as being key to the difference between the standard VAR approach and the Ramey-Shapiro approach. The fact that the Ramey-Shapiro dates Granger-cause the VAR shocks suggests that the VARs are not capturing the timing of the news. The theoretical analysis shows that timing is crucial in determining the response of the economy to news about increases in government spending.

V. A New Measure of Defense News

The previous sections have presented evidence that standard VARs do not properly measure government spending shocks because changes in government spending are often anticipated long before government spending actually changes. Although the original Ramey-Shapiro war dates attempt to get the timing right, the simple dummy variable approach does not exploit the potential quantitative information that is available.

Therefore, to create a better measure of “news” about future government spending, I read news sources in order to gather quantitative information about expectations. The defense news variable seeks to measure the expected discounted value of government spending changes due to foreign political events. It is this variable that matters for the wealth effect in a neoclassical framework. The series was constructed by reading periodicals in order to gauge the public’s expectations. *Business Week* was the principal source for most of sample because it often gave detailed predictions. However, it became much less informative after 2001, so I relied more heavily on newspaper sources. For the most part, government sources could not be used because they were either not released in a timely manner or were known to underestimate the costs of

certain actions. However, when periodical sources were ambiguous, I consulted official sources, such as the budget. I did not use professional forecasters except for a few examples because the forecast horizon was not long enough.

The constructed series should be viewed as an approximation to the changes in expectations at the time. Because there were so many conflicting or incomplete forecasts, I had to make many judgment calls. In calculating present discounted values, I used the 3-year Treasury bond rate prevailing at the time. Before the early 1950s, I used the long-term government bond rate since the other was not available.

If the shock occurred in the last week or two of a quarter, I dated it as the next quarter, since it could not have much effect on aggregates for the entire current quarter. The detailed companion paper, “Defense News Shocks, 1939-2008: Estimates Based on News Sources” by Valerie Ramey (2009), provides more than 100 pages of relevant news quotes and analysis of the expectations during this 70 year time period.

Table 2 shows the dates and values of the nonzero values of the new military shock series. Figure 9 shows the shocks as a percent the previous quarter’s nominal GDP. Some of the shocks, such as the Marshall Plan estimate in 1947:II and the moon mission announcement in 1961:II, were caused by military events but were classified as nondefense spending. While Roosevelt started boosting defense spending as early as the first quarter of 1939, the first big shock leading in to World War II was caused by the events leading up to the fall of France, in 1940:II. Thus, my independent narrative analysis supports Gordon and Krenn’s (2009) contention that fiscal policy became a major force in the economy starting in 1940:II. The largest single defense news shock (as a percent of GDP) was 1941:IV. As the companion paper (Ramey (2009)) discusses, estimates of defense spending were skyrocketing even before the

Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Germany had been sinking U.S. ships in the Atlantic during the fall of 1941, and *Business Week* proclaimed that American entry into a “shooting war” was imminent (October 25, 1941, p. 13). It also declared that the U.S. was set for a Pacific showdown with Japan. The second biggest shock (as a percent of GDP) was the start of the Korean War. Estimates of defense spending increased dramatically within two months of North Korea’s attack on South Korea on June 25, 1950.

Table 3 shows how well these shocks predict spending and whether they are relevant instruments. As Staiger and Stock (1997) discuss, a first-stage F-statistic below 10 could be an indicator of a weak instrument problem. Unfortunately, most macro “shocks” used in the literature, such as oil prices and monetary shocks, have F-statistics well below 10.

The numbers shown in Table 3 are for three sample periods: 1939:1 – 2008:4, 1947:1 – 2008:4, and 1955:1 – 2008:4. The first two columns show the R-squared and the F-statistic for the regression of the growth of real per capita defense spending or total government spending on current and four lags of “defense news,” which is the present discounted value of the expected spending change divided by nominal GDP of the previous quarter. The last column shows the F-statistic on the exclusion of the defense news variable from a regression of the growth of real per capita defense spending on four lags of log real per capita defense spending, log real GDP, the 3-month T-bill rate, and the Barro-Redlick average marginal tax rate. These variables will be used in the VARs to follow, so it is important to determine the marginal F-statistic of the new shock variable.

The table shows that as long as WWII or the Korean War is included, the new military shock variable has significant explanatory power and is a strongly relevant instrument. The R-squared for the sample from 1939 to 2008 is 0.42 and from 1947 to 2008 is 0.55. All of the F-

statistics in the first two samples are just below or well above 10. On the other hand, for the sample that excludes WWII and the Korean War, the shock variable has much less explanatory power and the F-statistics are well below the comfortable range. All indications are that this variable is not informative for the period after the Korean War.

I next consider the effect of the defense news variable in a VAR. Since timing is important, I use quarterly data rather than annual data. Therefore, I must construct quarterly data for the 1939 to 1946 period since the BEA currently reports only annual data from that period. Fortunately, a 1954 BEA publication reports estimates of quarterly nominal components of GDP back to 1939. I combined these data with available price indices from the BLS to create real series. I used these constructed series to interpolate current annual NIPA estimates. The data appendix contains more details.

One is always worried when interpolation of data is involved, since the method and data used might make a difference. Fortunately, Gordon and Krenn (2009) have independently created a valuable new dataset for their research analyzing the role of government spending in ending the Great Depression. In their paper, they use completely different data sources and interpolation methods to construct macroeconomic data from 1919 to 1954. In private correspondence, we compared our series for the overlap period starting in 1939 and found them to be remarkably similar.

In order to examine the effect on a number of variables without including too many variables in the VAR, I follow Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher's (2004) strategy of using a fixed set of variables and rotating other variables of interest in. The fixed set of variables consists of defense news, the log of real per capita government spending, the log of real per capita GDP, the three-month T-bill rate, and the Barro-Redlick average marginal income tax rate.

These last two variables are included in order to control for monetary policy and tax policy.¹⁵ To the fixed set of five variables, I rotate in a series of sixth variables, one at a time. The extra variables considered are total hours, the manufacturing product wage (the only consistent wage series back to 1939), the real BAA bond rate (with inflation defined by the CPI), the three components of consumer expenditures, nonresidential investment and residential investment. Four lags of the variables are used and a quadratic time trend is included. The data appendix fully describes all of the data used in the VAR, including the extensive construction of quarterly data for the WWII era.

Figures 10A and 10B shows the impulse response functions to a shock in the defense news variable. As before, the responses are normalized so that the government spending response to defense news is equal to unity. In the impulse responses shown earlier, I only included 68% standard error bands so that the graphs could be more easily compared across specifications. Here, I also show the more conventional 95% standard error bands.

After a positive defense news shock, total government spending rises, peaking six quarters after the shock and returning to normal after four years. GDP also increases significantly, peaking six quarters after the shock and returning to normal after four years. The implied elasticity of the GDP peak with respect to the government spending peak is 0.2. Since the average ratio of nominal GDP to nominal government spending was 4.9 from 1939 to 2008, the implied government spending multiplier implied by these estimates is 1.0. If, instead, I calculate the multiplier by using the integral under the impulse response function for the five years after the shock, estimate of the multiplier is only slightly higher, at 1.1.

¹⁵ Rossi and Zabairy (2009) make the case that analyses of fiscal policy should always control for monetary policy and vice versa.

Figure 10A also shows that total hours increases, significantly even by conventional significance levels. A comparison of the peak of the hours response to the peak of the GDP response implies that productivity also increases. McGrattan and Ohanian (forthcoming) argue that the neoclassical model can only explain the behavior of macroeconomic variables during WWII if there were also positive TFP shocks. Positive TFP shocks are one possible explanation, although learning-by-doing (extensively documented during WWII) or increasing returns to scale are other possibilities. The real product wage in manufacturing initially falls and then rises. Thus, the manufacturing product wage appears to be following the path of labor productivity.

The 3-month Treasury bill rate falls slightly after a positive defense news shock, but it is not significantly different from zero. This response is most likely due to the response of monetary policy, particularly during WWII and the Korean War. On average, the income tax rate increases significantly after a positive spending shock.

Figure 10B shows six more variables of interest. The first panel shows that the real interest rate on BAA bonds initially falls significantly for a year, then rises above zero, before falling somewhat again. Some of this pattern is likely due to the erratic behavior of inflation. In both World War II and the Korean War, prices shot up on the war news in anticipation of price controls. The next panel shows that nondurable consumption expenditures fall significantly at conventional significance levels. In contrast, consumption expenditures on services rises significantly. Oddly, this variable stays well above normal even after GDP has returned to normal. Consumer durable purchases fall significantly. In addition, the stock of consumer durable goods as well as total consumption expenditures (not shown) also fall significantly. Finally, both nonresidential investment and residential investment fall significantly.

To summarize, except for services consumption, all other components of consumption and investment fall, consistent with the negative wealth effect of neoclassical theory. On the other hand, the rise in productivity and the real product wage are inconsistent with the neoclassical model. The multiplier is estimated to be between 1.0 and 1.1.

Figures 11A and 11B compare the impulse responses from the VARs estimated from 1939 to 2008 to the ones estimated from 1947 to 2008. Again, the peak of government spending is normalized to be one. The upper right panel of Figure 11A shows the response of GDP is somewhat less when WWII is excluded. The peak response is 0.21 with WWII included but 0.16 when WWII is excluded. This response implies a government spending multiplier of 0.78. If instead I calculate the multiplier using the integral of the impulse response functions, the multiplier is estimated to be 0.6. As Ohanian (1997) argues, spending during WWII was financed mostly by issuing debt, whereas spending during the Korean War was financed in large part by increases in taxes. Thus, the differential multiplier might be attributable to the effect of less use of distortionary business taxes during WWII.

The hours response is somewhat smaller when WWII is omitted. In contrast to the earlier results, the manufacturing product wage decreases significantly if WWII is excluded. The increase in the manufacturing product wage during World War II could be due to differential strengths of wage and price controls. Finally, the 3-month Treasury bill rate falls much more when WWII is omitted.

Figure 11B compares the responses with and without WWII for real interest rates, consumption and investment. The responses of both real interest rates and nondurable consumption are similar with and without WWII. In contrast, services consumption moves little if WWII is excluded. Consumer durable purchases fall in both samples, but there is an initial

rise when WWII is excluded. This rise is dominated by the beginning of the Korean War, when consumers with recent memories of WWII feared that rationing was imminent. Finally, residential investment falls much less and turns positive after two years when WWII is excluded.

The results for the sample from 1955 to 2008 (not shown) are unusual. In particular, GDP rises for one period and then becomes negative after a positive defense shock. The standard error bands are very wide, though. As discussed above, the preliminary diagnostics indicate that the defense news variable is not very informative for government spending in a sample that excludes the two big wars. On the other hand, the impulse responses estimated on a sample that includes WWII, but excludes Korea, look very similar to those from the entire sample.

The multipliers estimated here, around 1.0 for the sample with WWII and 0.6 to 0.8 for the post-WWII sample, lie in the range of most other estimates from the literature. In his recent paper, Hall (2009) regresses the growth of real GDP on the growth of real defense spending using annual data. In the sample from 1930 to 2008, he finds a multiplier of 0.55; for 1947 to 2008, he finds a multiplier of 0.47. Barro and Redlick (2009) use annual data from 1914 to 2006 and find multipliers between 0.6 and 1. In contrast, Fisher and Peters (2009), using excess returns on defense stocks find a total government spending multiplier of 1.5. I will discuss details of their paper in the next section.

To summarize, the results based on VARs using the richer news variable back to 1939 largely support the qualitative results from the simpler Ramey-Shapiro military date variable. Most measures of consumption fall. Although the product wage in manufacturing rises if WWII is included, it falls when WWII is excluded.

VI. Post-Korean War News Shocks Based on Professional Forecasts

As discussed in the last section, the defense news variable is not very informative for the post-Korean War sample. Both the R-squared and the first-stage F-statistic are very low. Thus, the VAR finding that output and hours fall after a positive government spending shock in this later period are suspect. In order to study this later time period, I construct a second news variable based on professional forecasters. This variable measures the one-quarter ahead forecast error, based on the survey of professional forecasters. As discussed above, I have already shown that the professional forecasts Granger-cause the standard VAR shocks. Thus, this measure of news is likely to have fewer anticipation effects than the standard VAR shock.

From the fourth quarter of 1968 to the second quarter of 1981, the Survey of Professional Forecasters predicted nominal defense spending. I convert the forecast of nominal spending to a forecast of real spending using the forecasters' predictions about the GDP deflator. For this period, I define the shock as the difference between actual real defense spending growth between $t-1$ and t and the forecasted growth of defense spending for the same period, where the forecast was made in quarter $t-1$. From the third quarter of 1981 to the present, the forecasters predicted real federal spending. I construct the shock based on the actual and predicted growth of real federal spending from period $t-1$ to t . As Table 4 shows, this shock has an R-squared of 60 percent for government spending growth and F-statistics exceeding 200. Thus, they are potentially more powerful indicators of news.

I then study the effects of this shock in the same VAR used for the defense news shock, with the forecast shock substituted for the defense news shock. All other elements of the specification are the same. Figures 12A and 12B show the effects of this shock on the key

variables. Unlike the case with defense spending news shocks in which government spending has a hump-shaped response, this shock leads government spending to spike up temporarily and then fall to normal and then negative after a couple of quarters. GDP rises slightly on impact, but then turns negative. The multiplier computed using the peak responses is around 0.8; the multiplier computed using the integral under the impulse response functions is negative. Thus, these shocks lead to rather contractionary effects, similar to those I found for the 1955 to 2008 period with my defense news shocks.¹⁶

A recent paper by Fisher and Peters (2009) has taken another promising approach to constructing news series for government spending by using excess returns on defense stocks. Their series is not informative for the big wars, such as WWII and the Korean War because excess profits tax limited the stock returns of defense contractors.¹⁷ For the post-Korean War period, however, it usually matches up well with the Ramey-Shapiro dates. A key exception is the second half of the 1970s, when the cumulative excess returns increase much earlier than the narrative method suggests they should. This discrepancy might be explained by the fact that after the 1973 war in the Middle East, defense contractor sales to foreign governments started to increase dramatically until they were one-third the size of the U.S. defense procurement budget (*Business Week* 12/20/1976, p. 79). Thus, the increase in returns could be due to foreign arms sales rather than anticipations of increases in the U.S. defense budget. Further evidence in favor of this hypothesis is provided by Figure 1 of Fisher and Peters' (2009) paper, which shows that contractor sales started increasing several years before U.S. military spending increased.

¹⁶ These results also hold in a variety of specifications. For example, when I limit the sample to 1981:3 – 2008:4 so that the news shock variable refers only to federal spending, I find similar results.

¹⁷ Several years ago, I had initially tried to construct a series based on defense stock returns, but had abandoned it when I realized that defense stocks did not perform better during WWII and the Korean War. Fisher and Peters wisely limited their sample to the post-Korean War period.

Fisher and Peters (2009) show that after a shock to the cumulative excess returns to defense contractor stocks during the post-Korean War period, government spending begins rising almost immediately, reaches a new plateau after 10 quarters, and shows little indication of falling for at least 20 quarters. On the other hand, output, hours, and consumption either stay constant or decline for five quarters, and then rise with a hump-shape. The consumption response is not significantly different from zero at conventional levels, though.¹⁸ On the other hand, real wages fall significantly and then become indistinguishable from zero. Their multiplier is estimated to be 1.5.

Thus, the shocks identified from Fisher and Peters' (2009) defense stocks excess returns imply much more persistent rises in government spending and much higher multipliers than implied by most other shocks studied, including those from a standard VAR, the defense news variable based on the narrative method, as well as professional forecast errors. In contrast, my new shock based on professional forecast errors implies more temporary changes in government spending and smaller multipliers than the other methods. Therefore, in order to understand why the responses of macroeconomic variables are different, it would be useful to analyze why the responses of government spending to the various shocks have such different persistence.

VI. Conclusions

This paper has explored possible explanations for the dramatically different results between standard VAR methods and the narrative approach for identifying shocks to government spending. I have shown that the main difference is that the narrative approach shocks appear to capture the timing of the news about future increases in government spending much better. In

¹⁸ Fisher and Peters (2009) show 68 percent confidence bands. As discussed earlier, there is no econometric basis for using this low level of significance for hypothesis testing.

fact, these shocks Granger-cause the VAR shocks. My theoretical results show how timing can account for all of the difference in the results across the two methods. Because the VAR approach captures the shocks too late, it misses the initial decline in consumption and real wages that occurs as soon as the news is learned. I show that delaying the timing on the Ramey-Shapiro dates replicates the VAR results.

Finally, I have constructed two new series of government spending shocks. The first series improves on the basic Ramey-Shapiro war dates by extending the analysis back to WWII and by computing the expected present discounted value of changes in government spending. This variable produces results that are qualitatively similar to those obtained from the simple war dates variable: in response to an increase in government spending, most measures of consumption and real wages fall. However, the implied multipliers are lower: the implied multiplier is unity when WWII is included and 0.6 to 0.8 when World War II is excluded. It should be understood that this multiplier is estimated on data in which distortionary taxes increase on average during a military build-up, and is not necessarily applicable to situations in which government spending is financed differently.

Since the defense news variable is much less informative for the most recent period, I also construct a second news series, based on forecast errors of professional forecasters. Shocks to this series imply that temporary rises in government spending generally lead to declines in output, hours, consumption and investment. Thus, none of my results indicate that government spending has multiplier effects beyond its direct effect.

Data Appendix

Construction of the New Military Series

See Ramey (2009) “Defense News Shocks, 1939-2008: Estimates Based on News Sources” for complete documentation.

Data for 1947 – 2008

Data on nominal GDP, quantity indexes of GDP, and price deflators for GDP and its components were extracted from bea.gov on August 30, 2009. The combined category of real consumption nondurables plus services was created using Wheelan’s (2000) method. The quarterly stock of consumer durables was created by interpolating annual data on the quantity index for the net stock of consumer durables with the quantity index of consumer durable purchases. The Denton module for Stata (Baum (2008)) was used to interpolate the annual change in the stock with purchases, and then was integrated.

The nominal wage and price index for business were extracted August 2009 from bls.gov productivity program.

The total hours data used in the baseline post-WWII regressions is from unpublished data from the BLS, kindly provided by Shawn Sprague.

Data for 1939 - 1946

NIPA Data: *National Income, 1954 Edition, A Supplement to the Survey of Current Business* presents quarterly nominal data on GNP and its components going back to 1939. Although the levels are somewhat different, the quarterly correlation of these data with modern data for the overlap between 1947 and 1953 is 0.999.

To create quarterly real GDP, I first constructed price deflators for various components. The price deflators that were available either monthly or quarterly were the Producer Price Index (available from FRED), the Consumer Price Index (total, nondurables, durables, and services), available from bls.gov, and the price index for manufacturing. For this latter series, I spliced together data from old *Survey of Current Business*’ with data from bls.gov, which was available from 1986. Based on quarterly regressions of log changes in the various deflators on log changes in these price indexes for 1947 through 1970, I used the following relationships. For each component of consumption, as well as total consumption, I used the relevant CPI index. For nonresidential investment deflator inflation, I used weights on 0.5 each on the CPI inflation and manufacturing inflation. For the residential investment deflator inflation, I used a weight of 0.7 on CPI inflation and 0.3 on manufacturing inflation. The total fixed investment deflator inflation was a weighted average of residential and nonresidential, with the weights varying over time depending on the ratio of nominal nonresidential investment to total fixed investment. For defense (as well as federal and total government spending), I used a weight of 0.3 on CPI inflation and 0.7 on manufacturing inflation. For GDP, I used a weighted average of CPI inflation and manufacturing inflation based on the ratios of the nominal values of defense and investment to GDP, and the component series weights on each type of inflation. Deflators were obtained taking exponentials of the integrated log changes. I used these constructed real

quantities to interpolate the quantity indexes for GDP and its components, extracted August 2009 from the BEA website, with the Baum (2008) Stata module of the proportional Denton method.

Hours: Kendrick (1961) reports annual civilian and total hours series extending back to the late 1800s. An advantage of Kendrick's civilian series is that it includes hours worked by "emergency workers" as part of the WPA, etc. Thus, I interpolate Kendrick's annual series to a quarterly series. I constructed several components for the quarterly interpolation. Various issues of the *Statistical Abstract* (available online through census.gov) report quarterly or monthly data on employed persons and average weekly hours of employment persons for civilians starting from the 1941:III through 1945. In 1946, ranges of hours were reported, so that average weekly hours could be constructed. Thus, a total hours series for civilians was constructed from these numbers from 1941:III – 1946:IV. However, this series did not include the hours of emergency workers. The number of employed civilians was reported from 1940:2 on, but average hours were not reported. For 1939:I to 1941:II, the only available series was civilian nonfarm employment. I used each of these pieces to interpolate the Kendrick civilian series to a quarterly frequency. (To preserve the seasonal factors from agriculture, I used the information on seasonality in farm hours after 1941 to reproduce the seasonality.) Because this series was based on household data, I spliced it to the CPS household series from 1947 on and seasonally adjusted the entire series using the Census' X12 program, allowing for outliers due to roving Easterns and Labor Days. The seasonally unadjusted CPS monthly data were collected by Cociuba, Prescott, and Ueberfeldt (2009).

The military hours series was available quarterly from unpublished BLS data from 1948 on. For 1939 to 1947, I inferred military hours from the annual number of active duty military, assuming that hours per military employee were the same as in 1948. I then interpolated the annual series. Note the hours estimated by the BLS, and hence my series, are about six percent higher than Kendrick's estimates of military hours. Siu (2008) argues that Kendrick underestimates military hours.

Tax Series

Barro and Redlick (2009) provide an update for the Barro-Sahasakul (1983) average marginal tax rate series through 2006. I had previously updated Alexander and Seater's (2009) series through 2007 using their programs. I assumed that the Barro-Redlick series changed by the same percent in 2007 as my update of the Alexander-Seater (2009) series and (for want of more information) was constant through 2008.

Survey of Professional Forecasters Series

The forecasts of federal spending from 1981:3 on are available online from the Philadelphia Federal Reserve. GDP deflator forecasts were also available online. Thomas Stark kindly provided the forecasts of defense spending from 1968:4 to 1981:2.

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**Table 1. Granger Causality Tests
1948:1 – 2008:4**

Hypothesis Tests	p-value in parenthesis
Do War dates Granger-cause VAR shocks?	Yes (0.017)
Do one-quarter ahead Professional Forecasts Granger-cause VAR shocks? 1981:3 – 2008:4	Yes (0.025)
Do four-quarter ahead Professional Forecasts Granger-cause VAR shocks? 1981:3 – 2008:4	Yes (0.016)
Do VAR shocks Granger-cause War dates?	No (0.148)

VAR shocks were estimated by regressing the log of real per capita government spending on 4 lags of itself, the Barro-Redlick tax rate, log real per capita GDP, log real per capita nondurable plus services consumption, log real per capita private fixed investment, log real per capita total hours worked, and log compensation in private business divided by the deflator for private business. Except for the professional forecasts, 4 lags were also used in the Granger-causality tests.

For the professional forecaster test, the VAR shock in period t is regressed on either the forecast made in period t-1 of the growth rate of real federal spending from t-1 to t for the forecast made in period t-4 of the growth from t-4 to t. The professional forecast regressions were estimated from 1981:3 to 2008:4 because this forecast was only available for that period.

The war dates are a variable that takes a value of unity at 1950:3, 1965:1, 1980:1, 2001:3.

Table 2. The “Defense News” Variable

Quarter	PDV of expected change in spending, billions of nominal \$	% of previous quarter GDP	Quarter	PDV of expected change in spending, billions of nominal \$	% of previous quarter GDP
1939q1	0.5	0.56	1961q4	-1	-0.18
1939q3	0.7	0.78	1962q1	2	0.36
1940q2	31.6	32.17	1963q3	-7.1	-1.16
1940q4	4.9	4.78	1964q1	-4.6	-0.73
1941q1	7	6.63	1965q1	2.2	0.33
1941q2	44.3	39.15	1965q2	1.4	0.20
1941q4	97	74.50	1965q3	14	1.98
1942q2	29	20.22	1966q2	1	0.13
1942q3	66.2	42.45	1966q3	11	1.41
1943q1	23	12.67	1966q4	21.8	2.75
1944q2	-34	-15.93	1967q1	38.8	4.81
1944q4	19.4	8.71	1967q2	6	0.73
1945q3	-41	-17.60	1967q3	3.8	0.46
1946q3	3.7	1.70	1967q4	-10	-1.19
1947q2	7.8	3.29	1968q1	5	0.59
1948q1	1.8	0.71	1968q2	-23.3	-2.65
1948q2	3.5	1.34	1970q1	-5	-0.50
1949q4	-2	-0.75	1970q2	-3	-0.29
1950q2	7.7	2.80	1973q3	-5	-0.36
1950q3	179.4	63.06	1973q4	5	0.36
1950q4	124	41.07	1976q1	4	0.23
1951q1	4.1	1.31	1977q3	-5	-0.25
1952q1	-0.5	-0.14	1979q1	11	0.46
1952q2	-4.6	-1.31	1980q1	169.1	6.36
1952q3	0.8	0.23	1981q1	74.5	2.56
1953q1	-7.5	-2.02	1986q4	-89.4	-1.99
1953q2	-4.4	-1.16	1988q1	-242	-4.96
1953q3	-11.7	-3.06	1988q4	-58.8	-1.14
1953q4	-1	-0.26	1989q4	-507.6	-9.17
1954q3	-5	-1.33	1990q4	112.1	1.92
1955q1	4.9	1.26	1991q4	-112.1	-1.86
1956q1	0.9	0.21	1999q1	15	0.17
1956q2	0.6	0.14	2001q3	97.1	0.94
1956q3	3	0.69	2002q1	296.3	2.86
1956q4	0.5	0.11	2002q3	93	0.88
1957q2	2.4	0.52	2003q1	123.8	1.15
1957q4	10.3	2.21	2003q3	41	0.37
1958q1	0.7	0.15	2003q4	78.2	0.69
1959q1	1.5	0.31	2004q2	25	0.22
1960q2	2.9	0.55	2005q1	100	0.82
1961q1	7.7	1.47	2006q2	227.7	1.73
1961q2	31.1	5.89	2007q4	739.3	5.21
1961q3	3.5	0.65	2008q4	-243.6	-1.67

Table 3. Explanatory Power of the Defense News Variable

	1	2	3
	R-squared	F-statistic	Marginal F-statistic
Defense Spending			
1939:1 – 2008:4	0.419	38.90	9.36
1947:1 – 2008:4	0.551	58.41	20.74
1955:1 – 2008:4	0.082	3.66	2.01
Government Spending			
1939:1 – 2008:4	0.410	37.58	9.00
1947:1 – 2008:4	0.518	51.15	19.65
1955:1 – 2008:4	0.037	1.60	0.429

Columns (1) and (2) show statistics from a regression of the growth of real per capita spending on current and four lags of the news shock divided by lagged nominal GDP. Column (3) shows the marginal F-statistic on current and four lags of the news variable in a regression of the growth of real per capita spending on four lags of the following additional variables: log real per capita spending, log real GDP, the 3-month T-bill rate, and the Barro-Redlick average marginal tax rate.

**Table 4. Explanatory Power of Professional Forecaster Errors
1968:4 – 2008:4**

	R-squared	F-statistic	Marginal F-statistic
Government Spending	0.596	233.2	201.64

See notes for Table 3. The news shock in this case is the difference between actual real spending growth (measured in logs) and forecasted growth, based on t-1 information. For 1968:4 – 1981:2, the shock pertains to defense spending; for 1981:3 – 2008:4, the shock pertains to all federal spending

Figure 1: Real Government Spending Per Capita
(in thousands of chained (2005) dollars)






Figure 2: Real Defense Spending Per Capita, Including WWII
(in thousands of chained (2005) dollars)



Figure 3: Components of Government Spending
Fraction of nominal GDP



**Figure 4A. Comparison of Identification Methods
Response to a government spending shock**

(Standard error bands are 68% confidence intervals)

VAR Shocks

War Dates














Figure 4B. Comparison of Identification Methods (continued)
Response to a government spending shock


(Standard error bands are 68% confidence intervals)

VAR Shocks

War Dates




**Figure 5A: Comparison of VAR Defense Shocks to Forecasts
Korea and Vietnam**




The top and middle panels are based on log per capita real defense spending on a quarterly calendar year basis. The bottom panels are nominal, annual data on a fiscal year basis.

**Figure 5B: Comparison of VAR Defense Shocks to Forecasts
Carter-Reagan and 9/11**



The top and middle panels are based on log per capita real defense spending on a quarterly calendar year basis. The bottom panels are nominal, annual data on a fiscal year basis.

Figure 5C: Survey of Professional Forecasters Predictions



The variable shown at time t is the forecast of the growth rate of real spending from quarter $t - 1$ to quarter $t + 4$.

Figure 6. The Theoretical Effect of an Increase in Government Spending Announced Two Quarters in Advance (variables in logarithms)




Figure 7A. The Effect of Missing the Timing

Based on trivariate VARs on model simulations in which government spending changes are anticipated two quarter in advance

Shocks to actual government spending

Shocks to news about government spending




Figure 7B. The Effect of Missing the Timing

Based on trivariate VARs on model simulations in which government spending changes are anticipated two quarter in advance

Shocks to actual government spending

Shocks to news about government spending








Figure 8. The Effect of Mistiming the Ramey-Shapiro Dates
 (The Ramey-Shapiro dates are shifted later to coincide with the large positive VAR shocks in 1951:1, 1965:3 1981:4 2003:2)
 (Standard error bands are 68% confidence intervals)




Figure 9. Defense News: PDV of Change in Spending as a % of GDP




Figure 10A. The Effect of an Expected Change in Defense Spending, 1939-2008
 (Both 68% and 95% standard error bands are shown)




Figure 10B. The Effect of an Expected Change in Defense Spending, 1939-2008
 (Both 68% and 95% standard error bands are shown)




Figure 11A. Comparison of the Effect of Defense Shocks with and without WWII
 (Blue solid line: 1939 - 2008; green dashed line: 1947 - 2008)




Figure 11B. Comparison of the Effect of Defense Shocks with and without WWII
 (Blue solid line: 1939 - 2008; green dashed line: 1947 - 2008)




Figure 12A. The Effect of a Government Spending Shock, 1969-2008
Forecast Errors Based on Survey of Professional Forecasters
 (Both 68% and 95% standard error bands are shown)




Figure 12B. The Effect of a Government Spending Shock, 1969-2008
Forecast Errors Based on Survey of Professional Forecasters
 (Both 68% and 95% standard error bands are shown)

